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ABSTRACT 
Historians have long viewed American department stores as barometers of social 
change, anchors of modern urban life, and purveyors of a new kind of consumer capitalist 
culture. In its heyday, from the late nineteenth century to the middle twentieth century, 
the department store was all of these things, but it was also much more. This dissertation 
draws on business, government, and family papers to reveal how a new kind of 
businessman, the department store retailer, pioneered powerful political and trade 
networks that were deeply embedded in Washington and stretched across the Atlantic 
into the increasingly volatile capitals of Europe. As campaign contributors, trade policy 
advisors, and political appointees, retailers like John Wanamaker, Isidor Straus, Louis 
Kirstein, and Ira Hirschmann regularly moved through the inner circles of the national 
government. They could just as easily be found on Capitol Hill, or at trade offices located 
in London or Paris, as behind their own desks in the upper floors of Wanamaker’s or 
Filene’s. Retailers’ command of vast transatlantic trade networks, now largely forgotten, 
made them key participants in pressing debates about everything from tariff reform and 
economic recovery to wartime mobilization and the plight of refugees. Yet retailers 
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approached politics and commerce with profoundly different sensibilities than executives 
at other major American corporations, such as Ford, United Fruit, or Coca Cola. In the 
retail industry, commercial expansion depended not on the domination of foreign markets 
and foreign workers, but rather on transnational cooperation and the development of 
policies and business methods that upheld both the sovereignty and distinctiveness of 
other nations—and their goods. In this complex era, as the imperatives of trade routinely 
collided with politics and other large forces, from devastating world wars and widespread 
depression to the rise of new radical ideologies, retailers did much more than market 
desire. They brokered vital connections between Americans, Washington, and the world. 
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INTRODUCTION  
American Retailers in Washington and the World:  
A New Vision for American Department Stores 
 
 
Historians have long viewed American department stores as barometers of social 
change, anchors of modern urban life, and purveyors of a new kind of consumer capitalist 
culture. In its heyday, from the late nineteenth century to the middle twentieth century, 
the department store was all of these things, but it was also much more. This dissertation 
reveals how department store retailers pioneered powerful political and trade networks 
that were grounded in Washington and stretched across the Atlantic into the increasingly 
volatile capitals of Europe. As campaign contributors, trade policy advisors, and political 
appointees, retailers moved through the inner circles of the national government. Their 
command of vast transatlantic trade networks made them key participants in pressing 
debates about everything from tariff reform and economic recovery to wartime 
mobilization and the plight of refugees. Yet retailers approached politics and commerce 
with profoundly different sensibilities than executives at other major American 
corporations, such as Ford, United Fruit, or Coca Cola. In the retail industry, commercial 
expansion depended not on the domination of foreign markets and foreign workers, but 
rather on transnational cooperation and the development of policies and business methods 
that upheld both the sovereignty and distinctiveness of other nations—and their goods. In 
this complex era, as the imperatives of trade routinely collided with politics and other 
large forces, from devastating world wars and widespread depression to the rise of new 
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radical ideologies, retailers did much more than market desire. They brokered vital 
connections between Americans, Washington, and the world.1 
To unveil a new kind of department store history, this dissertation puts forward 
five key arguments. The first is that retailers at these establishments were deeply 
embedded in Washington politics. This now forgotten connection was forged early in the 
history of the business. On the eve of the American Civil War Alexander T. Stewart, who 
has often been labeled the “father” of American department stores, lent his money and 
influence to a secretive “Committee of Fifteen” that worked to oppose sectionalism in 
congress and to keep trade open between northern and southern states. After the war 
Stewart led a fundraising campaign for Republican presidential candidate Ulysses S. 
Grant and received an appointment to serve as Secretary of the Treasury. When congress 
blocked the appointment, citing the 1789 Establishment Act, which prohibited persons 
involved in the “business of trade and commerce” from holding such a position, the aging 
Stewart settled for chairing the U.S. Government Commission to the 1867 Paris 
                                                      
1 Some of the most influential studies centered on American department stores include William Leach, 
Land of Desire: Merchants, Power, and the Rise of a New American Culture (New York: Pantheon Books, 
1993); Vicki Howard, From Main Street to Mall: The Rise and Fall of the American Department Store 
(Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015); Richard Longstreth, The American Department 
Store Transformed, 1920-1960 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2010); Elaine Abelson, When 
Ladies Go A-Thieving: Middle-Class Shoplifters in the Victorian Department Store (London: University of 
Oxford Press, 1989); Susan Porter Benson, Counter Cultures: Saleswomen, Managers, and Customers in 
American Department Stores, 1890-1940 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1988) and Jan Whitaker, 
Service and Style: How the American Department Store Fashioned the Middle Class (New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 2006). Key works on department store culture outside the United States include: Michael B. 
Miller, The Bon Marché: Bourgeois Culture and the Department Store, 1869-1920 (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1994; Erika Diane Rappaport, Shopping for Pleasure: Women in the Making of London’s 
West End (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000); Geoffrey Crossick and Serge Jaumin, eds., 
Cathedrals of Consumption: The European Department Store, 1850-1939 (London: Ashgate, 1999).  
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Exposition. In 1884, Oscar Straus of Macy’s department store similarly served as 
secretary for a national committee of businessmen devoted to raising funds for 
Democratic presidential candidate Grover Cleveland. Once Cleveland was in the White 
House he appointed Straus U.S. Minister to the Ottoman Empire. Oscar’s brother Isidor, 
who remained at the helm of Macy’s, also had Cleveland’s ear and traveled back and 
forth between Washington and New York to advise the president on the hottest political 
issue of the decade: tariff reform. At the height of his political influence during 
Cleveland’s second administration, New York Democrats all but begged Isidor to run for 
a seat in the U.S. House of Representatives. He agreed, and he won. John Wanamaker, 
too, raised campaign funds to find a path into politics. In 1888 he chaired the finance 
committee for the National Republican Party and raised substantial sums on behalf of 
Benjamin Harrison’s presidential bid. In turn, Harrison appointed Wanamaker Postmaster 
General, which gave him a place in the president’s cabinet. As Wanamaker grew to 
become the most influential retailer in the country by the turn of the century, he retained 
his connections to the Republican Party and continued to influence national elections and 
trade policies.2  
                                                      
2 Steven N. Elias, Alexander T. Stewart: The Forgotten Merchant Prince (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1992); 
Oscar S. Straus, Under Four Administrations, From Cleveland to Taft, Recollections of Oscar S. Straus 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1922); Isidor Straus, The Autobiography of Isidor Straus, ed. Joan Adler  
(Smithtown: Straus Historical Society, Inc. 2011); Also see Isidor Straus Personal & Business Letters, 
Boxes 2 & 3, Isidor Straus Papers, Straus Historical Society; Herbert Adams Gibbons, John Wanamaker, 
vols. 1 & 2 (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1926); Richard White, “The Bull Moose and the Bear: 
Theodore Roosevelt and John Wanamaker Struggle Over the Spoils,” Pennsylvania History: A Journal of 
Mid-Atlantic Studies 71 (2004): 1-24. 
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When the United States entered the First World War in 1917, the state’s inability 
to meet the needs of wartime mobilization on its own opened up new opportunities for 
retailers to win government appointments and gain political influence. None took better 
advantage of that fact, or contributed more in terms of national service, than Louis 
Kirstein of Filene’s department store in Boston. Kirstein was appointed Chairman of the 
Board of Control for Labor Standards, which oversaw major supply contracts for the U.S. 
Army. While in Washington, he worked under the supervision of Brigadier General 
Robert E. Wood, who would go on to become perhaps the most influential executive in 
the history of Sears Roebuck Co. Kirstein remained closely tied to the Democratic Party 
and backed Franklin D. Roosevelt for president in 1933. Just months after entering the 
oval office, Roosevelt appointed Kirstein to the Industrial Advisory Board, created under 
the auspices of the National Recovery Act, and the Boston retailer spent many months in 
Washington developing national codes to control prices and wages in the retail industry. 
Jesse Isidor Straus, son of Isidor Straus and his successor as President of Macy’s, was 
also an enthusiastic and wealthy backer of Roosevelt and (like his Uncle Oscar before 
him) he accepted the president’s appointment to serve as the U.S. Ambassador to France 
in 1933. National mobilization for the Second World War once again opened doors for a 
new generation of retailers, including Kirstein’s son George, a vice president at 
Bloomingdale’s who served as the Executive Secretary of the National War Labor Board 
before shipping off to the South Pacific. Another Bloomingdale’s executive, Ira 
Hirschmann, who helped run Fiorello La Guardia’s several successful mayoral 
campaigns in New York City, also leveraged his connections in Washington to land a 
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position on Roosevelt’s War Refugee Board in 1944. From that position, he helped tens 
of thousands of Jewish refugees escape near certain death in Nazi concentration camps 
located throughout the Balkans.3  
Scholars have tended to refer to businessmen like Wanamaker, Kirstein, Straus, 
and Hirschmann, as merchants. But these men actually pioneered a new kind of 
businessman: the retailer. Merchants, as Americans had long understood the label, had 
been a person who engaged in trade; they traveled extensively, often across oceans, to 
buy and sell goods for some company or other wealthy entity. A merchant’s life was 
exciting, filled with adventure and intrigue, and proximity to wealth and power. Over 
time, however, English speakers began to use the term interchangeably with “peddler,” to 
indicate a person who traveled door-to-door selling goods—a much more local and 
humbler kind of merchant. In 1871, for example, the title of Horatio Alger’s dime novel 
Paul the Peddler; Or, The Adventures of a Young Street Merchant employs both terms to 
frame the trials of fourteen year-old Paul who hawked candy on the streets of New York 
to support his widowed mother. Then, as large-scale commerce changed the appearance 
of city streets in the late nineteenth century, many began to differentiate between peddlers 
who moved through neighborhoods and merchants who owned fixed places of business. 
                                                      
3 There are no published biographies of Louis Kirstein. On Kirstein and WWI, see correspondence in 
multiple folders (especially “Overseas Correspondence” and “Personal”) in Box 37, Louis E. Kirstein 
Papers, Harvard’s Baker Library [hereafter LEK HBL]. Kirstein’s political work in the 1930s is more 
extensively covered in chapters four and five; James C. Worthy, Shaping An American Institution: Robert 
E. Wood and Sears, Roebuck (New York: New American Library, 1986);on Jesse Isidor Straus, see Jesse 
Isidor Straus Papers, Straus Historical Society; also see “R.H. Macy,” Box 86, LEK HBL; On George 
Kirstein, see: “I.A. Hirschmann,” Box 84, LEK HBL; on Hirschmann, see Ira Hirschmann, Caution to the 
Winds (New York: D. McKay Co., 1962);also see: Ira Hirschmann Papers & War Refugee Board Records, 
Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library. 
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Paul the Peddler went to print at the start of this sweeping transition. By the end of the 
novel young Paul finds success by landing a position at a “fixed” street stand selling 
neckties. “He was not a merchant prince, to be sure,” Alger wrote in the conclusion, “but 
he had a fixed place of business.” Alger titled the second installment in Paul’s story, Slow 
and Sure; Or, From the Sidewalk to the Shop (1872). By the turn of the twentieth 
century, many believed that commercial success could be tracked in a progression from 
outside to inside, or from movement to fixity. The greatest of the so-called “merchant 
princes,” owners of America’s iconic “palaces of consumption,” wholeheartedly 
endorsed this narrative. When Wanamaker opened his signature flagship store in the 
center of Philadelphia in 1911, he celebrated its sheer scale—forty-five acres of floor 
space for shoppers to roam—as the most tangible symbol of his commercial success. 
Little more than fifty years later, amid the decline of modern department stores across the 
country, one of the earliest histories of American retailing cemented the same narrative in 
its title, From Peddlers to Merchant Princes: A History of Selling in America (1967). 
This theme has been so pervasive in department store histories that most scholars have 
written about Wanamaker and his peers as though their work only rarely took them 
beyond their flagship stores; as if the buying and selling of goods took place within the 
limits of a single city block.4 
                                                      
4 Horatio Alger, Paul the Peddler; Or, The Adventures of a Young Street Merchant (New York: Hurst & 
Company, 1903) and Slow and Sure; Or, From the Sidewalk to the Shop (New York: A.K. Loring, 1872); 
Penrose Scull and Prescott C. Fuller, From Peddlers to Merchant Princes: A History of Selling in America 
(Chicago: Follet Publishing Co., 1967).  See also “merchant, n. and adj.,” OED Online (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2016).  
  
7
To call the executives who populate these pages merchants is to fundamentally 
misrepresent their work as fixed or contained by the flagship stores they built, when, in 
fact, it was far more dynamic and expansive. Industry leaders increasingly styled 
themselves as retailers during the second decade of the twentieth century to capture the 
modern, changing nature of their work and their multifaceted roles as businessmen. When 
President William Howard Taft gave a keynote address from the Grand Court inside 
Wanamaker’s new flagship building in 1911, he called Wanamaker the “greatest 
merchant in America.” But during the very same year, industry leaders agreed to call 
their first nationwide trade organization the National Retail Dry Goods Association (now 
the National Retail Federation). “Retail” appeared with increasing frequency in the titles 
of popular trade journals, books, and manuals, from the monthly organ, The Modern 
Retailer (est. 1915) to the widely read study by Dr. Paul H. Nystrom, The Economics of 
Retailing (1917), and the Butler Brothers’ handbook, Success in Retailing: The Variety 
Business (1920). By the 1930s, references to “dry goods” and “merchants” began to fall 
away from industry labels altogether. When President Roosevelt ordered the development 
of new codes to regulate department stores, he called them “retail codes,” and when 
Kirstein spearheaded the organization of a powerful lobbying group that attracted over 
one million members nationwide in 1935, he called it the American Retail Federation. 
When Kirstein died at age seventy-five in 1942, tributes more often described him as 
“one of the nation’s leading department store executives,” a “chief executive,” or a “Vice 
President,” than as a merchant. By then, common associations with “merchants” bore 
little resemblance to the kind of work undertaken by leading retailers like Kirstein, who 
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could just as easily be found at trade offices located in London or Paris or even on 
Capitol Hill, as behind their own desks in the upper floors of their flagship stores.5 
Department store executives did not just nurture connections to Washington 
politics. The second key argument of this dissertation is that they also built extensive and 
consequential overseas networks that have never been thoroughly studied.  Now largely 
forgotten, these international dimensions to the department store business appeared 
obvious to Americans at the time. Establishments like Marshall Field’s, one writer argued 
in 1893, were “mechanism[s] that worked from day to day and from year to year, in all 
parts of the earth.”6 Again these connections began early. Already in the middle of the 
nineteenth century, A. T. Stewart managed small import offices attached to 
manufacturers based in Paris, Lyons, Manchester, Nottingham, Belfast, Glasgow, and 
Berlin.7 By the 1890s the nation’s leading department stores, including Wanamaker’s and 
Macy’s, maintained large trade offices in Paris and regularly sent buyers to 
manufacturing centers throughout Britain and into Central Europe, especially to 
Germany. Department stores that could not afford to keep proprietary trade offices 
abroad contracted with foreign commissionaire firms to represent their interests in 
Europe’s markets and regularly sent visiting American buyers across the Atlantic to work 
directly with commissionaires. In the years following the First World War, every major 
American department store owned at least a share in cooperative trade offices scattered 
                                                      
5 See: “Louis E. Kirstein Dies in Boston at 75,” Jewish Telegraphic Agency, December 11, 1942; Benjamin 
M. Selekman, “Louis Edward Kirstein,” American Jewish Yearbook, 35 (1943-44): 35-46. 
6 William Osborn Stoddard, Men of Business (New York: Scribner’s Sons, 1893), 293. 
7 Letter from unknown author, July 23, 1869, “Additions 130-D,” Box 1, Alexander Turney Stewart 
Papers, New York Public Library. Also see Elias, The Forgotten Merchant Prince. 
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across Europe. Filene’s, for example, entered into cooperative trade offices located in 
Paris, London, Berlin, Vienna, Zurich, Brussels, Belfast, Chenmitz, Gablonz, and 
Florence. “The world is our hunting ground!” a Filene’s advertisement boasted in 1929. 8  
Of course, in their references to “all parts of the earth” and “the world,” what 
Americans really meant during this period was Europe. For better and for worse, Europe 
marked the center of the American retail trade during the first half of the twentieth 
century. Although many retailers established trade offices in other parts of the world, 
principally in Yokohama, Tokyo, Shanghai, and Beijing, none of the offices in these 
cities rivaled those in Paris, London, and Berlin. In nearly every measure, from staff size 
to operating and buying budgets, trade offices in Europe towered over their counterparts 
in Asia. As Director of the Foreign Office Committee of the AMC Kirstein kept in 
regular touch with trade managers in Europe, sometimes on a daily basis, by mail, 
telegraph, and occasionally by telephone. By contrast, only one very slight folder of 
correspondence documents his relationship with the trade manager of the offices in 
Yokohama and Tokyo. Europe was much closer to Boston and New York both in 
physical terms—retailers thought nothing of spending one week on board a steamship to 
visit Paris—but also in cultural terms. Americans adored the fanciful eastern flares of 
styles said to originate in China and Japan, but most of these fashions came from the 
ateliers of Paris designers and were inspired by their ideas about far-off lands they had 
likely never visited. Moreover, as this dissertation shows, the extensive involvement of 
                                                      
8 Advertisement, 1929, “Miscellaneous Photos,” 11 Drawer 4, Filene’s Marketing Archive, Boston Public 
Library.  
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the American retail trade in the capitals of Europe in an age when warfare twice 
devastated the continent would implicate department stores in a wide array of 
international currents from transatlantic relief efforts to anti-Nazi boycotts. 9 
As transatlantic retail trade brought retailers into close touch with the capitals of 
Europe, this in turn reinforced their connections to Washington. Retailers had a stake in 
shaping foreign policy debates because matters such as tariff rates greatly affected their 
business. Both Isidor Straus and Wanamaker spent considerable time advising their 
party’s leaders on foreign trade policies, stumping for candidates whom they believed 
would most benefit the American retail business, and pouring contributions into their 
campaign coffers. Like the majority of industry leaders who followed him, Straus was a 
resolute Democrat and proponent of free trade. Wanamaker, too, despite his almost pious 
devotion to the Republican Party, favored progressive tariff reforms—just not quite to the 
lower levels that Democrats preferred.  
Regular access to foreign trade offices also kept retailers in close touch with 
diplomats and consular officials stationed in Europe, some of whom later became 
important figures in Washington. In 1933, for example, the manager of Filene’s 
cooperative trade office in Germany, developed a relationship with then Consul General 
at Berlin, George S. Messersmith. When Messersmith became Assistant Secretary of 
State under Roosevelt in 1937 he proved to be one of Kirstein’s most valuable allies in 
helping individual refugees escape Nazi Germany. Finally, as major importers of foreign 
                                                      
9 Kristin Hoganson, Consumers’ Imperium: The Global Production of American Domesticity, 1865-1920 
(Chapel Hill: University of Carolina Press, 2007), 13-104. 
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goods, retailers were generally supportive of reciprocity agreements and other measures 
designed to stabilize American foreign relations and maintain peace in Europe. No 
American retailer more vigorously embraced those principles than Kirstein’s oft-studied 
colleague, the irascible visionary, Edward Filene. An avid supporter of Woodrow Wilson, 
Filene was regarded in Europe as a kind of plenipotentiary, though he never held an 
official diplomatic post. Filene ardently backed the formation of the International 
Chamber of Commerce in 1919, established a widely publicized European Peace Prize in 
1924 (he received 15,000 entries), and helped to found the International Management 
Institute for the promotion of modern business techniques globally.10 In more subtle 
ways, too, retailers welcomed the improvement of foreign relations through trade. In 
1934, when Austrian trade officials visited the United States calling for more balance in 
Austro-American trade relations, they argued that it was “the key” to peace in Europe. In 
New York City, retailers honored the legation with a luncheon at the Waldorf-Astoria; 
two years later, Americans were awash in Austrian fashions. 
The third claim of this dissertation is that the nature of retailers’ business abroad 
allowed them to move through the world with a different set of sensibilities than 
executives at other major corporations. American retailers did not seek to export or sell 
products, ideas, or even business models to Europeans. Nor, did they aim to exploit 
foreign workers in order to make, process, or sell products under brand-names now 
                                                      
10 Victoria de Grazia, Irresistible Empire: America’s Advance Through Twentieth Century Europe 
(Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2006), 133-34. Filene is also a central figure in Meg Jacobs, Pocketbook 
Politics: Economic Citizenship in Twentieth-Century America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2005).  
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synonymous with the history of American commercial hegemony in the twentieth 
century, such as Ford Motor Co., United Fruit, Coca Cola, or even Hollywood. Recent 
studies of major American corporations have revealed the destructive and violent sides of 
commercial expansion in the twentieth century. When Henry Ford attempted to export an 
entire Midwestern town, tennis courts included, to the Amazon River basin in the name 
of vertical integration, he instead brought a blight upon the rubber trees, the region, and 
his own workers. Similarly, when United Fruit exported and enforced a Jim Crow labor 
system in Latin America, the company was thrust to the forefront of virulent labor 
conflicts and undermined stability in the region. The histories of these corporations have 
folded neatly into a narrative that casts American commercial expansion as imperial, a 
force that, as Victoria de Grazia has persuasively argued, undermined the sovereignty of 
other nations and shaped a “market empire” that displaced older methods of foreign 
conquest. The “outward thrust” model of American history, or “Americanization of the 
world” paradigm, has been central to studies that have situated Americans abroad, 
whether they were doing business, philanthropy, diplomacy, conducting military 
operations, or even just traveling. However, the American retail trade established a 
fundamentally different pattern. To cast foreign trade offices as imperial outposts would 
be to miss the unique role they played as cultural and commercial contact zones.11 
                                                      
11 Kristin Hoganson offers an overview of the “outward thrust” model in the introduction to Consumers’ 
Imperium. Also see: Jason M. Colby, The Business of Empire: United Fruit, Race, and U.S. Expansion in 
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America’s Advance Through Twentieth Century Europe (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2006); Frank 
Costigliola, Awkward Dominion: American Political, Economic and Cultural Relations With Europe, 1919-
1933 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984);  Greg Grandin, Fordlandia (New York: Metropolitan Books, 
2009); Robert Bruce Davies, Peacefully Working to Conquer the World: Singer Sewing Machines in 
Foreign Markets, 1854-1920 (New York, Arno Press, 1976); Emily S. Rosenberg, Spreading the American 
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Retailers viewed alliances with their foreign counterparts as vital to the success of 
their trade and, equally important, their business depended on upholding the unique 
qualities, customs, and characteristics particular to the nations and regions of Europe. As 
Kristin Hoganson has shown, Americans in this era wanted identifiably foreign imports 
to adorn their homes and wardrobes. Such objects said important things about 
Americans’ connections to other people and places, and so it was in retailers’ interest not 
to dominate foreign markets or impose their own visions on foreign buyers. Only for two 
brief periods in 1911-12 and in 1932 did “buy national” movements stimulate widespread 
interest in the purchase of goods because they were in some way distinctively American; 
otherwise, New Yorkers and San Franciscans alike craved imports, or at least the 
appearance of authentic foreign influence on their merchandise, from dresses inspired by 
the designs of Poiret and Callot to sweaters that reflected the folk traditions of the 
Austrian Alps. In order to bring the most authentic foreign goods at the best prices into 
their stores, retailers worked to establish partnerships in the capitals of Europe and staffed 
their trade offices with local managers and buyers. When Kirstein or a buyer from 
Filene’s spent time at their foreign offices the permanent local staff regarded them as 
visitors; and they were, in every sense of the term. Local resident buyers knew the 
language, customs, and expectations of the designers and manufacturers in their region. 
They helped visiting American buyers to negotiate headline-making merchandise deals 
and they had the power to withhold or obstruct those opportunities. At Filene’s 
                                                      
Dream: American Economic and Cultural Expansion, 1890-1945 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1982);  
Reinhold Wagnleitner,Coca Colonization and the Cold War: The Cultural Mission of the United States in 
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cooperative trade office in Paris, which the firm shared with nearly two dozen other 
department stores that joined together under the auspices of the Associated 
Merchandising Corporation (AMC), local French buyers facilitated a major deal for a 
large order of French frocks at unprecedented low prices in 1923. Not one of the visiting 
American buyers involved in the deal spoke French and Parisian manufacturers did not 
conduct business in English—local French buyers played a pivotal role in the deal from 
beginning to end. Although cooperation at foreign trade offices was not always the rule 
of the day, for American retailers, it was always the goal. 
The fourth key finding of this dissertation is that while Wanamaker was the 
undisputed leader of the national retail industry before the First World War, a new class 
of predominantly Jewish retailers moved to center stage in its aftermath. Without a doubt, 
Wanamaker ran one of the largest retail businesses in the country, but there were others 
that competed on the same scale, such as Marshall Field’s, Macy’s, and Gimbels. To a 
greater extent than sales volumes or the grandeur of flagship buildings, however, political 
influence and transatlantic trade determined industry leadership. Having served as 
Postmaster General from 1888-1892, the “Honorable” (his official title) John Wanamaker 
amassed more national political influence than any other retailer, and he hobnobbed with 
presidents and congressmen in Washington all his life. In addition, Wanamaker’s ran one 
of the first and most impressive trade offices in Paris, beginning in 1888. The firm always 
carried the latest in haute couture, regularly secured deals for exclusive Paris styles, and 
even remade entire sales floors in stores back in the United States to look like the 
fashionable rue de la Paix. Scholars have often attributed Wanamaker’s tremendous 
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influence to his innovations in advertising and his ability to generate headline-making 
spectacles, but these alone were not what made Wanamaker the center of attention. 
Plenty of retailers developed great advertising and drew crowds to their stores through 
one demonstration or another, but no one could compete with Wanamaker in Washington 
or in Paris; his unparalleled success in both capitals commanded attention from his peers.  
When Wanamaker died at the age of 84 in 1922, the American retail trade abroad 
was in the midst of sweeping changes. Prior to the First World War, only a few large 
firms could compete with Wanamaker’s in Paris, but with the establishment of the AMC, 
dozens of stores across the country gained access to the best imported fashions at even 
lower prices. Through the rise of group buying and cooperative trade offices in Europe, 
smaller stores across the country from Filene’s of Boston and Bloomingdale’s of New 
York to J. L. Hudson Co. of Detroit and the Emporium of San Francisco could under-buy 
retail giants like Wanamaker’s, even in the highly competitive markets in Paris. In the 
twenties and thirties, AMC member executives such as Kirstein, Filene, and Hirschmann 
moved to the center of the industry. Their stores set the model for others to follow and, 
with a few exceptions, they were almost all Jewish. 
In part, but not just because so many of the industry’s most influential executives 
were Jewish, no field of American commerce was as deeply shaken by the rise of Adolf 
Hitler and the spread of Nazism across Europe as that of department stores. Extensive 
trade networks in Berlin in Vienna made American retailers important targets for anti-
Nazi boycotters, even as those same connections granted executives like Kirstein and 
Hirschmann privileged access to the capital cities in which Europe’s Jews were most 
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devastated by Nazi terrorism. In the thirties, Kirstein approached the level of political 
influence and trade dominance that Wanamaker wielded around the turn of the century. 
Not only had Kirstein accepted political appointments in both the Wilson and Roosevelt 
administrations, he had also served many terms on the executive board of the country’s 
most influential Jewish organization, the American Jewish Committee (AJCOMM). As 
Hitler tightened his grip on Europe, American department stores emerged as profoundly 
important crossroads in which the imperatives of trade and politics were routinely pitted 
against each other. As the influence of Nazism spread and as debates over how 
Americans ought to respond to crisis facing Europe’s Jews, many American retailers, 
with Kirstein in the lead, prioritized the free trade policies of the Democratic Party over 
the principles of the anti-Nazi boycott movement, and many continued to purchase goods 
in or send them through Berlin. Even for retailers who complied with the boycott, 
however, shutting down an office in Germany only meant shifting the center of vibrant 
regional trade networks to Austria, where a quasi-fascist government was heavily 
invested in exporting a vision of their country that was wholly consistent with Nazi 
attitudes. By the middle thirties the American retail trade was so entrenched in Central 
Europe that retailers and buyers could not escape Nazism even when they tried to get 
beyond its reach.  
Yet at the same time, a handful of retailers, especially those connected with the 
AMC, used their access to trade offices and longstanding connections to U.S. consular 
officials stationed throughout the Third Reich to intervene in the refugee crisis. In the 
case of both Kirstein and Hirschmann, their interventions carried enough political clout to 
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save lives. That Kirstein could call on Messersmith to expedite visas for select refugees, 
and that Hirschmann could successfully convince State Department officials to place him 
on the nascent War Refugee Board, had everything to do with their leadership in the retail 
industry and importance in Jewish and Democratic circles. The demographic shift in the 
industry after the First World War brought with it important implications for retailers’ 
trade within the increasingly violent and volatile transatlantic networks in the thirties; 
there is perhaps no more fertile field for study of Nazism and American business. 
 The final argument of this dissertation is that retailers played a pivotal role in 
creating what scholars have variously called American “consumer society,” the 
“consumer sphere,” or the “consumers’ republic.” There is little question that sometime 
between 1880 and the end of the Second World War the act of consuming goods became 
a central, if not defining feature of what it meant to be an American citizen. During this 
period a great many Americans traded their small town farms for city life and 
increasingly, money, not land or skills, separated the haves from the have-nots. More and 
more Americans came to think about democracy in terms of their ability to buy things, 
and, in the words of progressive reformer Herbert Croly, “comfort and prosperity” 
emerged as more central to the promise of American life than either political or economic 
freedom. “Consumerism,” some historians have argued, surpassed religion and politics as 
the dominant form of public life in the early twentieth century, and even religious 
holidays became extravagant commercial affairs centered on the buying of gifts. Many 
studies have emphasized the more destructive aspects of consumer society, that is, how 
consumption diminished the value of work, drove economic inequality, eclipsed 
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traditions that once fostered social solidarity, and reinforced an array of discriminatory 
practices that greatly disadvantaged non-whites. At the same time, Americans have often 
used their buying power as consumers to great advantage. Immigrants wore cheap 
readymade clothes to appear more American, women shopped to establish a public 
presence, and Americans across the spectrum called for boycotts or demanded bargains to 
serve a wide range of political and economic needs. Yet, for all their power and 
influence, consumers did not shop in a vacuum. They did not create the marketplace, nor 
did they control what appeared on store shelves or how those items were marketed and 
priced; retailers did. At every turn, consumers acted within, alongside, or against the 
retailers who had shipped merchandise into the so-called consumer sphere in the first 
place.12 
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To reimagine flagship buildings as the central hubs of vast transatlantic trade 
networks deeply entrenched in national debates and international conflicts is to render 
visible the economic and political conditions that constrained the marketplace. 
Consumers browsing the little French Store filled with lingerie at Wanamaker’s, or 
admiring the Alpine ski fashions displayed alongside an antique coal-burning stove at 
Bloomingdale’s, shopped at the nexus of trade and politics. It was not just glass, light, 
and color that dazzled, as William Leach and others have argued, but also the way those 
flagship institutions brokered Americans’ connections to Washington, war, and the 
broader transatlantic world. In the zeal to recover the history of consumers and move 
them to the center of studies in twentieth century American history, scholars have 
neglected the other people and processes that shaped the marketplace. That is, the 
retailers and buyers who sourced the goods, brought them across the Atlantic, and 
marketed them to Americans. With this new vision of retailers as political players in 
Washington and influential traders abroad, consumption, too, emerges as a decidedly less 
provincial act, and even more central to American public life.  
 
 
*** 
 
This dissertation traces the story of how department stores and their retailers 
shaped politics and trade in the age of world wars in five roughly chronological chapters.  
Chapter one uncovers Wanamaker’s close ties to the Republican Party, and to President 
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William Howard Taft in particular. Taft emerged as a presidential candidate in favor of 
moderate tariff reform at a moment when foreign trade policies threatened to divide the 
GOP and when many Americans suffered from what they called the high cost of living. 
As a fellow proponent of moderate tariff reductions, Wanamaker backed both of Taft’s 
campaigns and felt the sting of the president’s failure to see his reform agenda through 
congress in 1909. In the wake of that failure, department stores became central 
battlegrounds in a larger debate over the high cost of living and cultural nationalism—
that is, whether a singular American style or culture might be developed to stand apart 
from foreign influences. As a leading Republican and a major importer of Paris fashions, 
Wanamaker was trapped in a vise between bargain hunters and fashion nationalists. 
Despite widespread pressure on retailers to sell low-cost and uniquely American goods, 
Wanamaker held steadfast to his longstanding connections in the high-end Paris trade. 
Even as he developed new low-priced initiatives and reframed his stores as allies to 
consumers in the battle against the high cost of living, Wanamaker never capitulated to 
the anti-Paris rhetoric of fashion nationalists. Although many American retailers 
eventually began to promote American-made goods alongside Paris designs, for 
Wanamaker these celebrations of American workmanship reflected his fears about 
Democratic financial reforms rather than any allegiance to fashion nationalism. If there 
was to be any sense of a national culture in fashion, retailers ensured that it would have 
more to do with low prices than the national origins of goods. On the eve of the First 
World War, the Paris trade continued to dominate the American retail industry. 
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Wanamaker remained devoted to the Republican Party throughout the First World 
War, but after 1914 developments across the Atlantic provided the dominant frame for 
his business decisions and reshaped his political priorities. Chapter two reveals how 
department stores connected Americans to the war as it unfolded abroad. Although the 
war threatened crucial transatlantic supply lines, retail buyers ensured that Americans 
continued to receive Paris fashions, which they now cast not as desirable tastes of 
aristocratic distinction but as tangible symbols of support for a beleaguered sister 
republic. After the sinking of the Lusitania in May 1915, however, retailers also invested 
anew in patriotic fashions, a trend that was led by Wanamaker and wholly wrapped up in 
a growing conservative, even hawkish movement urging national preparedness. 
America’s official entry into the war in April 1917 thrust department stores to the center 
of mobilization programs, especially Liberty Loan drives and fundraising for the 
American Red Cross. Amid widespread calls for shoppers to curtail spending, retailers 
proved master manipulators of government demands and language to serve both the 
nation and their own bottom lines. By the end of the war, retailers had positioned their 
institutions as widely accepted agents of the state and continued to promote sales in the 
context of national service and “fair prices.”  
In the aftermath of the war a new class of retailers joined together under the 
auspices of the Associated Merchandising Corporation (AMC) to establish cooperative 
trade offices across Europe. Chapter three illustrates how the business and culture of 
AMC retail trade offices in Europe differed from other varieties of commercial expansion 
abroad. While recent studies have shown the violent, destructive, and imperial sides of 
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American corporations operating overseas, AMC executives, led by Kirstein, approached 
Europe with a different set of priorities. They cultivated alliances with retailers in Europe 
and relied on local buyers to navigate the foreign language and unfamiliar customs of 
their home countries. American retail trade offices in Europe looked nothing like imperial 
outposts and instead functioned as spaces in which in Americans and foreigners 
negotiated both the terms of sale and each other’s differences. In no capital was this truer 
than in the highly competitive markets in Paris. Tensions ran high at the AMC trade 
office in the French capital and often broke along national lines, pitting visiting American 
buyers against local French staff. Despite these tensions, by the middle of the decade the 
AMC did the largest business of any group of retailers anywhere in the world and 
maintained offices in ten major European cities. Although the onset of the Great 
Depression forced the AMC to close down smaller satellite offices in cities like Belfast 
and Zurich, by the 1930s more American retailers were more deeply embedded in 
European trade networks than at any previous point in U.S. history. 
  When Adolf Hitler assumed the Chancellorship of Germany in 1933, the 
extensive trade networks that retailers maintained in Berlin thrust them to the forefront of 
tense debates over how Americans ought to respond to the rise of Nazism in Europe. 
Chapter four exposes influential retailers’ deep roots both in leading circles of the 
Democratic Party and in major American Jewish organizations, especially the American 
Jewish Committee. Although anti-Nazi boycotters placed enough pressure on department 
stores in New York City to force German merchandise off their shelves, most retailers 
continued to buy and trade through Berlin, a major hub for goods produced in Central 
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Europe. At the same time, an intensification of Austro-American trade relations prompted 
many stores that had refused to sell German wares to expand their investments in Vienna. 
By the mid-thirties Americans who had staunchly resisted Nazi merchandise found 
themselves surrounded by Alpine folk fashions, from Tyrolean sweaters to the latest 
skiwear seen at high-end resorts in the Alps. However, as part of a trade initiative 
fostered by the rightwing Austrian government, Alpine fashions consciously projected an 
image of Austrian national life that was both anti-Semitic and anti-modern. In the zeal to 
replace German merchandise, American retailers and consumers alike indulged in a 
fashion trend that was wholly consistent with Nazi attitudes. Not until Alpine fashions 
earned the Nazi label following the Anschluss in March 1938 did Americans reject them. 
By then, however, retailers were so profoundly embedded in trade networks throughout 
Central Europe that only Germany’s declaration of war on the United States in 1941 
could sever the ties that linked the trade capitals of the Third Reich to department stores 
in New York and Los Angeles. 
 Although the extensive retail trade networks that crisscrossed Central Europe in 
the 1930s implicated department stores in charged debates over trade with Germany, they 
also granted retailers privileged access to U.S. consular officials and other locals living 
under Nazi rule. The final chapter reveals that retailers leveraged their political influence 
both at home and abroad on behalf of Jewish refugees suffering under Nazi terrorism. 
Beginning in 1933 and until his death in 1942, Kirstein leaned on AMC executives and 
foreign trade managers, U.S. consular officials in Berlin, Vienna, and Paris, and Assistant 
Secretary of State Messersmith to provide financial support and, in some cases, a 
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pathway out of Germany for Jewish relations, friends, and colleagues. He also opened 
doors for Ira A. Hirschmann, an executive at AMC member store Bloomingdale’s, in 
powerful circles within the Democratic Party and throughout the Roosevelt 
Administration. Ultimately, Hirschmann forced his way onto Roosevelt’s War Refugee 
Board and became its first special attaché in January 1944. From his new post in Ankara, 
Turkey, Hirschmann negotiated deals that released tens of thousands of Jews from 
concentration camps in the Balkans and secured transportation for many more through 
the Black Sea and onto Palestine. Leading American retailers, many of whom were 
Jewish, were uniquely positioned to intervene in the refugee crises because of their 
extensive networks both in Washington and in Nazi-controlled territories. Few American 
executives did more to save the lives of those at risk during the greatest humanitarian 
crisis of the twentieth century. 
 
  
25
CHAPTER ONE  
 
Wanamaker’s America: Paris Fashions, Turn-of-the-Century Tariff Reforms,  
and the Failures of Cultural Nationalism 
 
 
Introduction 
In 1912, the advice columnist Dorothy Dix predicted that “the time will not be far 
distant when a respectable American woman will no more think of getting her clothes 
from Paris than she does her morals.” Dix insisted that women ought to disregard the 
influence of Parisian couturiers and buy fashions designed in America and by Americans. 
“Too long,” she intoned, “have we been under the thralldom of the fallacious idea that all 
sartorial glory not only originated in Paris, but stayed there.” Paris had “hypnotized” 
American women to such a degree that “we have taken whatever Paris handed out and 
have worn it, no matter what freaks it made us look like.” Dix argued that the “sloppiest” 
dressmaking establishments in the world could be found on the banks of the Seine and 
that women’s clubs across the country ought to be “combating the hoary superstition that 
Paris is capable of clothing American women of refinement and taste.” Millions of 
American women read Dix’s widely syndicated advice columns and she received an 
average of two thousand letters each week, some from women who requested they meet 
to discuss the questions at hand. A good number of letter writers assumed that Dix 
worked at their own local newspaper office in part because she so closely captured their 
concerns; she wrote in the voice of the proverbial lady next door. In fact, Dix was born in 
Tennessee and spent two decades writing in Manhattan for the New York Journal before 
  
26
settling permanently at the Picayune in New Orleans. Although she was not nearly so 
provincial as most of the women who valued her guidance, Dix had never crossed the 
Atlantic. For all her criticisms of the dress shops on the banks of the Seine, and for all her 
attacks on the morals of French women, Dix had never set foot in Paris. But an American 
woman in New Orleans, New York, or Omaha did not have to travel abroad to be 
critically engaged in big questions about the nation and its position in the world. In 1912, 
women inserted their voices into a long running debate about foreign influences on 
American culture every time they purchased a dress at their local department store. 
Presumably, the label on the dress, whether it was in French or English, said a lot about a 
woman’s political opinions and worldviews.13  
During the second decade of the twentieth century, department stores became 
entangled in a tense and highly partisan debate over the role fashion played in 
establishing a sense of a uniquely American national culture. In one sense, the debate had 
its origins in a long and gradual transition from a patchwork of rural, local, and 
geographically disparate economies in the nineteenth century towards a national economy 
around the start of the twentieth. More and more, Americans found themselves part of a 
national consumer culture in which they read the same advertisements, heard the same 
jingles, and purchased the same name-brand products, such as Heinz Ketchup, Coca 
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Cola, or Lydia Pinkham’s soap. In the arts, too, many began to call for the development 
of a singular American cultural style. The Music Teachers National Association 
sponsored all-American concerts and critics agitated for music that reflected the nation’s 
spirit and people. Nonetheless, disagreement raged over what kinds of cultural influences 
ought to be allowed into a singular national culture. Elite, native-born white protestants 
abhorred the inclusion of African American melodies into a national style even as New 
York’s Tin Pan Alley, run primarily by immigrant Jews, churned out wildly popular sheet 
music that drew heavily on these traditions, from ragtime and jazz to the blues. Influences 
from Europe bothered elite Americans, too. When Theodore Roosevelt made a case for 
cultural nationalism in literature, he called for an end to regional differences and accused 
eastern elites of fostering too much deference to European opinion. As the journalist 
Walter Lippmann wrote of Roosevelt, he was “the first President who knew that the 
United States had come of age—that America was no longer a colony of Europe, and no 
longer an immature nation cringing on the outskirts of western civilization.” Roosevelt 
established a “salon” of writers, artists, musicians, reformers, and intellectuals whom he 
hoped would reveal to the world something of the greatness and distinctiveness of 
American culture; he even ordered ordered the Government Printing Office to use three 
hundred new spellings of words to assert American cultural independence from England. 
Not long after Roosevelt left the White House in 1908, his brand of cultural nationalism 
  
28
would ripple through the fashion industries, in which Paris—not London—reigned as the 
supreme arbiter of taste.14 
In a more immediate sense, though, the public debate that consumed retailers was 
also an acute reaction to the Payne Aldrich tariff bill that Republican President William 
Howard Taft signed into law in 1909. Although Taft had campaigned on a promise to 
lower tariff rates, he instead raised them on many important raw materials and 
manufactured goods less than one year into his presidency. The Payne Aldrich bill made 
clear that Taft did not control congress, nor could he manage his image in the press, 
which skewered him as an ineffective leader. As one New York Times columnist put it, 
Payne Aldrich “tells the story of [Taft’s] failure to keep pledges repeatedly given, of the 
abandonment of a resolve... save for a few petty details he yields everything, most of all 
principle.”15 Taft’s stubborn insistence that the bill was the best one the Republican Party 
ever passed, a refrain he repeated as he traveled the country on speaking tours, further 
alienated him from Democrats and more moderate Republicans who championed tariff 
reforms and once viewed him as their ally. While Payne Aldrich is best known for the 
part it played in destroying Taft’s chances for reelection, it also sparked widespread 
resentment across the country and thrust retailers to middle of a politically charged 
conversation over the role of fashion in American life. Despite the centrality of frocks 
and silks, and of hobble skirts and corsets, to the dialogue, the debates over fashion were 
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embedded in longstanding divides between stalwart protectionist Republicans and free-
trade Democrats. On the one hand, cash-strapped wage earners already suffering from 
what they called the “high cost of living,” criticized the bill for driving up prices on 
consumer goods and demanded bargains. On the other hand, influential progressive 
reformers called for an end to Paris fashions and for big investments in the development 
of a uniquely American fashion industry. They did not blame the tariff for high prices; 
rather, they saw the bill as an opportunity to wrest American women from the influences 
of the “immoral” French. Price motivated both bargain hunters and fashion nationalists, 
but so too, did Paris.  
 American department stores became a central battleground in the backlash to 
Payne Aldrich, and none more so than John Wanamaker’s. Founded as a small dry goods 
shop on the outskirts of Philadelphia at the start of the Civil War, by the turn of the 
century Wanamaker’s business had grown to include two imposing flagships in both 
Philadelphia and New York, and a large trade office in Paris. Celebrated for his business 
acumen, religiosity, and teetotaling—he signed letters to his son, “love your water-
drinking father”—Wanamaker was also well known in Washington. He had been 
intertwined with the leadership of the Republican Party since 1888, when his fundraising 
and contributions to Benjamin Harrison’s presidential campaign earned him a 
controversial cabinet appointment; some said he “bought” the post.16 Though Wanamaker 
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abhorred Roosevelt, whom he regarded as an upstart reformer and would later call a 
“madman,” he remained a reliable and significant leader in the Republican Party, 
contributing tens of thousands to each one of William McKinley’s and Taft’s presidential 
campaigns. Wanamaker’s very public associations with the leadership of the party and, 
more specifically, his close connection to Taft, aligned him with those responsible for 
Payne Aldrich. At the same time, Wanamaker’s standing as one of the country’s most 
celebrated importers of Paris fashions gave him an opportunity to take a public stand for 
or against Paris; or, as fashion nationalists framed it, for or against America. Amid the 
show windows and luxe displays at Wanamaker’s department stores, bargain hunters and 
fashion nationalists clashed over price and Paris, and, in a larger sense, over political 
party doctrine and whether there was such a thing as an American culture in fashion and 
retail.17 
Although the subjects treated in this chapter, from tariff policies and progressive 
reforms to John Wanamaker and “pocketbook politics,” have inspired numerous 
scholarly books and articles, they have never been treated together, as central elements in 
a conversation that played out in America’s department stores and radiated across the 
Atlantic. Most studies centered on the “tariff wars” peter out before Payne Aldrich and 
few studies of the “progressive era” touch on the debate over Paris and American 
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fashions.18 And while John Wanamaker has played an important role in nearly every 
study of department stores and America’s burgeoning consumer culture, his far-reaching 
political influence has never been considered alongside his business decisions.19 Many 
historians have emphasized the ways in which consumers leveraged their buying power 
to gain political influence, but none has considered the extent to which retailers did the 
same. Nor has any studied the ways in which retail trade networks that crossed the 
Atlantic drew retailers into the inner circles of Washington.20 In the conclusion to her 
article advocating for American fashions, Dix implored her readers to “quit Paris” and 
“show that our patriotism amounts to something more than belonging to Colonial Dames 
and Daughters of the American Revolution societies.”21 By the opening decades of the 
twentieth century the Paris trade was so central to the business of department stores that 
“quitting” was not an option, but neither was alienating a growing number of fashion 
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nationalists and bargain hunters. This chapter uncovers how John Wanamaker’s 
interventions in the backlash to Payne Aldrich set forth a vision of American culture that 
celebrated the originality of Paris designers alongside the ingenuity of American workers; 
in political terms, the vision was unabashedly consistent with Republican economic 
policies. In Wanamaker’s America, there could be no such thing as a national style 
without the influence of Paris. At the same time, in a period so deeply marked by high 
tariffs and the rising cost of living, retailers, bargain hunters, and fashion nationalists 
found common ground not over the national origins of goods, but rather on the value of 
low prices.   
 
 
The American Retail Trade in Paris and the Payne Aldrich Tariff Bill 
After the turn of the twentieth century, John Wanamaker and his son Rodman 
welcomed Paris into every aspect of their stores in New York and Philadelphia. Shoppers 
strolled through entire sales floors designed to resemble the fashionable streets of Paris, 
especially the rue de la Paix, which had marked the epicenter of the French fashion 
industry since Charles Frederick Worth opened his design house there in the 1850s. 
“Here is Paris literally translated,” boasted a Wanamaker’s advertisement after informing 
shoppers that they could “walk the broad street of the rue de la Paix by winding around 
our rotunda.” The sixteen shops that dotted the New York store’s replica of the rue de la 
Paix were “true in architecture,” and displayed women’s blouses, handbags, and scarves 
just as they were “shown in the heart of Paris itself.” In Philadelphia, John and Rodman 
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devoted most of a sales floor to what they called “the little gray salons,” and promoted 
them as a “counterpart on this side of the Atlantic” to the shops of the French capital. 
Each of the “charming” salons was “thoroughly French in their tone, being furnished, 
finished, and mirrored like the best Parisian shops.” At Wanamaker’s cafés, shoppers 
could eat candies made by a “white capped and aproned French chef according to the 
most delectable French recipes,” and in any department they could request gift-wrapping 
in the latest French styles. Wanamaker’s also distributed a popular magazine devoted to 
keeping Americans in touch with the latest French fashions. Buyers stationed at 
Wanamaker’s trade office on rue des Petites Écuries imbued these fashion reports with a 
sense of immediacy through titles like, “Lingerie of the Moment in Paris,” or “How 
French Women Are Wearing Their Hair.”  The magazine itself was titled La Dernière 
Heure à Paris to emphasize the store’s close and up-to-the-hour connection to the Paris 
trade, and Americans loved it—more than ten thousand subscribed at home in 
Philadelphia. Just as the firm advertised in Vogue, for many Americans Wanamaker’s 
was the “short route” to Paris.22  
To a greater extent than any other American department store, Wanamaker’s built 
its reputation on the Paris trade. The firm’s buyers and advertisers had been especially 
adept at capturing American attitudes towards the French in their Paris fashion 
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promotions and they managed to attract shoppers at the highest income levels through the 
sale and exhibition of haute couture. As historians have shown, Paris was the undisputed 
global center of fashion, and the city that Americans looked to in order to imagine 
themselves as part of an aristocratic world class.23 At the same time, the Paris trade 
implicated retailers in a range of tensely partisan debates over foreign trade policies, and 
especially tariff policies. Having served under the Harrison administration at the 
beginning of a decade that witnessed some of the most vicious battles over tariffs in 
American history, Wanamaker was well versed in the politics of foreign trade. However, 
by 1909, he was one of a growing number of Republicans who challenged longstanding 
party doctrine that favored high protective tariffs. He stood behind fellow Republican and 
old friend William Howard Taft in his 1908 campaign for President, largely because Taft 
had promised to pursue moderate tariff reforms. When Taft’s promise went unrealized 
and the 1909 Payne Aldrich tariff bill instead raised rates on French imports as much as 
sixty percent, Wanamaker faced two camps of angry Americans: one that sought lower 
prices on consumer goods, and another that called for an end to American dependence on 
Paris fashions. As Taft’s election and the fallout from the Payne Aldrich bill make clear, 
Wanamaker’s stores operated in as close proximity to Washington as they did to Paris. 
Retailers had a stake in shaping national economic policies and the consequences of 
national financial reforms, successful or not, rippled through the business of American 
department stores long before they reached consumers. 
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In 1907, as the American financial system seemed on the verge of collapse, John 
Wanamaker’s son Rodman received international acclaim for his success in fostering 
Franco-American trade relations.24 Although John came from rugged Pennsylvania Dutch 
stock and had dropped out of school at an early age to begin working, Rodman had 
grown up as the son of one of the country’s most successful businessmen, a millionaire, 
and a member of the Republican Party’s Old Guard elite. Rodman spent his childhood 
traveling back and forth across the Atlantic with his father and in 1886 graduated from 
Princeton University. Early on in life, one biographer noted, Rodman developed a “zeal 
for France, for her creative genius in art, fashion, and merchandise.” As an adult, he spent 
at least half of each year in Paris in a home on the Champs Elysées that served as a 
laboratory for studying the latest European fashions from gowns and jewels to china and 
tapestries.25 While John might be credited for having the foresight to send his second 
eldest son to France, it was Rodman who brought Paris back to the stores in Philadelphia 
and New York. Between 1888 and 1898 he tripled the size of Wanamaker’s Paris 
headquarters and oversaw the expansion of many new contracts for exclusive French 
fashions. When John encountered some of Rodman’s imports, especially lingerie, he 
worried that his son had “gone out of his head.” But Rodman did much more than import 
ladies’ underwear. He pioneered a program to bring French contemporary art into the 
Wanamaker stores for free public display and became an energetic member of the 
                                                      
24 Although Roosevelt absorbed much of the blame for the Panic of 1907, it was caused largely by the same 
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American Art Association of Paris.26 When President Armand Fallières of France 
promoted Rodman from a Chevalier to an Officer in the French Legion of Honor in 1907, 
he cited “his services in promoting the commercial relations between the United States 
and France.” The American press noted that Rodman had “set the pace” for American 
department stores to follow in their foreign purchasing, and he was praised for fostering 
“practical commercial reciprocity” by directing French artisans towards deficiencies in 
the American markets. That French imports accounted for less than ten percent of 
Wanamaker’s total inventory mattered little. Under Rodman’s direction, Paris fashions 
and promotions of French art, history, and culture so dominated the Wanamaker business 
that many viewed the firm as a direct link to the world capital of fashion. 27   
Wanamaker’s Paris trade made such an impression on Americans largely because 
Rodman and his buyers were especially adept at capitalizing on American ideas about 
Paris. In the 1890s Paris represented the uncontested center of an international (albeit 
overwhelmingly European) fashion system shaped by and preoccupied with aristocrats. 
Wealthy American women shopped in Paris and purchased French imports because they 
believed it made them “world class” and associated them with titled and privileged 
Europeans.28 At the same time, popular magazines, newspapers, and novels perpetuated 
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an older idea that France was a land of loose sexual morals. Fin-de-siècle Americans so 
yearned for stories of a sexualized Paris that even the characters of Yellow Kid, the 
nation’s most popular comic strip, embarked on a tour of nude art at the Louvre and 
ventured into the seedy side of the Latin Quarter.29 Wanamaker’s delivered to its patrons 
both visions of the city. American socialites craving aristocratic fashions attended the 
firm’s seasonal exhibitions featuring exclusive haute couture from the most celebrated 
couturiers in Paris. Others indulged in what Scribner’s Magazine called one of 
Wanamaker’s most popular sights: the “little French store.” According to Scribner’s 
shoppers were encouraged to browse the little shop’s “most entertaining” and authentic 
displays of the finest women’s lingerie from Paris.30 The magazine even poked fun at 
“innocent old ladies” who were said to be caught by surprise when they interpreted the 
sign for lingerie as a place to “linger.” That Wanamaker’s “little French store” sold only 
women’s underwear was no oversight; the merchandise was carefully selected to 
“entertain,” even titillate, and capitalize on Americans’ assumptions about Paris.31 
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Following the Paris Exposition of 1900, Wanamaker’s stores began to promote a 
less sexualized and more historical-cultural vision of Paris. More than sixty-five hundred 
Americans attended the Paris exposition and they comprised the largest presence of any 
single nation other than France. Many imagined that the large American contingent, and 
all those displays of American manufactures, would stimulate French demand for U.S. 
exports. Horace Porter, the U.S. Ambassador to France spoke as much about profits to be 
made at the exposition as he did about peace. Indeed, in the years following the 
exposition, French officials began to recognize their junior sister republic as an 
“ascending star” in world politics, and they undertook new initiatives to promote French 
language and culture in the United States. By 1910 France had achieved prominence in 
the American theater of ideas and the arts, French language programs proliferated at 
universities across the country, and transatlantic intellectual exchange blossomed.32 
Perhaps not surprisingly, these changes in Franco-American cultural relations stimulated 
as much if not more demand among Americans for French exports, especially at stores 
like Wanamaker’s. Alongside seasonal exhibitions of exclusive Parisian haute couture, 
Wanamaker’s organized free public displays celebrating French history and art, such as 
the 1905 commemoration of Napoleon’s famous victory in the Battle of Austerlitz or the 
1906 celebration of the French Revolution. Local teachers and students received special 
invitations to visit these educational displays, which featured large-scale narrative 
tableaux, lectures, paintings, documents, flags, weapons, and other artifacts dating to or 
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copied from the period. Wanamaker’s flagships also showcased, free-of-charge, over six 
hundred works of contemporary French art imported from the Paris salons, and began 
celebrating an annual Franco-American Day. At times, even the firm’s advertising 
emphasized French history over fashion with sketches of the Arc de Triomphe or the 
Marquis de Lafayette. In 1907 Wanamaker’s boasted that “Paris and all France is best 
represented in America at Wanamaker’s,” and it was not an outlandish claim.33 
Wanamaker’s vision of France painted a rosy picture of fruitful exchange between 
the two countries, but that belied the reality of worsening Franco-American trade 
relations. The French chafed constantly at American tariff rates and sought repeatedly to 
lower them.  Although trade officials representing both countries established a 
satisfactory tariff reciprocity agreement in 1899, many French exporters and officials 
were angered by the passage of the Pure Food and Drug Act seven years later in 1906 
under the Roosevelt Administration. A great many French insisted that the progressive 
reform was, in fact, a “badly disguised tactic for protecting American producers.”34 The 
president of the Lyons Silk Manufacturers Syndicate further complained that American 
customs officials enforced tariffs arbitrarily and always to their own benefit. Such 
frustrations over tariffs were mutual. Much to the chagrin of American officials, the 
United States was the only commercially advanced nation excluded from French 
minimum tariff rate policies without exceptions. In this respect, France officially 
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classified the United States alongside undeveloped (and non-European) countries such as 
Haiti, Ethiopia, and the Congo.35 In stark contrast to this distressing picture of Franco-
American trade relations, promotions for the Wanamaker’s stores insisted that “our 
business connections with the French people were never so cordial, important, and 
sympathetic as at this time.” Alongside an editorial-style advertisement celebrating the 
historic connections between the two countries, Wanamaker’s presented a sketch of 
George Washington meeting the Marquis de Lafayette alongside a portrait of the 
contemporary French president. Advertisements claimed that France and United States 
were tied together through a shared history, but also through Wanamaker’s extensive 
trade in Paris, which cemented “a stronger link between the two great republics.”36  
Amid rising tensions over Franco-American trade relations, William Howard Taft 
announced his candidacy for President of the United States and made tariff reform central 
to his campaign platform. A lawyer from Ohio who preferred the quiet study of the law to 
the rough and tumble partisanship of campaigns and elections, Taft sorely lacked the 
political skills of his friend and predecessor, Roosevelt. He nonetheless took a stand 
against a policy that had been a central tenet of Republican Party doctrine for more than 
half a century: protectionism. That is, the setting of high tariffs to “protect” American 
industries and workers against competition from foreign imports. Longtime GOP leaders 
supported protectionist tariffs because it suited their vision of using the power of the 
federal government to promote business enterprise. Beyond Washington the doctrine 
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appealed to Republicans because high tariffs seemed to embody patriotism, promise 
social cohesion, and guard against poverty. However, after the turn of the century a 
growing number of progressive Republicans had begun to break with Old Guard 
conservatives by advocating for reductions. Tariff reform became so sharply divisive 
within the GOP that Roosevelt had largely ignored it during his presidency in order to 
preserve party unity. In fact, Roosevelt had strongly encouraged leading Republican 
Senator Henry Cabot Lodge to “manage the tariff bill to give Taft the chance to appear” 
an effective champion of reduction, even if his efforts to pass the bill through congress 
failed. Neither Lodge nor Taft seemed to take Roosevelt’s advice seriously and the 
President vowed again and again during the first year of his presidency to reduce tariffs.  
He was convinced that tariffs ought to be revised, as he wrote, “from time to time, 
schedule by schedule based on the reports of a nonpartisan board of experts.” He even 
went so far as to suggest that the independent commission ought to be established to 
“remove politics from the tariff.”37  
 As much as Wanamaker represented the Old Guard in terms of his age, wealth, 
and connections to former Presidents Harrison and McKinley, he was, in fact, one of a 
growing number of progressive Republicans who tried to advocate for more moderate 
tariff schedules without undermining the core principles of protection. Wanamaker had 
known Taft for at least twenty years by the time the he won his bid for the presidency in 
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1908; the two had met when Wanamaker served under President Benjamin Harrison as 
Postmaster General and Taft as U.S. Solicitor General.38 When Taft announced his 
campaign Wanamaker had come to his aid and gave several interviews on his behalf, in 
which tariff reform and “protection” played a key role. “The Republican Party is the only 
party that believes in and understands the tariff,” Wanamaker told the New York Tribune, 
“and its patriotism commands it to meet the views of the people by moderating the 
present tariff in careful ways that will not upset the business of the country.” Wanamaker 
was not only careful to point out that “moderating” the tariff could be as patriotic as 
raising it, but also that American businesses would benefit from the stability that Taft’s 
proposal promised. That is, through a “gradual approach” towards “a more satisfactory 
tariff.” He argued that hardworking Americans were tired of financial panics and that 
only Taft’s tariff reductions could bring stability.39 Just as Taft proposed to “remove 
politics from the tariff,” Wanamaker believed that businessmen independent of political 
parties ought to study the reduction of tariffs and other forms taxation to reduce the cost 
of doing business and the prices of goods. As he later told an assemblage of American 
retailers in New York, the tariff ought to be reduced to a point that would “revive the 
dying spirit of inventors, designers, and workmen of American enterprise, whom the high 
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manufacturer’s tariff has hindered.”40 What he neglected to mention, of course, was that 
high tariffs had also hindered retailers dependent on imports of Paris fashions. 
 Despite the fact that he won the White House by a solid margin, Taft lost the 
larger battle against high protective tariffs at great cost to his own credibility and, as 
many believed, to consumers across the country. During the summer of 1909 staunch 
protectionists outmaneuvered Taft and by August he was compelled to pass the Payne 
Aldrich bill, which reduced rates on only a handful of hundreds of imported items. The 
defeat undermined Taft’s credibility for the rest of his presidency and angered nearly 
everyone. Even many conservative Republicans who endorsed Payne Aldrich felt that the 
bill reduced some rates to unacceptable lows. At the same time, advocates of tariff reform 
and Democratic free traders argued that the bill had accomplished far too little. When 
Taft took off on a cross-country speaking tour months after signing the bill he further 
angered critics by defensively calling Payne Aldrich a triumph for the Republican Party. 
At the midterm elections the GOP sustained heavy losses and gave up control of the 
House to Democrats.41 Beyond Washington and across the Atlantic, too, Payne Aldrich 
infuriated the French and sparked talk of reprisals and an open tariff war. The bill 
terminated the 1899 reciprocity agreements that had stabilized (to some degree) Franco-
American trade relations and introduced new rates that doubled the cost of some French 
imports.42 Writers at Le Temps who were typically friendly to the United States argued 
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that, “The uncompromising protectionists of America have made the game easy for the 
protectionists of France,” signifying their intentions to hike rates on American exports.43 
Always sympathetic with the French, Wanamaker wrote a piece for the pro-tariff journal 
American Economist, in which he protested the excessive increase on rates for French 
imports. Regardless, Payne Aldrich remained the new law of the trade.44   
Across the country popular resentment surged from wage-earning Americans who 
blamed high tariffs for what many called the “high cost of living.” Although the national 
economy seemed to be in recovery by the summer and fall of 1909, Americans continued 
to find themselves “in a vise between their expenditures and their income.”45 In fact, the 
consumer price index was rising faster than wages and many workers struggled to keep 
pace. The Republican Party absorbed much of the public blame for the high cost of living 
and Payne Aldrich failed to reverse that trend. A growing number of wage earners 
believed that high tariffs stifled competition and increased prices. As one columnist for 
the New York Times argued, high tariffs seemed to cause a paucity of quality, affordable 
clothing across the country. Although the rich “tariff fixers” escaped the “monstrous 
inequality” wrought by Payne Aldrich, the columnist argued that the poor, working 
classes, so often held up as the “shameless pretext” of protectionism, were actually its 
victims. Heavy tariffs on imported woolens, for example, made them prohibitively 
expensive for most American workers. “The working classes get a lot of sham woolen 
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cloths made of cotton and shoddy, deficient in warmth, weak in weave, rotten in texture, 
and haven’t one tenth the wear in them of real woolen fabrics.”46 Critiques of Payne 
Aldrich written in defense of American consumers, became so prevalent that Lodge went 
on the defensive, denigrating what he called the “myth of the consuming public.” Lodge, 
like many Old Guard Republicans, persisted in his view of the nation as one centered on 
the values and needs of producers. “Where is this separate and isolated public of 
consumers? … This is a Nation of Producers,” he insisted. In the wake of Payne Aldrich, 
Lodge’s views were as unpopular as they were inaccurate. By 1909 more Americans 
identified as consumers than as producers, a fact that Democratic free-traders and other 
critics of Payne Aldrich understood and used to their advantage.47   
Payne Aldrich brought into sharp relief a growing movement among cash-
strapped Americans for lower prices on consumer goods, but it also raised questions 
about the role of foreign imports in American life. While consumers in favor of free trade 
and cheaper goods banded together to foster the rise of a “bargain hunting ethos,” an 
opposing group still sympathetic to the core principles of protection rallied behind calls 
for an end to high-priced Paris imports.48 Both movements viewed price as central to 
their demands. Prices were the raison d’être for bargain hunters and a means to another 
end for fashion nationalists: the development of a distinctly American fashion industry 
that operated independently of Paris. Just as free-traders and protectionists had done for 
decades, bargain hunters and fashion nationalists each argued that their vision was 
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patriotic and good for Americans. On the one hand, bargain hunters pictured a nation in 
which wage-earners could afford to buy a middle-class standard of living because it was 
cheap. On the other hand, fashion nationalists pictured a nation in which American 
manufacturers and designers earned high wages producing goods that would liberate the 
national culture from the influence of Europe. Neither movement was good for the 
country’s leading retailers who became trapped in a vice not only between bargain 
hunters and high spenders, but also between fashion nationalists and those who 
demanded styles from Paris. For John Wanamaker, longtime member of the Republican 
establishment and an old friend of Taft, the backlash to Payne Aldrich must have felt 
particularly acute. Moreover, Wanamaker and his son had spent the better part of two 
decades building up their trade in Paris and cementing their reputation as a business that 
could satisfy the demands of the much vaunted, high-spending “carriage trade” for the 
latest in haute couture. Though Lodge may have believed the consuming public to be a 
mythical creation of anti-protection Democrats, Wanamaker encountered them everyday 
in his stores and knew that to keep his business in the black he would have to find the 
middle ground between bargains and luxuries and between the United States and Paris.  
 
 
The Failure of Fashion Nationalism and the Rise of “American Made”  
 
More than thirty thousand people gathered in the breathtaking, eight-story Grand 
Court at Wanamaker’s newly erected flagship store in Philadelphia on December 30, 
1911. Among them were many distinguished bankers and businessmen, officers in the 
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United States Army, the mayor of Philadelphia, the governor of Pennsylvania, several 
U.S. Supreme Court justices, and one U.S. senator. Although the event marked the 
official dedication of the imposing fourteen-story building and celebrated fifty years of 
business for John Wanamaker, the real attraction was the keynote speaker, President 
Taft.49 Outside the new building, twenty thousand more people crowded the streets 
hoping to catch a glimpse of the president as he arrived for the ceremony. When Taft 
entered the Grand Court, a military-style band played a joyful rendition of Meyerbeer’s 
Coronation March with accompaniment from the forty-seven foot high organ embedded 
in the store’s walls. Originally built for the 1904 World’s Fair in St. Louis, it was (and 
still is) the largest pipe-playing organ in the world. Though Taft spoke only for a few 
minutes, his words were very carefully chosen. The President celebrated Wanamaker as 
the “greatest merchant in America,” whose business had provided “a model for all other 
stores throughout the country and throughout the world.”  Wanamaker’s was, he argued, 
the “highest type of one of the most important instrumentalities in modern life for the 
promotion of comfort among men.” Taft expressed his admiration for Wanamaker’s 
success in “reducing the cost of living” and providing for the “betterment of the condition 
of men” through the sale of consumer goods at the “lowest, reasonable, and fixed 
prices.”50 Just ten months ahead of the bitterly contested presidential election of 1912, 
Taft’s speech offered much more than a dedication to Wanamaker’s new building or a 
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toast to his fifty years in business. Instead the president seemed to offer up Wanamaker’s 
business as the solution to the financial problems Americans faced. Where his 
administration had failed to reduce the cost of living, Wanamaker’s stores in Philadelphia 
and New York had succeeded.  
Despite the disappointment of Payne Aldrich, Wanamaker remained by Taft’s 
side throughout his first term and even became one of the president’s most ardent 
supporters in the American business community. Yet when Taft spoke at the dedication 
of Wanamaker’s new flagship store, he did not say anything that Americans did not 
already know. The firm had already positioned itself as an ally to consumers fighting 
against the high cost of living and Taft was, in a sense, repeating Wanamaker’s own 
promotional rhetoric on a much grander stage—albeit a stage erected inside 
Wanamaker’s store. However, the President’s address came just before fashion 
nationalism, a movement spearheaded by Edward Bok, the influential editor of Ladies 
Home Journal, began to grab major national headlines in the New York Times and win 
support among influential men sympathetic to the language of cultural nationalism as 
well as protectionist economic policies. Fashion nationalists were not only engaged in a 
long-running conversation about the development of a national style, they were also 
savvy political opportunists. They did not see the high rates in Payne Aldrich as a 
problem so much as an opportunity to capitalize on bargain hunters’ demands by 
redirecting them towards American industries and away from Paris. But Wanamaker, 
America’s leading retailer, was neither a staunch protectionist nor a cultural nationalist. 
While retailers in the middle of the country had less trouble adapting to the anti-Paris 
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rhetoric of fashion nationalism, industry leaders on the east coast compromised by 
promoting the qualities of dresses designed in Paris and yet “American made.” Much to 
the chagrin of Bok and his followers, Wanamaker’s developed its most compelling 
campaign in defense of American industry only when the firm’s founder felt threatened 
by Woodrow Wilson’s sweeping financial reforms in 1913. Where bargain hunters had 
easily won over the retail industry, fashion nationalists had not. On the eve of the First 
World War there was very little sense of any national American style in fashion. The 
retailers who brokered the culture of fashion might have agreed that “American made” 
was no longer anathema and that low prices were unavoidable, but neither of these 
qualities mattered as much as whether or not a dress followed Paris styles. 
In the aftermath of Payne Aldrich, the “bargain hunting ethos” that spread across 
the country threatened to undermine sales at department stores that had, up to that time, 
avoided any special focus on low prices. During the first decade of the century large-
scale stores built around low-price promotions, such as J.C. Penney’s and Sears, 
proliferated across the country, and in 1909 Filene’s department store in Boston pushed 
into the center of the movement. With the opening of the Automatic Bargain Basement in 
1909, Filene’s virtually “institutionalized the idea of the bargain” even as the store 
continued to sell expensive fashions from Paris.51 The omnipresence of bargain hunters, 
however, threatened one of Wanamaker’s core principles, which he had insisted on for 
more than thirty years. In 1880 a Wanamaker’s sales catalogue boasted that: “Goods are 
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not marked up at the start of the season and afterwards frightfully reduced. We start at the 
low prices that many of the storekeepers end with at the close of the season.”52 Twenty 
years later, this sentiment remained at the heart of a pamphlet listing Wanamaker’s 
cardinal principles, “fair prices for everything to everyone alike without hidden 
reservations or concessions.”53 Wanamaker’s had never run “bargain” sales because, not 
unlike contemporary Wal-Mart and its “everyday low prices,” the firm maintained that 
the regular prices were already “fair.” Still, in 1909 Wanamaker’s buyers and department 
heads in New York and Philadelphia submitted numerous proposals to introduce more 
creative bargain sales. John wrote to his son Rodman in shock. He could “hardly believe” 
that his buyers wanted to implement “hour sales” along the lines of those offered by the 
low-class discount stores on Manhattan’s Fourteenth Street. “It would be an imitation of 
the Jewish practices,” Wanamaker exclaimed, “that we do not want to follow.”54 
Wanamaker’s desire to distance himself from discount retailers was certainly bigoted, but 
it was also more than that. Macy’s of New York, which was owned by the American 
Jewish Straus family and whom Wanamaker knew well, also took a strong stance against 
hour sales and sought to distinguish themselves from the discount stores.55 Like 
Wanamaker’s, Macy’s had also developed a large following in the Paris trade and none 
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of their wealthy patrons who could afford haute couture would willingly associate with a 
store that endorsed bargain schemes.  
To solve this conundrum, Wanamaker’s buyers and advertisers reappropriated the 
“high cost of living” rhetoric that had captivated bargain hunters and imbued it with a 
new sense of national purpose. By fighting against the high cost of living, Wanamaker’s 
aligned itself with a national cause, rather than the déclassé world of discount stores. 
When the firm opened a new, low priced clothing store for men the advertising copy 
explained that the garments were priced for “those earning low wages and facing the 
constantly increasing cost of living.” Sales on women’s suits were advertised as the latest 
“captures” in the firm’s “war against the high cost of living.” Another promotion claimed 
that Wanamaker’s provided an important “service” in the current “emergency” by 
offering prices that “relieved any congestion of the market on one side and lowered the 
high cost of living on the other.”56 In 1911, Wanamaker’s followed Filene’s into the 
bargain basement business, but at no point did the store characterize its efforts as having 
anything to do with bargains. Instead, Wanamaker’s opened a “New Kind of Clothing 
Store.” Promotional materials explained that the New Store’s “reason for being is the 
universal and insistent need for the right sort of low priced merchandise.” Wanamaker’s 
advertisers regularly drew parallels between the quality of its shoppers and the quality of 
its low-priced merchandise: “The people of Philadelphia are not ‘half-price’ or ‘third off’ 
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people, nor are they after cheap goods.” Wanamaker’s promotions cast the “New Kind of 
Clothing Store” as a “modified” bargain basement that served quality people with quality 
clothing at prices that served the national good. As yet another advertisement explained, 
the New Store emerged out of public necessity: “It came because it had to come.” 57 At 
Wanamaker’s low prices were “fair” and catered not to bargain hunters, but to working 
Americans who needed them. When Taft credited Wanamaker for reducing the cost of 
living in his dedication of the new store in 1911, he echoed Wanamaker’s own 
promotional tactics. Wanamaker’s rhetoric informed Taft’s speech, rather than the other 
way around. 
Yet if Wanamaker found a way to position his firm as the answer to a consumer 
movement for low prices though clever shifts in rhetoric, managing growing frustrations 
with the Paris trade would prove more challenging, not least because of the influential 
figure who raised those frustrations in the first place: Edward Bok, editor of Ladies Home 
Journal (LHJ). Although Bok filled LHJ with folksy, first person editorials, in much the 
same manner as the advice columnist Dorothy Dix, he was anything but folksy. Bok had 
arrived in the United States as a poor Dutch immigrant at the age of seven and rose to 
wealth and prominence in the publishing world by the turn of the century. Bok’s Dutch 
ancestry was something he shared with Roosevelt and the young editor managed to 
cultivate a long-lasting friendship with the Bull Moose, in part by offering him an 
opportunity to speak directly to more than two million LHJ readers in a regular column. 
Roosevelt accepted the offer and Bok printed his columns (half based on interviews, half 
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based on dictation), which advocated various aspects of the “strenuous life,” by 
encouraging women to pursue the moral education of children and to “strive for better 
civic conditions.” In his bestselling memoir, the appropriately titled Americanization of 
Edward Bok, the writer reminisced about his early bond with Roosevelt: “We must work 
for the same ends,” Roosevelt had once told him, “You and I can each become good 
Americans by giving our best to make America better.”58 Beyond offering Roosevelt his 
own space in LHJ, Bok also used his editorial clout to promote Roosevelt’s progressive 
reforms. For example, a series of editorials condemning “quackery” in in the patent-
medicine industry built public support for the passage of Roosevelt’s Pure Food & Drug 
Act in 1906. Bok also tapped into Roosevelt’s vision for the “simple life” when he, like 
Roosevelt, endorsed the Arts and Crafts movement as a path away from Victorian bric-a-
brac and towards the simplification of American architecture and interior design.59  LHJ 
was not always, as these campaigns suggest, a mouthpiece for Roosevelt or progressive 
reforms, but in Bok’s hands it certainly could be.  
Although fashion nationalism did not gain real momentum until the winter of 
1911-1912, Bok began the campaign in LHJ in 1909—just two months after Taft signed 
Payne Aldrich into law. When Bok debuted the first “department” devoted to “American 
Fashions for American Women” in LHJ he initiated what would become the first modern 
campaign in fashion nationalism. In his editorials, Bok couched what was fundamentally 
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a movement for economic nationalism, consistent with Republican principles of 
protection, in a more broadly appealing call for the development of a domestic fashion 
industry. As one historian has noted, there is no question that the American Fashions 
movement was a “concerted attempt to reshape consumer desires in accordance with 
national economic interests.”  Bok saw in the backlash to Payne Aldrich an opportunity 
to direct bargain hunters away from expensive foreign imports and towards a new form of 
cultural nationalism rooted in the most visible and attention-getting of consumer goods: 
women’s fashions. He began by selling small batches of sewing patterns designed in the 
United States and produced by the popular Home Pattern Company. When he discovered 
how limited the selections of American patterns were, however, Bok began running 
nationwide contests with cash prizes to encourage LHJ readers to submit their own 
original designs.  He appealed to women by arguing that fashion design was “a new and 
truly feminine way, right at home, of making money,” an attitude that tied in neatly with 
Roosevelt’s columns championing mothers as heroines of the strenuous life from the 
confines of their own homes. Finding styles that could be called uniquely American 
proved to be one of Bok’s greatest challenges. In February 1910, LHJ featured twenty 
pictures of “American-designed hats,” which were offered as evidence that it was 
possible for America to “originate its own fashions.” But these, too, displayed all manner 
of foreign influence: one was labeled a “toque,” and another was a “Spanish turban.” 
Although the copy claimed that these styles were “purely American designs without any 
regard to Paris,” any woman who followed haute couture knew better.60  
                                                      
60 Schweitzer, “American Fashions,”137-139; Dalton, Theodore Roosevelt, 305. 
  
55
Much as Roosevelt took aim at British spellings of words in order to assert 
American cultural independence, Bok had to take aim at Paris to distinguish America 
from the world’s fashion capital. Early on Bok’s critiques of Paris fashions flattered 
American women by appealing to their patriotism, economy, and ingenuity. In an 
advertisement promoting American fashions in Vogue, the campaign balanced a polite 
rebuke of Paris with nationalism: “No More Paris Alone in Women’s Clothes; But Paris 
with America.”61  In LHJ, Bok contrasted American and French women by celebrating 
the former’s “New World cleverness,” and insisting that only Americans understood the 
needs and desires of other Americans. As the campaign expanded, however, Bok changed 
his measured tone towards Paris. By 1912 LHJ had sold hundreds of thousands of 
“original” American sewing patterns and Bok managed to secure a partnership with the 
New York Times. With the support of the Times behind him, Bok ran even better 
publicized nationwide contests for original American designs and gained a new audience 
of predominantly male readers. In his Times columns, Bok preyed on male readers’ fears 
about the ill effects of French decadence on American society—and American women, in 
particular. He characterized innovative Paris fashions, such as Paul Poiret’s radical sheath 
and hobble skirts, as grotesque, freakish, and unfeminine.62 American women, Bok 
alleged, had been “duped” by greedy and corrupt French couturiers into wearing clothes 
designed not for respectable French women, but rather for Parisian demimondaines.  Bok 
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and the male reformers, mostly conservative businessmen, who backed his campaign 
drew on “melodramatic tropes” to position themselves as “valiant heroes out to rescue 
American women from the evil clutches of Paris couturiers.”63  
The harsh tone against Paris resonated with many consumers and retailers across 
the middle of the country partly because they found the increasingly outré fashions 
pouring out of the workshops of radical French designers, such as Paul Poiret, 
undesirable.64 In Michigan a news correspondent wrote that Paris designers had been 
“shockingly overdoing it of late,” and another newswriter in Idaho attributed the success 
of the American Fashions movement there to the “extreme manifestations” of Paris 
skirts.65 In a follow up to her first column endorsing American fashions, Dix called the 
recent designs pouring out of Paris “monstrosities.” “Such styles,” she argued, “do not 
suit the sensible, practical, clean-minded woman-hood of young America. American 
women with their liberty have no business in hobble skirts.”66 Even the Chicago-based 
Dry Goods Reporter, the most influential retailing and manufacturing trade journal 
outside the east coast, joined the campaign. In 1912, the Reporter published a fashion 
issue that was not only “broadly and distinctly” American, but also censured those who 
continued to defer to Paris: “We do not believe in becoming such blind worshippers at 
the shrine of French fashions that we fail to give American fashions the pre-eminence to 
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which they are rightly entitled.”67  Such widespread support in the middle of the country 
for rhetoric that denigrated Paris and contributed to a sense of American cultural 
superiority proved a boon to fashion nationalism, and cast the movement as patriotic. In 
the spring of 1913, even First Lady Ellen Wilson and her daughters declared their 
personal support for fashion nationalism in LHJ and posed for photographs while wearing 
original American designs.68 
In the large commercial centers on the east coast, however, retailers were far less 
inclined to endorse any critique of Paris. Many responded to the growing popularity of 
fashion nationalism by drawing attention to American manufactures, rather than 
commenting on original American fashion designs. In 1912 Filene’s of Boston 
announced it was adopting a new “America first” buying policy: “We would rather hear 
the busy hum of American mills than the fog-horns of inbound transatlantic steamships,” 
the firm exclaimed. The New York-based trade journal Dry Goods Economist reprinted 
Filene’s advertisements and urged, “Let us have more American goods and more 
American weeks!”69 Both Filene’s and the Dry Goods Economist embraced the patriotic 
impulse behind fashion nationalism without undermining the ultimate authority of Paris 
couturiers. Large east coast retailers emphasized American manufactures over American 
fashion designs for several important reasons. First, they knew that fashion nationalists 
did not have the power to redirect the international fashion industry; only highly visible, 
                                                      
67 “Broadly American,” Dry Goods Reporter, July 20, 1912, 1.  
68 “The President’s Wife” and “Personally Selected American-Designed Fashions by Mrs. Woodrow 
Wilson,” Ladies Home Journal, April 1913, 1, 28-29; Schweitzer, “American Fashions,” 145. 
69 “Push American Goods!” Dry Goods Economist, September 28, 1912, 35. 
  
58
wealthy women had that kind of influence. The world of fashion, as the society pages of 
Vogue and Cosmopolitan and every other fashion magazine made clear, was governed by 
aristocrats, not upstart reformers.70 In 1912 the Dry Goods Economist, leading trade 
journal and eastern counterpart to the Dry Goods Reporter, made this point when the 
publication defended its loyalty to Paris: “As long as the average American woman 
follows the fashion standard upraised by her wealthy sisters, and as long as the wealthy 
American woman accepts the international mode, so long will our fashions continue to 
originate in [Paris].”71 Second, in the more cosmopolitan cities along the east coast 
consumers found the new designs from Paris fascinating, even if they were radical. In 
1913, Americans stood in line for hours outside Wanamaker’s to catch a glimpse of Paul 
Poiret on his widely publicized American tour.72 In 1914, sixty thousand New Yorkers 
paid to see an exhibition of dresses designed by Parisian Madame Paquin.73 Finally, even 
if there were an American design industry in which retailers might have invested, that 
would have required a significant shift in each firm’s buying operations. Promoting 
American manufactures, on the other hand, required no changes in buying. American 
retailers already possessed in their stocks plenty of fashions made in America—they just 
did not advertise them as such.  
As Bok learned early in his campaign the United States had no fashion design 
industry to speak of, but it did have a booming clothing manufacturing industry. As the 
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highly structured hoop skirts and complex, custom designed fashions of the nineteenth 
century gave way to the ready-made cloaks, shirtwaists, women’s suits, and dresses of the 
twentieth, the American garment industry witnessed spectacular growth. Between 1870 
and 1900, capital investment in garment production increased threefold, from $54 to $169 
million, and the size of the labor force nearly doubled, from 120,000 to 206,000 workers. 
During the first two decades of the twentieth century more than half all garment workers 
labored in New York City, which became the undisputed “fashion capital” of the United 
States.74  What made Manhattan a fashion capital, however, was not its creativity or 
originality in design, but rather its capacity for the mass production of standardized, 
readymade clothes. And although many American women who could afford it continued 
to patronize dressmakers and tailors, by 1914 very few could claim not to own a 
readymade garment manufactured in the United States.75 More than ninety percent of the 
inventory across all departments at Wanamaker’s, including everything from home 
furnishings to sports equipment, was produced in the United States. However, although 
there are no statistics on the percentage of imported goods sold in Wanamaker’s women’s 
dress department, the scale of the firm’s trade in Paris suggests that imports had a much 
greater role in that department than, say, in kitchenware. Nonetheless, Wanamaker’s 
buyers knew very well that no matter how far from France a garment was produced, 
promotions succeeded when they emphasized proximity to Paris trends.76  
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Although retailers had long since advertised American made clothing in 
sometimes vague terms that suggested they originated in Paris, fashion nationalists 
reframed the practice as dishonest and un-American. At department stores, buyers 
promoted the garments they purchased in New York as “Paris styles,” or even (more 
deceptively) as “Paris originals” or “Paris imports,” if they followed designs that 
originate in Paris.77 As a Wanamaker’s menswear buyer explained to the New York 
Times, his firm spent thousands of dollars buying style samples in Europe that he and 
other buyers brought back across the Atlantic to the United States to be reproduced. They 
negotiated contracts with American manufacturers for exclusive rights to the mass 
reproduction of the original samples, which might be sold only at Wanamaker’s, or in 
some cases, at a handful of other approved stores.78 However, in 1912, a cover story in 
LHJ labeled this common practice a “countrywide swindle.”  Dix alleged that 90% of so-
called “imported” gowns that American women purchased in department stores were 
merely exported from New York’s Sixth Avenue and given “bogus” Paris labels.79 In the 
spring of 1913, respected muckraker Samuel Hopkins Adams published a report in LHJ 
that revealed the use of fraudulent Paris labels at major department stores was so 
widespread an entire branch of the weaving industry was devoted to producing realistic 
label forgeries. Adams posited that more than two and a half million articles of women’s 
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clothing with false Paris labels were on sale every day in department stores across the 
country. Retailers defended the practice, suggesting that American shoppers were 
complicit in accepting false labels. “Any woman knows that she can’t get a new Paris hat 
for twenty dollars,” one unnamed retailer told Adams, “If she doesn’t, she’s a fool and 
she deserves to get swindled.”80 Although Adams highlighted Wanamaker’s as one of the 
more honest retailers, archival records indicate that buyers regularly advertised American 
made garments opaquely as “Paris styles,” and years later the firm publicly admitted that 
their popular Lyons Velvet was not made in Lyons, France, but in the United States.81 In 
the conclusion to his report, Adams blamed consumers and retailers alike for stoking a 
“French mania among all womankind,” when, in fact, much of the well-made 
merchandise on store shelves was more American than it was French.  
For decades Wanamaker’s had insisted that America could not produce fashions 
at the level of the French, but as fashion nationalism gained headlines in LHJ and the 
New York Times the firm began to promote the uniquely American made qualities of 
fashions that followed Paris designs.  In a 1911 promotion, Joseph Appel, director of 
advertising, had emphasized the country’s youth in art and fashion relative to Europe. 
“America is still a pioneering country,” he explained, “She is still at work on the firing 
line, conquering the soil. She has not the leisure yet to give to Art and Fashions.”82 John 
Wanamaker himself was so convinced of the inferiority of American creativity that he 
                                                      
80 “The Dishonest Paris Label: How American Women Are Being Fooled by a Country-Wide Swindle,” 
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without the “leisure to give to art and fashion.” Appel and Hodges, Golden Book, 194, 275. 
  
62
had developed his own “laboratories” to “plan, originate, and make” a wide variety of 
original designs. He explained privately to his son that the point of these laboratories was 
to produce some American goods that might be equal to foreign goods.83 Increasingly, 
though, Wanamaker’s informed consumers that buyers pursued a strict “America and 
Philadelphia FIRST buying policy,” and only went abroad “for goods that could not be so 
well bought in our home city, our home state, and our home country.”84  By 1912, 
Wanamaker’s took great care to emphasize the fact that many of its Paris styles were 
made in America. One advertisement reminded shoppers that Paris had “a natural effect 
on many of the American made articles that come into the Wanamaker stores.” Even in 
Vogue, a high-end fashion magazine with intense loyalty to Paris, Wanamaker’s 
advertisements asserted the role of American manufacturers in their Paris fashions.  “The 
influence of Paris on the American-made gowns can hardly be overestimated,” one 
advertisement read.85 Advertisements such as these expressed a sense of national pride in 
American industry even as they stoked the “French mania” that Samuel Hopkins Adams 
criticized in his LHJ report on false labels.  
Although fashion nationalism emerged in the wake of Payne Aldrich in 1909, Bok 
and his supporters grabbed national headlines during the most hotly contested 
presidential election in American history; and one that brought both John Wanamaker 
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and tariffs back into the national spotlight. In the year following Taft’s dedication of 
Wanamaker’s new flagship store in Philadelphia, Wanamaker became one of the 
president’s biggest supporters in the American business community. So much so, that he 
even received a nomination to run as vice president on Taft’s reelection ticket.86 At the 
contentious Republican National Convention Wanamaker gave the speech seconding the 
party’s nomination of Taft and later wrote several widely circulated articles on the 
president’s behalf.87 Tariff reform was, once again, central to the election. In a widely 
circulated open letter to Wanamaker, Taft argued that a vote for Democratic candidate 
Woodrow Wilson was a “vote for economic experimentation.” He insisted that 
Democratic proposals to shift from a protective (high) to a revenue (low) tariff threatened 
the ruin of American industry, a spike in unemployment, and a drastic reduction of 
wages. “For sixty years under the protective policy our industries have grown at a pace 
which has astonished the world,” Taft reminded readers, “and our wage earners have 
maintained a standard of living which is unknown elsewhere.” In defense of the failings 
of his own administration, Taft offered that Americans were still more prosperous than 
Europeans” “even during this period of the high cost of living… our people have suffered 
no such hardships as those of the old world.”88 As progressive Republicans, Wanamaker 
and Taft had championed tariff reductions, but not nearly to the level that Wilson had 
proposed if elected. Alas, when Wilson came out ahead in November, Wanamaker cursed 
                                                      
86 He was a very distant second to the eventual nominee, Herbert Hadley. See “Taft and Hadley the Ticket 
of the Republican Party,” New York Tribune, November 4, 1912. 
87 Richard White, Roosevelt the Reformer: Theodore Roosevelt as Civil Service Commissioner, 1889-1895 
(Birmingham, University of Alabama Press, 2003), 185; Gibbons, John Wanamaker, 250-58; Filene and 
McAdoo respond; “Appeal to Commercial Men to Support Taft,” New York Tribune, October 28, 1912, 14.  
88 “Taft Draws Gloomy Pictures of Distress,” The Sun, October 22, 1912, 5. 
  
64
Roosevelt for his third party bid and reflected in his diary that the whole affair was a 
“pity of pities.” After Wilson’s inauguration on March 4, 1913, Wanamaker noted, 
Americans ought to: “look out for squalls.”89  
As sales lagged during the country’s transition from Taft to Wilson, Wanamaker 
blamed the incoming Democrat’s proposed financial reforms for causing widespread 
uncertainty in the markets. Wanamaker announced to his buyers that too many 
departments were falling far short of the expected annual increase of ten percent in sales 
over the previous year. “The present time in business is a very serious one because the 
condition of the country is serious,” he told them.90  Wilson had proposed a spate of 
financial reforms, including the establishment of the Federal Reserve banking system, the 
introduction of a Federal income tax, and a series of tariff revisions that would usher in 
the lowest rates in six decades.91 Wanamaker feared the effects of so many adjustments to 
the country’s financial systems and felt certain that American jobs were in jeopardy. 
During the summer of 1913, he cautioned his buyers and sales clerks that American 
shoppers were “holding their money” and “uncertain about the future.” “We can’t expect 
people to do anything else,” he explained, “we all know that it is not possible that the 
employment [levels] of previous years can go on under a tariff that does not protect the 
people who make the goods.”92 To Wanamaker, workers’ wages and sales revenues were 
two sides of the same coin: by threatening the job security of wage earners, Wilson’s 
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financial policies undermined retail sales. To address his fears about what the country 
might look like under Wilson and to stimulate sales, Wanamaker appointed a special 
committee tasked with developing new sales strategies.93 Before long a more deliberate 
sales campaign emerged centered not only on American manufactures, but also on the 
merits of American workmanship. 
Wanamaker’s emphasis on American workers in 1913 store promotions was 
unabashedly protectionist, but it did not approach the kind of cultural or “fashion” 
nationalism that Bok and his fellow reformers demanded. Whereas fashion nationalists 
praised American dressmakers in order to denigrate Parisian couturiers, Wanamaker’s 
celebrated American workers for the precision with which they copied Paris styles. In her 
American Fashions columns, Dix argued that women’s inability to detect false Paris 
labels was proof that American milliners and dressmakers could “provide the goods” 
without the help of Paris.94 Samuel Hopkins Adams struck a similar tone in his LHJ 
report when he exposed the high quality of “American makes” that sales clerks peddled 
as Paris imports.95 By contrast, Wanamaker’s advertisements boasted that American-
made undergarments were “exact copies of new Paris lingerie,” representing the “best 
workmanship in America.” Another advertisement praised the “exceptional American 
workmanship” exhibited in the styles “which Paris says are correct.” Increasingly, 
headlines announced clothing, “fresh from the workrooms,” and praised American 
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workers for “the cleverness with which they adapt Paris styles.” Wanamaker’s even 
invited shoppers to an exhibition comparing the workmanship in a handmade American 
trousseau with a trousseau handmade in Paris for a French Duchesse.96 Such concerted 
emphasis on the exceptional workmanship in American made copies of Paris styles 
reflected Wanamaker’s fears about the security of American workers under the new 
Wilson administration, rather than any sense of growing allegiance to the fashion 
nationalists.  
Still, like many retailers Wanamaker’s did adopt one of the most compelling 
arguments set forth by fashion nationalists, largely because it also satisfied demands from 
bargain hunters. That is, the fact that American made garments could be sold for less than 
Paris fashions, whether they were genuinely imported or not. Remarkably, when Dix 
listed the top five reasons to buy American fashions, “economy” ranked first, and 
patriotism second. The “French fashion fetish,” she argued, was “grotesquely humorous” 
because so many women were willing to pay so much of “their husband’s good money” 
for Paris labels. Adams emphasized the high cost of Paris labels, too, urging shoppers to 
pay reasonable “American prices” for their clothing.97 Although French imports had 
always been expensive, the high rates set in the Payne Aldrich bill combined with the 
rising cost of living meant that the average cost of an imported French hat had more than 
tripled since 1900. And while the total volume of American imports in women’s dress 
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goods and related materials declined fifty percent in the second quarter of 1912, the total 
value of imports had doubled.98 At Wanamaker’s American made dresses were typically 
listed at “extremely low” or “moderate” prices,” and often compared with the higher 
prices of Paris originals.99 Headlines featured announcements such as “an expensive suit 
copied,” or “all suits are adaptations of much more expensive models from Paris.” In 
1914 Wanamaker’s opened new “moderately priced millinery salons” inside the New 
York flagship which specialized in the sale of low cost American copies of French 
hats.100 Promotions of American-made garments, especially those that followed Paris 
designs, folded neatly into Wanamaker’s ongoing “war” against the high cost of living. 
They even reinforced the idea that low priced sales were offered for the good of the 
country, rather than as an attempt to pander to bargain hunters.  
 In 1913 Bok confessed to the advertising department at LHJ that he was 
disappointed with the progress of his American Fashions campaign. The “Paris idea” was 
too “deeply embedded in the American woman’s mind.”101 It was also too deeply 
embedded in the American retail industry. Two years later Bok would admit to Curtis 
Publishing, the parent company of LHJ, that fashion nationalism had failed and it was 
“no use trying to jam it down their throats. For some reason or other they [American 
women] won’t have American fashions.” But American women were not the only, or 
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even the first brokers of fashion, particularly not when it came to styles imported from 
Paris. It is not surprising that Wanamaker insisted on keeping up the trade connections 
that he and his son had spent more than two decades building, and which had become so 
central to their business that they had redesigned entire sales floors to look like the rue de 
la Paix. Fashion nationalism cut against longstanding transatlantic retail trade networks, 
and in Wanamaker’s case, the movement also threatened important political connections. 
The strict protectionist doctrine that underpinned fashion nationalism did not match the 
political views of most retailers, not even of John Wanamaker, the most influential 
Republican among them.  At Wanamaker’s, promotions that projected a protectionist 
view of American workers came only as a reaction to Democratic financial reforms, and 
never hinted at victory for the fashion nationalists. Despite the traction of their anti-Paris 
rhetoric in the middle of the country, Bok, Dix, and Adams did not win over the major 
east coast retailers who shaped the industry. In America’s department stores, Paris 
prevailed. Despite such considerable efforts to reduce dependence on Paris, the culture of 
fashion in the United States remained entrenched in Europe. 
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CHAPTER TWO  
 
Independence Blue and the One Million Dollar Sale:  
Patriotism, Politics, and the First World War 
  
 
Introduction 
 
Frank Tesson, head of the shoe department at Wanamaker’s New York flagship, 
bought last-minute tickets for Paris. The raw materials needed to make shoes—leathers, 
dyestuffs and more—had been difficult to procure since the war began in Europe nine 
months earlier.102 Tesson took with him a leather goods expert from the firm’s London 
office, Eugene Posen, and his wife, Alice. John Wanamaker had known Tesson for 
fifteen years and had personally requested that the head shoe buyer travel to Paris with 
Posen.103 Nothing was unusual about the trip except that it was early May 1915, and 
Tesson had purchased tickets to travel on RMS Lusitania. By some miracle, Posen 
managed to survive the wreckage by floating in the Irish Sea for nine hours before he was 
rescued. Frank and Alice Tesson were less fortunate. Wanamaker enlisted buyers 
stationed at the firm’s London office to work alongside the American consulate there in a 
fruitless, weeks-long search for the Tessons’ bodies.104 “It is partly my funeral,” 
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Wanamaker told news reporters, “my business family were on board that ship.”105 He felt 
deeply and personally responsible for the deaths of Frank and Alice Tesson, who were 
among the more than one hundred Americans who drowned when a German submarine 
struck the ship on May 7, 1915. In an editorial advertisement printed one week later, 
Wanamaker implored Americans: “Whatever race, creed, color or politics we belong to, 
every native-born citizen, every naturalized citizen, every person seeking for 
naturalization, must nail up the American flag and take his stand by the president.” He 
further instructed his more than twelve thousand employees in Philadelphia and New 
York to pledge support for whatever action President Wilson took “in defense of or for 
the protection of our fellow citizens.”106 For Wanamaker, who had campaigned 
vigorously against Wilson in the presidential election of 1912, the sinking of the 
Lusitania marked a turning point in his attitude towards the war that raged in Europe. 
Long before the United States officially entered the First World War in April 
1917 American department stores were entrenched in what they referred to as the 
European War. Prior to the sinking of the Lusitania, Americans clamored for some 
connection to the unsettling events rippling through Europe, and many found it through 
their local department stores. For these longstanding importers of European merchandise, 
and especially Paris fashions, Germany’s declaration of war on France in August 1914 
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interrupted crucial transatlantic supply lines. While many buyers, retailers, and 
manufacturers hoped that war in Europe might boost domestic manufacturers, stores 
nevertheless remained awash in Paris fashions for the duration of the war. In fact, during 
the first year of fighting retailers capitalized on and stoked American interest in the war 
by promoting Paris fashions as a way of expressing support for the beleaguered French 
Republic. After the sinking of the Lusitania, however, Americans’ focus turned inward 
and Wanamaker, still the country’s leading retailer, threw himself into a growing and 
hawkish movement for national preparedness. Just as Wanamaker often mixed business 
and politics, he reorganized his staff to bring them in line with the militarism and spirit of 
conservative preparedness groups like the National Security League. He also invested 
heavily in the development and promotion of patriotic fashions, a trend that spread 
quickly across the country. Unlike fashion nationalism, patriotic fashions did not seek to 
undermine Paris, but rather to inculcate a spirit of national service through the celebration 
of national symbols in popular styles, from the hats bearing the colors of the American 
flag to silks named after historic figures like Paul Revere. 
Ironically, America’s entry into the First World War halted retailers’ investments 
in patriotic fashions as department stores moved to the center of some of the country’s 
most important national mobilization programs, such as Liberty Loan campaigns and 
fundraising for vital charitable organizations like the American Red Cross. Studies of the 
United States during the First World War have revealed the extent to which local 
institutions like schools, churches, and workplaces became conduits for increasing 
demands from the federal government for citizens to support the war effort. In many 
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communities a culture of “coercive volunteerism,” fostered by President Wilson, 
impressed upon Americans their new duties and obligations to the state, and the 
consequences they risked if they did not comply. What is not often part of this narrative 
is the extent to which American businesses also participated in the dissemination of 
patriotic obligations during the war—how they had become agents of the state, a 
commercial crossroads for meetings between citizens and country—despite the fact that 
most wartime imperatives cut against their profits. In a sense, retailers turned the 
narrative of coercive volunteerism on its head. Through a dazzling array of displays and 
exhibitions, retailers compelled Americans to buy loans or donate to the Red Cross, and 
they played a key role in raising funds during the war, particularly in small sums from 
Americans who had little experience with banking and investments. But they did not 
threaten consequences for those who abstained; fellow citizens, the state, and other 
organizations did that work. Instead, retailers’ devoted their creative energies towards the 
manipulation of loan drives to stimulate sales and the appropriation of Wilson’s own 
turns of phrase, such as “fair prices,” to keep their businesses competitive amid 
widespread calls for national thrift.  By playing a central role in national mobilization 
programs retailers created new and important links between their stores and the nation.107  
 
 
 
Paris and Patriotism in the American Retail Trade  
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 In July 1914 Mary Walls, a dress buyer for Wanamaker’s stores, crossed the 
Atlantic to attend the fall openings of the city’s best couturiers. From the outset Walls’ 
trip was no different from any one of the many other times she had visited Paris, but soon 
after her arrival the French Ministry of War announced that the city would mobilize to 
prepare for war. Walls reported that on the night before mobilization French flags 
streamed down from every window on every boulevard and revelers filled the night air by 
singing the “Marseillaise” and “Chant du Départ.” The French government had issued 
warnings urging tourists to leave the city, but Walls stayed. As she later recounted, Walls 
asked herself: “Have I come three thousand miles for nothing? Shall Americans have no 
Paris fashions this autumn?” Determined not to return home empty-handed, Walls made 
her usual rounds of the couturiers, brazenly pushing past crowds eager to secure passports 
at the American embassy and long lines winding outside ticket offices for rail 
transportation to seaside ports. When she stopped at the famous atelier run by radical 
designer Paul Poiret, Walls found him donning the blue and scarlet uniform of a French 
soldier and consoling a crowd of weeping women. “France needs men today,” Poiret told 
Walls, “not artists.” She encountered similar scenes at the famous House of Worth, where 
Jean and Jacques Worth greeted her in their soldiers’ uniforms, and again at Doeulliet’s 
on Place Vendôme, and again at Béchoff-David. Amid these “heart wrenching” 
departures of some of the world’s best designers, Walls managed to secure more than two 
hundred samples of haute couture gowns to bring back to Wanamaker’s stores in New 
York and Philadelphia. As quickly as she could, Walls had the samples packed in French 
osier baskets (trunks had been barred from sold-out trains leaving Paris) and began to 
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make her way to the steamships docked at Le Havre. Although, as Wanamaker’s 
shoppers would soon learn, that journey would bring another adventure entirely.108  
The eruption of war across Europe in the late summer of 1914 sent American 
retailers into a panic as it threatened to disrupt crucial transatlantic supply lines. For a 
brief period, retailers and buyers imagined that the moment had come for American 
manufacturers to step up and produce replacement merchandise that might rival the work 
of their counterparts in Europe. At Wanamaker’s, however, Walls’ success securing 
haute couture samples in August 1914 put to rest any fears that Americans might have to 
go without Paris fashions. In fact, the many “Paris Gowns” exhibitions and promotions 
that the firm organized upon Walls’ return to the United States stoked a kind of “French 
mania” that was markedly different from the reverence for aristocratic distinction  
described by Samuel Hopkins Adams in Ladies Home Journal just one year earlier.109  
Even as the sinking of the Lusitania gave rise to a new investments in hawkish patriotic 
fashions, the trend did not undermine the influence of Paris. Instead, in the hands of some 
of the best retail advertisers, patriotic and Paris fashions together made a compelling case 
for the country to join the Allied Forces. Long before the United States officially entered 
the First World War, department stores were immersed in developments on the French 
front and attuned to Americans’ changing attitudes towards Europe and the nation. 
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When Wanamaker’s Paris office shut down along with the city on August 2, 
1914, buyers stationed in Philadelphia and New York immediately began planning how 
to manage their inventories in the absence of imports from Europe. Not a single French 
employee had stayed behind to package the goods ready for delivery to the United 
States—even Charles Simonet, the aging director of the office, had been called to service 
on the front. Gloves buyer William Tompkins who typically purchased sixty-five percent 
of his inventory in Europe, was desperate to see that a large shipment of Reynier kid 
gloves manufactured in Grenoble arrived safely. But Tompkins’ department was in better 
shape than the linen department, where more than ninety percent of stocks were imported 
from Europe. In early August, Wanamaker received telegrams from lace and linen 
manufacturers in Belfast requesting permission to ship goods early because future 
production and transportation seemed so uncertain. After agreeing to the requests, he 
called an emergency meeting of all buyers across the store and they uniformly agreed to 
request early, albeit incomplete, shipments from as many manufacturers in Europe as 
they could. “We had better be prepared” Wanamaker told them, “in a few weeks the war 
may be over and we can countermand [the early orders].” He further promised that his 
son Rodman would do “anything that can be done” from the London office to ensure that 
the shipments arrived safely. Nonetheless, shoe buyers feared that the absence of 
imported raw materials and dyestuffs would make many of their most popular styles 
impossible to replace. Buyers in women’s suits and millinery, some of whom had 
returned from London and Paris just before Germany’s declaration of war, reported that 
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they could not reach foreign manufacturers to confirm the status of the large orders they 
placed for the fall season.110  
From the beginning of the war in Europe reports circulated confirming serious 
disruptions in transatlantic shipping, and retailers and buyers strategized new ways to 
stay in touch with markets abroad. As a representative of the Chicago wholesale firm 
John V. Farwell Co. told the Wall Street Journal, “nearly every line in the wholesale dry 
goods field is more or less affected.” Just one month into the war imports of merchandise 
through New York were already down 15% from the previous year and U.S. government 
officials projected that the country would lose 35-40% of its income from custom 
duties.111 With his French staff mobilized for war, Wanamaker relied on his son Rodman 
to keep in touch with the markets and secure shipments from manufacturers in France and 
Britain.112 Smaller firms that did not yet own trade offices abroad relied on friends and 
foreign buyers to stay in touch with the markets abroad. At Filene’s in Boston, for 
example, Louis Kirstein, then the Vice President in charge of merchandising, enlisted his 
longtime friend Frank Chitham at London’s Selfridge & Co., to advise him as to which 
goods could be purchased reliably in France or England.113 Some American retailers and 
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buyers also took considerable risks when they continued to cross the Atlantic in spite of 
the war. When Kirstein’s colleagues Edward and Lincoln Filene tried to scout new trade 
opportunities in markets outside Paris they were arrested and detained on charges of 
suspected spying.  Lincoln told reporters that, “the proceeding had a touch of the opéra 
bouffe,” but he later cautioned his brother about the dangers of returning to France.114 
Three buyers from Carson, Pirie, Scott & Co. in Chicago were on board the German 
steamship Kronprinzessin Cecilie when it received orders to proceed directly to Germany 
without stopping as had been planned in England and France. Fortunately for many on 
board the ship, four British cruisers seized the vessel and escorted its passengers safely to 
London.115  
As transatlantic shipping looked more and more uncertain, American retailers and 
manufacturers began to speculate that the war might bring a much-needed boost to the 
country’s fledgling fashion industries. Lincoln Filene told his buyers that he couldn’t see 
any harm in losing access to European goods. “It would give us a big opportunity,” he 
mused, “America can supply its customers with the right style and all the necessary 
apparel it needs.”116 Even the high-end fashion magazine Vogue ran a feature article titled 
“American Manufacturer in the Breach: Turning to Good Account the Things We Make 
to Fill the Places of the Things We Can No Longer Obtain.” Vogue editors worried about 
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losing access to German dyestuffs, but they praised American silks and woolen goods. 
New Jersey woolens, they reported, “are so exquisitely fine that they are exported and 
sold in Paris in competition with fine French textiles.”117 A large American manufacturer 
of corsets ran a nationwide competition for innovative American dress designs to 
complement American-made under-clothes. A representative from the company excitedly 
told reporters: “What a chance for all our hat manufacturers, garment manufacturers, 
shoe manufacturers; silk, cloth, fur, hosiery manufacturers —makers of every product in 
which style figures! We may not be able to reach the height of the French designers at 
first dash, but… designers will learn by the experience!”118 The New York Times insisted 
that it was finally America’s moment to develop her talents for designing clothes, and the 
Dry Goods Economist once again urged retailers nationwide to hold “Made in USA” 
weeks. At its annual meeting in December, members of the National Cloak, Suit, Skirt, 
and Dress Manufacturers Association agreed that, “All eyes are upon the American 
designer.”119  
At Wanamaker’s, some buyers felt confident that they could find satisfactory 
replications of imported goods in the United States, but others dismissed the idea entirely, 
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especially in the field of women’s fashions. Two jewelry buyers excitedly reported to 
Wanamaker that they had secured new contracts with manufacturers in Rhode Island, 
who could “duplicate anything turned out from Paris so that you cannot tell the 
difference.” Another buyer had found a factory in Massachusetts capable of producing 
excellent copies of German clock movements. The head of the new low-priced menswear 
department also encouraged his colleagues by insisting that: “if we have to do our 
business with only what can be obtained in the United States, we can do it.” The director 
of the advertising department, however, was not so sure. Editors at Printer’s Ink, the 
journal of record in the advertising industry, had asked Joseph H. Appel of Wanamaker’s 
to compile a report comparing American and European merchandise in an array of lines 
sold at department stores across the country. In the report Appel noted that retailers were 
busy developing new contracts for domestic goods, but that some would find that task 
more challenging than others. Buyers in linens, furs, basketry, toys, and especially in 
women’s fashions would be hard pressed to find American manufacturers capable of 
meeting the standards set by Europe. “American fashions,” Appel wrote, “are not a 
question of patriotism; they are a question of genius.” He reminded Americans of the 
debt they owed to the “genius” of French designers: “For every one original French dress 
we buy and wear in this country we copy and reproduce at least a hundred.” France 
would continue to produce the world’s “most artistic” fashions, he argued, a fact that 
would be futile to deny. And, war or not, Americans would continue to demand them.120 
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Appel’s devotion to France is not surprising given Wanamaker’s long history with 
the Paris trade, and the fact that he had just orchestrated an advertising campaign for 
Paris gowns that attracted admiration across the country, and even across the Atlantic. 
Printer’s Ink judged Wanamaker’s “Paris Gowns” promotions as “probably the best that 
any advertiser has ever published.”121 When Walls returned with such exciting stories of 
her wartime tour of Paris couturiers, Appel saw the advertising possibilities immediately. 
“We knew the public was hungry for anything with a war flavor,” he told Printer’s Ink, 
“and that the papers were full of speculations as to the absence of Paris fashions.”122 
Although some American buyers who stayed in Paris after the mobilization described the 
city as “calm and hopeful, full of courage and patience,” Walls and Appel crafted a much 
more dramatic portrayal of her adventures in Paris.123 Adding to the story, of course, was 
the fact that Walls’ gown samples were some of the only haute couture to reach the 
United States between August 1914 and the spring of 1915. To generate enthusiasm for a 
scheduled exhibition of Walls’ nearly two hundred gown samples, Appel circulated a 
series of advertisements recounting the harrowing adventures of an unnamed female 
buyer on a patriotic quest to bring Americans the latest fashions from the French war 
front. Written as a dramatic first-person narrative, the advertisements detailed how the 
buyer encountered scenes of weeping women and dressmakers donning soldier’s 
uniforms. Hotels and banks closed around her and war threatened to envelop the city 
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while she bravely trekked from one atelier to another. But the real adventure began after 
the buyer secured her gown samples. According to the copy, she only narrowly escaped 
from Paris after being denied passage on a train and enduring frightening interrogations 
at seventeen military checkpoints on her way to Le Havre. In the most dramatic moment 
of the narrative, the buyer and her kindly French chauffeur found themselves surrounded 
by angry French soldiers with bayonets fixed upon them. 124   
Wanamaker’s “Paris Gowns” stories and corresponding fashion exhibition 
quickly became a sensation. Reporters as far away as London took note of the campaign 
and countless newspapers and magazines reprinted the ad copy long after the “Paris 
Gowns” exhibitions ended.125 Wanamaker’s auditorium inside the New York flagship 
building was outfitted to seat 1,700 people and it was “packed solid” for multiple 
showings of the exhibition, which featured evidence of the story’s authenticity, such as 
the French osier baskets in which Walls had packed the gown samples. News outlets 
reported that hundreds of people were turned away from each of the wildly popular 
events. Inside the exhibition writers for Printer’s Ink noted that, “As one mixed with the 
crowd expressions of amazement were common, not only for the gowns, but over the feat 
of the buyer.” Although the advertisements did not release Mary Walls’ name, she 
quickly became a well-known figure in the retail and fashion industries, especially after 
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Wanamaker himself awarded her with a diamond pin for her “pluck” and service to the 
firm. In the American Cloak & Suit Review Walls was celebrated in the same terms as a 
war hero: “Here comes a woman back through the lines of war bringing victory in her 
own field as great as any achieved by the warring armies of Europe.”126 Walls’ story 
drew such widespread attention that novelist and playwright Earl Derr Biggers developed 
a play based on Walls’ adventures. Biggers’ Inside the Lines received positive reviews as 
a “war thriller” and ran for months at Broadway’s Longacre Theater. Carrol McComas, 
the lead actress in the play, even wore on stage some of the samples Walls brought from 
Paris. Years after the armistice, trade journals continued to refer to Mary Walls as a 
“heroine of the great war.”127 At a time when most Americans learned about the European 
War through grainy sketches and newsprint, Walls and her stories offered more authentic 
access to the French front. In 1914 Paris fashions came to symbolize more than artistry or 
“genius,” rather, they took on the hue of war relics and allowed Americans to imagine 
themselves “inside the lines,” alongside their sister republic. 
When many couturiers returned from the front at the start of 1915, Walls and 
Appel joined together again for another sensational, if a bit more somber, exhibition of 
Paris fashions. In the interest of the national economy, the French government pulled 
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couturiers back from the front and urged them to begin designing again; too many French 
women formerly employed in the dressmaking trades had been pushed out of work. As a 
number of leading couturiers returned to their ateliers to design new gowns for the 
upcoming Panama Pacific Exposition held in the newly rebuilt city of San Francisco, 
Walls, too, made her way back to Paris.128 She secured exclusive rights to display the 
samples at Wanamaker’s stores after the Panama Pacific Exposition.129 Once again Appel 
imbued the April 1915 exhibition with the “war flavor” that Americans craved. In his 
hands, the exhibition was not merely a display of gowns, but rather a “supreme message” 
to the world from Paris “during her day of trial.” Appel’s promotions took on the 
imagined voice of the beleaguered city. “They may take from us many things,” Paris 
announced, “but they cannot wrest from us the scepter of fashion.”130 Thousands of 
Americans flooded Wanamaker’s flagship stores for multiple exhibitions featuring gowns 
designed by the famous and selfless “soldier-dressmakers” of France. The New York 
Tribune reported that, “there was in the minds of all who watched the procession, a great 
admiration for the determination of France… and the importance of the fashion scepter to 
Paris.”131 As historians have shown, the French did regard the export of haute couture as 
an important part of the war effort, and as a symbol of the enduring French national spirit. 
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By placing Parish fashions in the context of French nationalism and the war, Walls and 
Appel orchestrated an event that the French would likely have appreciated, and which 
satiated Americans’ desire for some tangible connection to the war.132 
Only a few weeks after the exhibition, however, Americans experienced their first 
real brush with the war when a German submarine torpedoed the Lusitania off the coast 
of Ireland, sending nearly twelve hundred civilians to their deaths, including over one 
hundred Americans. In the aftermath of the Lusitania tragedy, sensationalized war-tinged 
exhibitions of Paris fashions no longer captured American attitudes towards the war—
especially not at Wanamaker’s, which had suffered the loss of Frank and Alice Tesson. 
Still reeling from the tragedy, Wanamaker poured his energies into fostering a resurgence 
of interest in American designs and manufactures, recast in boldly patriotic terms. Just 
days after the Lusitania, the most important trade journal in the industry, Women’s Wear 
Daily, featured a cover story on Wanamaker’s own house designer, Madame V. Kosow, 
who was behind a new series of patriotic fashions. Kosow was an immigrant from Russia 
but she developed Wanamaker’s new signature patriotic item: original Independence 
Blue silks.133 As advertisements explained, “Independence Blue” was a “new American 
color, created from the three colors used in Old Glory—the red in the stripes, the blue in 
the field of stars, and the white in the stars and stripes.” Promotions featured sketches of 
the Liberty Bell and described the color as “radiating with joy and independence.” 134 
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Under Kosow’s direction, a new team of designers developed a line of merchandise 
around the theme of American independence. For example, Wanamaker’s advertised an 
“Independence hat, a smart hat for the men of independence in taste.” Independence Blue 
silk lined the hat’s interior.135 The new patriotic color was such a success that 
Wanamaker’s designers developed an entire “color card” of forty original hues inspired 
by national symbols, such as: Revere red, Lincoln violet, Columbus green, West Point 
gray, Lafayette rose, Hiawatha scarlet, and San Juan raspberry.136  
Across the country, retailers and manufacturers followed Wanamaker’s lead and 
embraced patriotic American designs and manufactures. At the start of 1916 Women’s 
Wear Daily pronounced the year a “fresh psychological moment for the promotion of 
American ideas and American made goods,” and ran regular feature stories on retailers 
sympathetic to the cause.137 The New York Times reported that a growing number of 
American dressmakers had started incorporating the colors of the United States flag into 
their designs. In particular, dressmakers had begun to sew small, impressionistic flags 
done in loose stitches as a way of expressing their support for the U.S. National Guard 
after they were deployed to the Mexican border. At fashionable resorts young American 
women were wearing “sport suits made up of red Jersey skirts, blue coats, white shoes, 
and white hats with bands of red, white, and blue around the high crown.”138 In 
Washington, the Women’s National Made in the U.S.A. League, which had been founded 
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two years earlier when the war first threatened supply lines across the Atlantic, boasted a 
spike in membership. By 1916 the League attracted more than 100,000 members 
representing every state in the country. The League made headlines when it called for a 
“Made in America Christmas” and urged shoppers to “free themselves from the tyranny 
of the word ‘imported’” while shopping for Christmas gifts.139 Wanamaker, too, sent 
another team of designers to the American Museum of Natural History in New York to 
work with anthropologists on the development of another new American fashion line. 
Although the new collection was actually inspired by the museum’s South American 
collections and featured “Indian ponchos,” fashion critics praised it as a “new departure 
in the art of American costume designs.”140  
Despite the broad appeal of patriotic fashions, they were not neutral, or at least 
Wanamaker had not intended them to be. In fact, they represented an important shift in 
the retailer’s attitudes away from the commitment to American neutrality in the First 
World War. In 1914 Wanamaker had stood firmly behind President Wilson’s policy of 
neutrality and urged other Americans to focus on humanitarian relief instead through 
first-person editorials printed in the store’s advertisements. He ordered staff at both of his 
flagships to set up booths to collect donations of money and supplies for the American 
Red Cross.141 In addition, Wanamaker personally raised nearly two hundred thousand 
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dollars in donations to aid Belgium. He chartered two vessels to transport to the 
devastated country thousands of tons of food, clothing, and other supplies purchased with 
the donations.142 However, after the sinking of the Lusitania, Wanamaker questioned the 
wisdom of neutrality and lost faith in peace movements. Despite his years of devotion to 
former President William Howard Taft, even through the disappointments of the Payne 
Aldrich bill, Wanamaker demurred when Taft invited him to serve on the executive 
committee of the newly established League to Enforce Peace. And although he 
entertained several “peace talks” with Henry Ford, whom he had had admired since they 
met in 1904, Wanamaker refused to endorse the auto magnate’s plan to send a peace 
mission to Europe.143 His refusal was not only because Ford’s plan was ill-conceived, but 
also because Wanamaker did not believe peace was a viable path forward. “Peace talk is 
mostly fol-de-rol at the present moment,” he wrote in his diary, “business statesmanship 
as well as patriotism is the hourly call just now.”144 
Just what Wanamaker meant by “business statesmanship” became clear when he 
accepted the chairmanship of the newly formed Philadelphia branch of the conservative, 
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even hawkish National Security League (NSL) in July 1915.145 In his acceptance speech, 
Wanamaker suggested that the federal government ought to: “Borrow from every 
available source $100 billion dollars with which to purchase Belgium from Germany, 
restore its government and sovereignty, and then when suitable return it to its people.”146 
The room filled with gasps at Wanamaker’s proposal for “business statesmanship.” 
Letters of protest poured into his office, and Wanamaker was skewered in the national 
press.  Philadelphia’s mayor told newspapers that the proposal should be treated with as 
much seriousness as “midsummer dreams” and “childhood fables.” An editorial in The 
Washington Post chided Wanamaker for pushing sympathy to the point of absurdity, and 
Life joked that if the war kept up even France could be “bought for a song.” One week 
after his shocking speech, Wanamaker stepped down from the chairmanship of the 
Philadelphia NSL branch and retreated to Saratoga Springs, New York to rest. Appel, 
who had witnessed the fallout from the speech later reflected that Wanamaker had spoken 
“with a heart overwhelmed by the tragedy of the war, especially by the plight of 
Belgium.” He was also still reeling from the loss of the Tessons on board the Lusitania. 
Whatever the reason for Wanamaker’s ill-conceived proposal to “buy Belgium,” the 
backlash pushed him further and further from talk of peace and neutrality.147 
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Although he stepped down from his official post as Chairman of the NSL, 
Wanamaker remained deeply involved and brought his business in line with many of the 
League’s initiatives. Backed by the country’s leading banking and commercial 
executives, the NSL was the “best heeled and most formidable” of a growing number of 
groups advocating for national preparedness. Closely tied with conservative political 
interests, the NSL pushed for measures to militarize the country by establishing a bigger 
army, an expanded navy, and, most importantly, by advocating a system of universal 
military training. As captured in the organization’s bylaws, NSL members described their 
purpose in almost spiritual terms: “to promote patriotic education and national sentiment 
and service among the people of the United States.” Preparedness was, after all, the 
political movement that spawned one of the country’s most enduring symbols of 
patriotism: James Montgomery Flagg’s Uncle Sam. Long before Uncle Sam appeared 
above the caption, “I Want You,” he appeared alongside the question: “What Are You 
Doing For Preparedness?”148  In fact, Wanamaker had spent twenty-five years immersing 
his adolescent employees in preparedness training. Through the John Wanamaker 
Commercial Institute (JWCI), founded in 1890, all staff under the age of eighteen was 
required to undergo military training according to the regulations of the U.S. Army, as 
well as take classes in subjects like grammar or commerce, public-speaking or music. 
Wanamaker arranged his JWCI “cadets” in regiments and even organized a military band 
and drum and bugle corps.149 Beginning in 1916 Wanamaker extended the spirit of the 
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JWCI to the rest of his twelve thousand employees, including both men and women. 
Together they formed the Red, White, and Blue Cross, Inc. As the official charter 
explained, the group was “associated for the purposes of education and preparation for, 
and cooperative service in, public emergency.” Promotional materials celebrated the 
“patriotic impulse” of the Red, White, and Blue Cross and explained how its programs 
streamlined Wanamaker’s employees into one effective “agent of service.”  Under the 
auspices of the new organization, adult male employees enrolled in military drilling and 
physical training, and all were invited to undergo courses to learn the skills necessary to 
respond to national disasters, along the same lines as the American Red Cross. 150 It was 
precisely the combination of patriotic education, military training, and national service 
for which the NSL advocated. 
The principles of “preparedness” had underpinned the development of patriotic 
fashions, too. Unlike fashion nationalism, however, patriotic fashions did not aim to 
disrupt the Paris fashion trade. In fact, patriotic and Paris fashions became increasingly 
intertwined as the United States moved closer towards entering the First World War. 
Fashion magazines like Vogue and Cosmopolitan continued to report diligently on the 
latest styles emerging from the ateliers of Paquin, Poiret, and Callot, and some popular 
organs even pushed back against the trend towards American-made merchandise. For 
example, in the midst of the widely promoted “Made in America” Christmas season in 
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1916, Life magazine called on Americans to purchase imports for the sake of Europe. 
“General concern for human welfare,” editors at Life argued “should prompt us to buy 
from harried Europe anything she can produce that we have need of.”151 Significantly, the 
popular trade journal American Cloak and Suit Review argued that Americans ought to 
continue buying Paris fashions because of their “uniquely American” qualities. The 
“universality” of Paris styles in American life, editors argued, “relieved newer citizens of 
all distinguishing marks” and “obliterated class distinctions… whether one visits a 
mining camp in Colorado or a Spanish mission town in California, there is found the 
influence of French fashions.” By wearing clothing that followed Paris designs, new 
citizens mingled with older citizens, learned the language, and began to understand 
national ideals.152 Paris fashions could be seen as “leveling” American society in part 
because they, too, emerged from a democratic society. More and more, retailers, too, 
emphasized the historic friendship and shared history between the two countries. On the 
cover of the program for Wanamaker’s October 1916 Exposition Parisienne Americans 
found a powerful visual testament to the strength of Franco-American relations. In the 
image, two contemporary female figures representing France and the United States reach 
out towards each other from opposite sides of the Atlantic Ocean. Both figures wave 
white handkerchiefs as signs of peace and friendship. An eighteenth century frigate flying 
a French flag, a symbol of the crucial role France played in the American Revolution, is 
bound for the United States and just nearly brings the two figures together. Framed by 
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laurel wreaths that symbolize both victory and honor, and by the intertwined flags of the 
two nations, Wanamaker’s Exposition Parisienne almost made a case for the United 
States to fight alongside its historic ally.153  When the United States did finally enter the 
war six months later, however, the focus of the retail trade would shift again, away from 
fashion and towards a new level of national service. 
 
 
Liberty Loans and Fair Prices in Wartime Department Stores 
 
On the morning of April 16, 1917, Wanamaker called a meeting of buyers and 
managers in the Philadelphia flagship store to make clear his support for the President’s 
decision to enter the First World War. Six months earlier, he had campaigned vigorously 
against Wilson’s reelection, loudly denouncing the president for allowing Germany to 
invade Belgium with little consequence and for inaction in the wake of the Lusitania 
sinking.154 But none of that mattered now. Wanamaker told his buyers that he believed 
Wilson’s proclamation would “stand alongside the best things that George Washington 
ever did, as well as those of Abraham Lincoln.” He presented a draft of a resolution that 
he planned to send to the White House and circulate among all his employees. “You have 
made Democrats of us all,” the resolution proclaimed, “…we place not only our business 
institutions, but ourselves as a unit for any and every service which will aid you to carry 
out your plans at this momentous hour.” Wanamaker’s buyers and managers unanimously 
                                                      
153 Exposition Parisienne, October 2-6 1916, WC HSP. 
154 Wanamaker placed a series of patriotic advertisements in favor of Wilson’s opponent Charles Evans 
Hughes, donated hundreds of thousands of dollars to the Hughes campaign, and even orchestrated a highly 
publicized reconciliatory campaign featuring Hughes and Theodore Roosevelt in advance of the election. 
See Gibbons, John Wanamaker, vol. 2, 389-401; “Tariff for Protection to American Wages,” The Sun, 
October 26, 1916, 8; “$500,000 in Advertising Reported,” Women’s Wear Daily, November 1, 1916, 19. 
  
93
approved the resolution and voted to print copies of it on thousands of cards that 
employees could carry daily in their pockets. They also agreed to procure two thousand 
American flags, enough to fill every window in the building, and stock counters 
throughout the store with an array of affordable patriotic merchandise, everything from 
red, white and blue handkerchiefs, lampshades, and parasols to submarine inkwells and 
military charms.155 That evening, Wanamaker’s stores closed early so that the firm’s 
twelve thousand employees in Philadelphia and New York could gather to hear a reading 
of the president’s proclamation announcing the nation’s entry into the First World 
War.156  
Transatlantic trade had thrust American department stores into the throes of what 
many called “Europe’s War,” long before the United States officially joined the Allied 
Forces. However, the country’s entry into the war in April 1917 radically altered the role 
that department stores played in American life. Across the country, the war marked an 
“unprecedented mobilization of social institutions, human labor, and popular will.” Calls 
to serve one’s duty, sacrifice, and fulfill obligations to the federal state infiltrated every 
corner of American’s lives, in their homes, schools, clubs, and workplaces.157 For 
America’s retailers, wartime mobilization programs posed both a tremendous opportunity 
to demonstrate their unique capabilities to serve the nation and a great threat their sales 
revenues. No federal program better illustrates this quandary than the nationwide drive to 
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sell Liberty Loans. Even before Congress passed the Liberty Loan Act, retailers reached 
out to Secretary of the Treasury William G. McAdoo offering to sell bonds over the 
counter in their stores. For the duration of the war, department stores across the country 
played a key role in marketing the loan program to women and average American wage-
earners, most of whom had little familiarity with banks or loans prior to the war. At the 
same time, widespread calls for Americans to curtail their spending, a core principle of 
Liberty Loan drives, threatened profits and bloated merchandise stocks. By adopting the 
popular and government-sanctioned language of “fair prices,” many retailers shrewdly 
undermined the “national need for thrift” by reframing spending as patriotic and linking 
shopping to the sale of Liberty Loans. The demands of wartime mobilization in a country 
that was largely ill-prepared for it signaled the end of retailers’ emphasis on inspired 
pitches for patriotic or Paris fashions. Instead, retailers positioned their stores as one of 
many new local agents of the federal government, even as they served their own bottom 
lines. 
Weeks before Congress approved the First Liberty Loan Act, Elbridge Howe, 
Treasurer of the newly formed National Retail Dry Goods Association (NRDGA), 
recognized the potential for retailers to sell bonds.158 The purpose of the Liberty Loan 
program was to sell bonds to the non-banking public. Or, as one historian has explained, 
“to find investors who would divert their resources from other uses and put them in the 
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service of the war effort.” In order to reach these potential investors, Secretary of the 
Treasury William G. McAdoo recruited an army of volunteers at the local and national 
levels to solicit (and sometimes coerce) subscriptions.159 As soon as Howe heard about 
the program, he wired McAdoo to offer the services of department stores all over the 
country, explaining that retailers “would be glad to treat [bonds] as merchandise and sell 
them over the counter.” The New York Times seconded Howe’s enthusiasm and argued 
that department stores had the ability to reach the “largest number of persons of any 
private agency that has taken up the boosting of the loan as a patriotic duty.” Large stores 
across New York City joined forces with smaller retailers to form the New York Retail 
Merchant’s Liberty Loan Committee. Louis Stewart, Chairman of that committee and 
President of McCreery & Co. department store, donated space in his flagship building to 
establish a headquarters where a team of clerks developed strategies for selling bonds. 
Stewart told the press that, “A department store is the natural place to sell Liberty bonds 
to the women of this country because it is the one establishment in which every woman 
feels at home.” 160 Retailers in Chicago and Boston followed the example set by New 
York retailers and collaborated along similar lines.161 
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Beginning in May 1917 department stores across the country devoted whatever 
resources they could to raising Liberty Loan subscriptions. Like many large corporations 
in other industries, retailers leaned on their employees to take out subscriptions and 
donated thousands upon thousands of advertisements to their local liberty loan 
committees.162 During each of the four major bond drives department stores hosted 
actors, comedians, authors, singers, and dignitaries to draw crowds into their stores 
hoping to sell loan subscriptions. When Marshall Field’s in Chicago recruited Mary 
Pickford to promote bonds the crowds were so dense that it was almost impossible for 
volunteers to sell bonds efficiently. 163 Some of the most effective promotions, however, 
were the window displays that overwhelmed cityscapes, especially in Manhattan. As the 
New York Times reported, a person could not walk down Broadway or Fifth Avenue 
“without having his eyes assailed from every side with calls to buy bonds and with 
powerful and dramatic arguments for buying them.” While some of these were 
educational, such as Best & Co.’s elaborate display of a miniature world at war or Bonwit 
Teller’s exhibition of a German “one man tank” captured by the French in the battle of 
the Somme; others were hawkish and entertaining, such as Gimbels’ life-size papier-
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mâché statue of the Kaiser on his knees in front of an American soldier. 164 Marshall 
Field’s produced what were arguably the most emotionally stirring displays during the 
fourth Liberty Loan drive. Five full window size tableaus depicted standard bearers from 
the armies of Great Britain, Belgium, Italy, France, and the United States heroically 
clutching their nation’s flag in the midst of battle. The firm sent the tableaus from 
Chicago to New York where the Fuel Administration gave special permission to 
illuminate the displays so that workers could see them at night, and the Liberty Loan 
Committee asked that they remain in place long after the loan drive ended.165  
Department stores raised mostly small denomination subscriptions, but they 
nonetheless became an essential part of the national Liberty Loan program because they 
had access to vast segments of the “non-banking public,” mainly women. Banks and 
hotels routinely raised larger subscriptions by dollar amounts from their ranks of wealthy 
clientele than most retailers. Whereas New York’s Liberty National Bank could subscribe 
over $10 million from a single client, Marshall Field’s high profile event featuring Mary 
Pickford brought in just $1.5 million.166  Yet, by the second loan drive the Treasury 
Department recognized the important contributions of department stores by listing them 
alongside banks and post offices as sites to purchase subscriptions in their official 
brochures. The National Women’s Liberty Loan Committee treated department stores as 
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an extension of the public square by instructing groups to hold meetings in “department 
stores, on street corners, everywhere that the public may be reached.” In New England, 
local committees reported that their three most successful strategies for bond sales were 
door-to-door canvassing, street meetings, and sales booths in department stores.167 Even 
in smaller cities not known as bustling commercial centers, local newspapers directed the 
public to “go to the nearest department store” to subscribe to a liberty loan.168 
Department stores proved so essential in raising small denomination subscriptions during 
the first loan drives that when the War Savings Committee was established in 1918 to 
promote low-cost war savings stamps, the chairmen organized a national retail division 
led by Howe, Secretary of the NRDGA.169  
The Liberty Loan program was not the only national mobilization effort to rely on 
department stores as gateways to the pocketbooks and loyalties of average Americans. 
When Liberty Loan drives ended, many retailers and sales clerks simply redirected their 
energies towards an array of war-related charities from Belgian relief funds to support for 
the Fatherless Children of France, and especially to raising contributions and making 
supplies for the American Red Cross. In addition to staging rallies, running 
advertisements, and setting up donation booths, window displays for the American Red 
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Cross were just as creative as those designed to solicit loan subscriptions.170 In New 
York, Bloomingdale’s filled one window with a replica of an operating room, complete 
with a wounded soldier, doctor, nurse, and the flags of the United States and the 
American Red Cross. Lord & Taylor attracted considerable attention with its elaborate 
scene of a soldier’s trench dugout, which was constructed six feet below the window 
level, and featured a soldier surrounded by bits of exploded shells waiting on a Red Cross 
truck pictured off in the distance.171 Wanamaker’s began raising funds for the Red Cross 
in 1914 with the establishment of “Wanamaker’s Red Cross Central Station,” but after 
the United States entered the war, legions of female employees were called on to provide 
additional support.  Under the auspices of the employee preparedness organization, the 
Red, White, and Blue Cross, Inc., Wanamaker established an official Red Cross auxiliary 
unit. On a weekly and sometimes daily basis, members of the auxiliary gathered in the 
store’s workrooms to make by hand tens of thousands of surgical dressings and other 
hospital supplies.172 Wanamaker also gave over the entire eighth floor of the Philadelphia 
flagship building to the Southeastern Pennsylvania Chapter of the American Red Cross to 
manage a “volunteer factory” that was open to the public everyday.173 Volunteers 
working in Wanamaker’s Red Cross Hall made over five hundred thousand articles of 
surgical dressing, medical garments, and knit goods, such as sweaters and socks, to send 
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to Europe. 174 Although Wanamaker hoped his generosity to the Red Cross would serve 
as an “electric flash to every American office and factory” to follow his example, 
executives across the country found much more inspiration in his winning sales strategies 
than in his generosity.175 
Retailers’ headline-grabbing contributions to Liberty Loan drives and the 
American Red Cross belied the pressures that buyers faced to keep up their sales in spite 
of the rising cost of living and widespread calls for thrift. For average wage-earning 
Americans the cost of living rose sixty-five percent over the course of the war. During the 
first three months alone, the price of clothing skyrocketed by thirty percent. By the time 
the war ended clothing costs had further increased by an eye-popping ninety-three 
percent. President Wilson repeatedly called on businessmen to adhere to “fair and market 
prices,” but he also exhorted American consumers to change their spending habits.176 In 
his proclamation announcing America’s entry into the war, Wilson appealed directly to 
“housewives,” whom he implored to practice “strict economy” with forceful reproach: 
“This is the time for America to correct her unpardonable fault of wastefulness and 
extravagance.”177 Strict economy quickly became a cornerstone of the national program 
to sell liberty loans. When Secretary of the Treasury McAdoo toured the country to 
promote Liberty Loans in the spring and summer of 1917, he called for the prevention of 
“waste and extravagance,” and suggested that Americans give up all luxuries for the 
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duration of the war. McAdoo claimed that, “The amount saved in a year by the practice 
of intelligent economy—not foolish or unnecessary denial—would be sufficient to pay 
the cost of the war for a year.” Local Liberty Loan committees and speakers repeated the 
same refrain. A handbook for volunteer Liberty Loan speakers published by the U.S. 
Treasury included five pages describing strategies for discussing the “national need for 
thrift.”  As the handbook advised: “Everyone who wishes to encourage the sale of 
government securities will be interested in having people curtail in buying other things.”  
When McAdoo spoke to businessmen, he struck a more conciliatory tone. In Chicago he 
told a room full of bankers and other corporate executives that Liberty Loans would not 
cause a “business disturbance” because the government planned to keep the money raised 
circulating within the country.178 It was cold comfort for executives facing declines in 
revenues. 
Retailers did their best to counter calls for strict economy without seeming self-
interested. The president of the NRDGA told the New York Times that it was “most 
unfortunate” that so “much has been uttered on the subject of economy. It would be better 
during the continuance of the war to be extravagant than unwisely economical.”179 
Wanamaker, too, circulated a widely admired editorial advertisement titled, “Keep 
Business Going for Our Country’s Sake,” and subsequently received requests from 
retailers across the country to reprint his words in their own local newspapers. 
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Wanamaker insisted that in a truly “patriotic economy,” the standard of living must be 
kept up: “Homes must be kept up. Merchandise must be produced, distributed, and used. 
The more money we spend the more we will have in our pockets to spend.”180 Editors at 
Women’s Wear Daily praised the advertisement as “strong blow” against the “ill-advised” 
calls for economy.181 Leading executives at the NRDGA also collaborated with the 
National Economy Board of the National Council of Defense to implement a number of 
cost-saving measures in the name of what they called “patriotic conservation.” In July 
1917 retailers across the country agreed to pass some of the first limits on merchandise 
returns. By eliminating the “return goods evil”—that is, the frequent return of damaged 
or dated goods many months after the initial purchase—the committee claimed retailers 
could save five to ten percent of the cost of doing business. Retailers also greatly 
curtailed the number of package deliveries made to customers’ homes each day, and 
eliminated special custom deliveries altogether. The NRDGA implemented a nationwide 
advertising campaign to convince shoppers who had grown accustomed to these services, 
that carrying their own packages was a patriotic act. “You serve the government while 
serving yourself when you shop in this manner,” one Macy’s advertisement instructed.  
Two months before the war ended, the New York Times declared that no “institution” had 
been “affected by the various wartime changes in industry, transportation, and labor so 
much as the department store.” 182 
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Despite the claims of savings attributed to such patriotic conservation measures, 
Wanamaker’s buyers saw their sales decline steadily through 1917. During the first 
month of the war, storewide sales at the Philadelphia flagship plummeted seven percent 
behind the previous year. Wanamaker increased the advertising budget and demanded 
that each department head inform him personally of their sales progress every two 
days.183 By the fall season, sales were running slightly ahead of the previous year, but 
still several percentage points behind the expected annual increase. For department 
stores, lagging sales not only affected overall revenues, they also disrupted buying 
operations by preventing the turnover of stocks and decreasing returns on future sales. 
Macy’s, for example, turned over the entire inventory in the store four and one half times 
per year between 1914 and 1918. While figures for Wanamaker’s yearly turnovers are not 
available, the minutes of buyers’ meetings reveal that in the fall of 1917 the store carried 
higher stocks than at any previous point in more than fifty years of business: a nerve-
wracking twenty million dollars worth of merchandise.184 Wanamaker’s buyers labored 
over the size of new merchandise orders, always fearful that large stocks would bring low 
returns and small stocks would fail to meet demands.185 Department heads regularly 
complained that no one was spending money and, in exasperation, Wanamaker blamed 
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the success of the Liberty Loan drives.186 “Rich people are buying bonds,” he lamented to 
his managers, “papering their houses with them, and not spending their money for 
anything.”187 Moreover, the repeated calls for thrift had likely curtailed the kind of 
spending that large-scale retailers depended on to reach their high sales volumes and 
turnover stocks. As Wanamaker had once told his sales clerks: “If a man comes into the 
store to buy a watch, we do not want to simply sell him the watch and let him go 
home.”188    
Wanamaker was the first and the most successful retailer to use Liberty Loan 
drives as opportunities to drive up sales and turnover stocks. A few weeks ahead of the 
Second Liberty Loan drive in October 1917, Wanamaker called a meeting of what he 
called a “war council,” comprised of his most experienced managers and buyers.189 
Together they planned a campaign for a banner sale of one million dollars worth of select 
merchandise below market value to occur simultaneously with the Liberty Loan drive. 
Wanamaker told the war council that the purpose of the sale was two-fold: “to make a 
favorable impression on the public, and at the same time make an increase in sales.” To 
guard against any accusations that the sale was self-interested, members of the war 
council swiftly incorporated the increasingly popular language of “fair prices.” President 
Wilson had relied heavily on the phrase in establishing the Federal Food Administration 
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during the summer of 1917, which aimed to address growing demands for more 
affordable food. The Federal Food Administration mobilized thousands of women 
volunteers across the country, encouraging them to demand “fair prices” from local 
business owners.190 Wanamaker’s war council placed the firm in allegiance with 
consumers in the fight for fair prices. Promotions for the “One Million Dollar Sale” 
insisted that Wanamaker’s was “a servant of the people, supplying them with what they 
need of good grades at fair prices.”  And as another advertisement claimed, the store’s 
alliance with the American people preceded any demands from the government: 
“Without waiting for the government to ask us… we have decided to do our duty as 
merchants to take part in the [fair price] policy of the government.”191 Wanamaker’s 
“One Million Dollar Sale” was an immediate hit. Women’s Wear Daily reported that 
crowds at Wanamaker’s stores were as thick as at Christmastime, and the war council 
even decided to extend the sale for five additional weeks beyond the duration of the 
Second Liberty Loan Drive. In the end, Wanamaker’s sold over five million dollars of 
merchandise at “fair prices,” below market value. During the final days of the sale, 
advertisements prodded other businesses to follow their lead: “It only seems fair that all 
producers, and distributors of goods should take less profits until the war settles.”192  
Following the success of the “One Million Dollar Sale,” Wanamaker’s continued 
to rely on the language of “fair prices” to counter increased pressures on Americans to 
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save their money. During the 1917 Christmas season, the Society for the Prevention of 
Useless Gifts (SPUGS), a reform group founded in 1912 to oppose American 
materialism, resurfaced to add to the chorus of calls urging thrift. SPUGS targeted 
American women and argued that only small trifles should be bought during the 
Christmas season. The rest, they argued, ought to be donated for the support of American 
soldiers.193 Wanamaker’s upended calls for thrift by urging a different kind of sacrifice 
during the Christmas season. “We must not limit the expression of our goodwill to the 
convenience of our pockets,” Wanamaker wrote in an editorial advertisement, “we must 
be willing—and glad—to suffer a little financially.”194 The stores also adopted a new 
policy of no discounts for special groups, which advertisers claimed enabled them to 
continue offering fair prices. According to Wanamaker, it was the “right psychological 
moment” for discontinuing discounts to favored classes of consumers, even to members 
of the U.S. military. “Every man’s dollar ought to go as far as any other man’s dollar,” he 
proclaimed.  The Dry Goods Economist praised Wanamaker for his leadership and 
retailers in Washington, D.C., Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, New York, and Nebraska soon 
followed his lead.195  
At the start of 1918, Wanamaker gathered his head buyers for a meeting in which 
he explained that it was “the most difficult time in our lives from any point of 
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consideration: political, financial, commercial or any other.” Some of the merchandise 
that buyers had ordered two months in advance of the Christmas season was still lost on 
the railroads and overseas, its value decreasing with every day that passed. “Hardly 
anything,” he reported, was coming in from abroad. “No matter if we could buy all the 
rugs in Turkey,” Wanamaker explained, “we couldn’t get them here.” Moreover, 
Americans were still not spending at prewar levels. He pleaded with his buyers “You 
have got to find a way to bring in the customers.”196 In advance of the third Liberty Loan 
drive in April 1918, buyers strategized with Wanamaker to develop a new promotion that 
directly linked merchandise sales and stock turnover to the liberty loan drive. As always, 
the promotion was framed as a program to ease the sacrifices the war thrust upon 
American consumers. In the midst of the third loan drive, Wanamaker’s announced that 
gross receipts for five days of sales at both the New York and Philadelphia stores would 
be used to purchase Liberty Loan subscriptions. During the sale, shopping at 
Wanamaker’s became equivalent to the purchase of a loan subscription. As a local 
Liberty Loan volunteer explained to the newspapers, “it seems there are a great many 
thousands of people who are perplexed by the difficulty of buying Liberty bonds at a time 
when they urgently need to buy clothing and furnishings. It is hard for them to decide 
what to do. The Wanamaker stores provide a plan by which they can do both.”197 The 
“Wanamaker Plan,” as newspapers began calling it, so effectively framed a drive to 
increase sales and overturn stocks as a patriotic national service that stores, hotels, and 
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manufacturers in Philadelphia and New York printed advertisements affirming their 
allegiance with Wanamaker’s “whole-hearted, big-visioned patriotism.”198 The sale 
raised over five million dollars in Liberty Loan subscriptions, by far the largest grossing 
Liberty Loan promotion at a retail outlet during the First World War.199 
Well after the armistice in 1918, Wanamaker’s promotions remained entrenched 
in the language of fair prices and ideas about national service. In 1920, as prices 
continued to rise, Wanamaker orchestrated a twenty percent deduction sale on the entire 
inventory at his New York and Philadelphia stores. Top buyers and advertisers marketed 
the event as a “People’s Sale,” and a “sledgehammer blow,” that would “break the 
backbone of high prices.” 200 National news outlets praised Wanamaker with headlines, 
such as: “While Economists Were Bewailing the High Cost of Living, Wanamaker’s 
Acted.”201 At the height of the sale, Wanamaker’s hit a record-setting total of over one 
million dollars in sales in a single day. The New York Times announced that the firm had 
set off a wave of price-cutting that spread throughout the country.202 So many newspapers 
reported on Wanamaker’s “revolutionary” sale that his advertisers released a full-page 
collage featuring clips of all the flattering headlines. In the center of the collage, 
advertisers included a caricature of Wanamaker depicted as a young, spry, and muscle-
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bound baseball player (he was, in fact, eighty-two years old). Swinging a heavy bat, 
Wanamaker’s caricature “knocked a homer” against the high cost of living.”203  
Consuming and citizenship had become inextricably intertwined in the first half 
of the twentieth century. One of the more compelling advertisements for the sale of 
Liberty Loans, which illustrated this clearly, came in April 1918 and was sponsored by 
twenty leading department stores in New York City, including Wanamaker’s, Macy’s, 
and Bloomingdale’s. The advertisement pictures a beautiful young woman cloaked in a 
long, shapeless dress and a dark head scarf characteristic of the city’s immigrant poor. In 
one hand she clutches her child, who dons an old-fashioned newsboy cap reminiscent of a 
Dickensian street urchin. In the other hand, she proudly raises to her heart a Liberty Loan 
subscription. Behind the poor young mother and her son, nearly a dozen much more 
fashionably dressed women swarm the sales counter at an unnamed department store, 
each one eager to subscribe for a Liberty Loan. Behind the counter boxes are stacked and 
labeled “Liberty bonds,” underneath a sign calling bonds the “best bargain in the world.” 
The caption on the advertisement targeted women with the question: “Are We Women 
Just Bargain Hunters, After All?” Surely advertisements like this one taught Americans 
to associate their national identity with spending, but in the World War I-era department 
store the link between citizenship and spending took on even more particular meanings, 
extending well beyond the carefully constructed imagery and language employed by 
professional advertisers on New York’s Madison Avenue. Everyday Americans mingled 
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together in amid aisles filled crockery, home furnishing, or sportswear and performed 
their citizenship through the purchase of Paris or patriotic fashions, and most clearly 
through their participation in Liberty Loan drives. Whatever the motivation—profits or 
patriotism, and often both at the same time—America’s retailers ensured that women 
were never merely bargain hunters, but rather informed witnesses to events developing 
abroad or critical participants in national mobilization programs.204  
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CHAPTER THREE 
  
A New Class of American Retailers Abroad:  
National Tensions at the Overseas Trade Office in the 1920s 
  
 
Introduction 
In May 1927, as Charles Lindbergh famously touched down to a hero’s welcome 
just outside Paris, Frank J. Scheidecker left his office at 5 Cité Paradis, in the heart of the 
commissionaire district, for Zurich.205 He regretted missing Lindbergh, whom he 
regarded as a “superman,” capable of “eradicating the distances that separated the 
world’s people.”206 In his own line of work, Scheidecker aspired to eradicate distances 
too. Born in Switzerland, he had spent most of the previous two decades managing 
American retail trade offices in Paris, first for New York’s B. Altman Co., and then for 
the Associated Merchandising Corporation (AMC), the largest cooperative buying 
association for department stores in the United States.207 In 1926 the AMC created a new 
executive post for Scheidecker: General Manager of Foreign Offices in Europe.208 His 
trip to Zurich marked the beginning of an extended tour of AMC trade offices in Vienna, 
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Chenmitz, Gablonz, Berlin, Brussels, Belfast, and London. He also spent time in Milan 
where, although prices on silks and drapery remained high, he suggested opening a new 
office the following year. When Scheidecker returned to Paris he organized the first 
meeting to include all of the AMC European office managers. They gathered in Brussels 
in July and, with the blessing of the American retailers on the AMC executive board, 
Scheidecker did his resolute best to implement new systems of organization across the 
foreign offices. He insisted that all staff in Europe ought to send the same interim reports 
on orders to the New York office, keep the same general files on all local manufacturers, 
conform to the same systems of classification and numbering, and so on. “If we want to 
get a real wholesome organization in Europe,” Scheidecker wrote to AMC executives in 
the United States, “the foreign offices should consider themselves as part of a whole... 
and [ought to understand] that they do not work for just one office but for the AMC. That 
is, for all our stores.”209  By the end of the decade at least some of the foreign 
representatives of the AMC may have recognized their offices “as part of a whole,” but 
the extent to which that “whole” might be considered American remained debatable.  
Although the spread of the AMC across Europe seems to fit neatly into a widely 
accepted narrative about the advance of American commerce abroad in the twenties, it 
would be a mistake to cast foreign retail trade offices as another brand of imperial 
outpost. To be sure, department stores often framed their expansion in imperial terms, as 
in a 1929 advertisement for Filene’s department store, which featured an abstract map of 
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the world above the boast: “In 1909 our buying was confined to a radius of a few hundred 
miles. Today, in 1929 the world is our hunting ground!”210 Yet, unlike the oft-studied 
Ford Motor Corporation, Hollywood production studios, or even chain stores like 
Woolworth’s, department store executives had no stake in exporting American 
merchandise or values to Europe or anywhere else.211 Quite the reverse: American 
retailers expanded abroad in order to import more and higher quality merchandise at 
lower prices, and to enhance their prestige in the United States through association with 
the Europe’s most fashionable people and places. As Kristin Hoganson has shown, 
foreign imports played a critical role in shaping notions of American domesticity, but the 
French frocks, British sport coats, and German gloves that filled American closets did not 
arrive there on their own. For a large sector of the American public, especially middle 
class white women, department stores were the foremost purveyors of the merchandise 
that shaped what Hoganson has incisively labeled the “consumers’ imperium.” And 
despite the imperial and racist undertones inherent in many imported fashions—how else 
might one make sense of American interest in folk fashions from the Balkan war zone or 
boudoir attire from Japan?—the process by which these goods entered department stores 
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looked nothing like the American domination of foreign markets. On the contrary, 
American retailers prized alliances with their counterparts in Europe and depended on the 
special skills and expertise of foreign residents, especially in France. Indeed, in the 
American retail industry, expansion abroad more closely resembled an unending series of 
trials in transatlantic cooperation, in which American methods and expectations rarely 
trumped local knowledge and customs.  
The AMC was not the first group of American retailers to establish cooperative 
trade offices in Europe, but the corporation set new terms for the retail trade abroad and 
quickly became an industry leader. Established in 1918, the AMC grew out of the Retail 
Research Association (RRA), a group of innovative and independent American retailers 
committed to the scientific study of a wide variety of retail problems. Several RRA 
studies revealed widespread frustration over the longstanding commissionaire system of 
foreign trade in which smaller retailers contracted with foreign firms to manage their 
buying overseas. Nine RRA member stores agreed to form the AMC as an experiment in 
the group buying method of merchandising; that is, the practice of increasing buying 
power by placing high volume orders with manufacturers for distribution through 
multiple stores. After the AMC established its first foreign offices in London, Paris, and 
Berlin between 1920-1921 all eighteen RRA member stores joined the AMC, and the two 
associations, although legally separate corporations, became linked in every other sense, 
sharing the same executive board, stockholders, and committee members. The RRA-
AMC represented influential department stores in cities across the United States from the 
Emporium in San Francisco and the J. L. Hudson Company in Detroit to Joseph Horne 
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Co. in Pittsburgh and Filene’s of Boston. No two executives did more than Lincoln Filene 
and Louis Kirstein, the co-owner and Vice President of Filene’s in Boston respectively, 
to ensure the success of the AMC overseas. By the middle of the decade the group 
wielded more buying power in Europe than the much older, perennial retail and 
wholesale giants such as Macy’s, Wanamaker’s, Gimbels, and Marshall Field’s. The 
AMC ushered in a dramatic shift in the balance of power in the American retail  industry; 
one that allowed otherwise inconsequential AMC member stores situated well outside 
New York City, like L. & S. Ayres of Indianapolis and William Taylor Son & Co. of 
Cleveland, to sell the latest Paris fashions at prices that compared favorably with 
longtime industry leaders such as Macy’s and Gimbels.212 
Although the AMC was legally an American corporation and ostensibly run by an 
American executive board, Europeans staffed and managed the foreign offices. When 
Kirstein and Filene traveled to Europe in 1919 to lay the groundwork for the first AMC 
trade offices abroad, they considered alliances with local retailers to be an integral part of 
developing foreign trade operations. And no single retail firm was more vital to the 
success of the AMC than Harrods of London, whose top executives hired and trained 
British buyers to run the AMC offices not only in London, but also in Berlin. In 
administrative terms, managers of the AMC foreign offices aspired to implement trade 
systems developed by the staff at Harrods’ Paris office, rather than import any uniquely 
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American model. While a shared interest in the cheap postwar German trade fueled the 
partnership between the AMC and Harrods, American retailers found no common ground 
with fellow retailers in Paris who looked abroad primarily for consumer markets in which 
to sell their own manufactured goods. With no institutional partner in Paris comparable to 
Harrods, the AMC office there took longer to establish and was never as well organized 
as those in London and Berlin. Still, Paris fashions marked the epicenter of the American 
retail trade, as they had for decades, and the AMC Paris headquarters quickly became the 
corporation’s most important location in Europe. Nearly one hundred fifty American 
buyers visited the office annually and around three dozen French worked there year 
round. The AMC’s French trade was profitable and helped, in no small terms, to establish 
the corporation as an industry leader.  
No cooperative association of retailers anywhere in the world did as large a 
business in Europe as the AMC, but that did not preclude the corporation from the 
resentments that pitted resident staff against visiting American buyers and vice versa. In 
1927 Kirstein wrote to Scheidecker insisting that the resident staff at the corporation’s 
foreign offices ought to show more “sympathetic consideration” for the challenges 
American buyers faced when they visited the markets abroad, where many did not know 
the local languages or customs. In the highly competitive and financially uncertain Paris 
fashion trade, tensions ran especially high and, more often than not, broke along national 
lines. Despite repeated requests from the American executive board that only English be 
spoken in the Paris office, French staff continued to speak and work in their own 
language. The language barrier fostered deep feelings of mistrust between French and 
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American employees of the AMC working in Paris, and to a lesser extent in other cities. 
Even by the end of the decade, the Paris office manager, a Frenchman named Edouard 
Léon, was still trying to persuade his staff that they worked in service of an American 
corporation. Indeed, the Paris headquarters of the AMC lacked any sense of what Léon 
called the “American spirit,” but the trade progressed regardless, because for American 
retailers imports from the fashion capital of the world were an essential part of their 
business.  
As Kirstein once explained, “the success or failure of a department depends, to a 
certain extent... on the merchandise which buyers secure while they are abroad, both with 
respect to quantity and quality.”213 For the nearly twenty department stores that entered 
into the AMC in 1918 the corporation’s expansion in Europe contributed significantly to 
the success of many departments in their flagship stores. As the American drapery buyer 
Richard Owen boasted to his superiors at the AMC member store J. L. Hudson Co. of 
Detroit from the Paris office in 1922, “we will have some French merchandise this fall 
that ought to make the ‘Fifth Floor’ famous!”214 Yet, it would be remiss to cast the 
American retail trade that brought famous French draperies to Detroit as another in a long 
line of American commercial conquests abroad. In fact, the AMC retail trade succeeded 
precisely because it was not wholly American, but rather comprised of nationally distinct 
parts, some of which were more British or more French than the imperial tone of member 
stores’ advertising might suggest. Retail trade offices functioned less like extensions of a 
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market empire, than as cultural and commercial “contact zones” in which American and 
European buyers negotiated both terms of sale and each other’s differences amid larger 
international tensions. From the perspective of American retailers, commercial expansion 
abroad demanded extensive negotiation and cooperation, rather than 
“Americanization.”215  
 
 
How Harrods Made the AMC Beyond the Paris Markets 
“Paris is of course the most interesting place in the world,” Louis Kirstein wrote 
from his makeshift office on the Champs Elysees in February 1919. “It seems that 
everybody from anywhere is here and if some big things are not put across it won’t be 
because there are no master minds trying to.”216 Like many American businessmen who 
flooded the French capital after the armistice, Kirstein, too, was trying to accomplish big 
things. During the war, he had held several posts in Washington, the last of which was 
Chief of Clothing Procurement under the Office of the Quartermaster of the United States 
Army.217 Little over one week after the armistice Kirstein had submitted a proposal to sell 
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vast quantities of surplus U.S. army stocks, including both uncut materials and 
manufactured items, in Europe in order to prevent the “dumping” of these items on 
American markets. Kirstein volunteered himself to chair the commission to oversee that 
project and by January 1, 1918 he had secured an office and sample room at the Elysees 
Palace Hotel. As an envoy attached to the American Expeditionary Forces in France, 
Kirstein negotiated deals with national representatives from Belgium, Romania, and 
Serbia, and he entertained proposals from an array of foreign commissionaires and 
manufacturers.218 When he was not selling army surplus stocks, he kept busy working on 
another “big thing.” Alongside Anne Evans, one of the most celebrated American 
resident buyers in Paris, he toured clothing design houses and met with French 
manufacturers to gather information on the Paris fashion trade. “With the information 
you bring back,” Lincoln Filene wrote to Kirstein, “we can clinch the matter and get the 
AMC office started as soon as we wish.”219  
 In the aftermath of the First World War, a new class of retailers led by Kirstein 
and Filene joined together through the AMC to set the foundation for what would become 
the most influential American buying operation in Europe. They considered alliances 
with retailers based in Europe essential partly because AMC executives had less 
experience in the overseas trade than executives at larger, more established firms like 
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Wanamaker’s and Macy’s.220 Beyond that, transatlantic retail alliances promised valuable 
insights into foreign markets and access to experienced local buyers in the region. Early 
on, Filene and Kirstein even hoped that their trade offices might be situated inside 
department stores in London and Paris, thereby cutting their own costs, reducing their 
liabilities, and gaining the prestige of an address already well known to local 
manufacturers and designers. In London, they succeeded in negotiating a vital partnership 
with Harrods that worked largely because AMC executives shared the London firm’s 
desire to buy cheap merchandise in postwar German markets as soon as possible. French 
retailers, on the other hand, had less interest in buying German wares than they did in 
exporting their own readymade fashions, confections, to German consumers.221 Kirstein 
and Filene attempted to court a number of French retailers to establish an alliance 
comparable to that of Harrods in London, but these relationships foundered over 
differences in language, culture, and business interests. As a result, the AMC offices in 
London and Berlin opened without a hitch under the direction of managers hand-picked 
and trained by Harrods. It took a full year longer for AMC executives to secure stable 
leadership at the Paris trade office, and even then the French headquarters would never 
run as smoothly as the offices operating with Harrods’ support in London and Berlin.  
By 1919 both Kirstein and Filene had become successful retailers, but neither had 
an upbringing that compared with their contemporaries at the country’s largest and oldest 
firms, such as Rodman Wanamaker or Jesse Isidor Straus. Kirstein was the son of a 
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German Jewish lens grinder who fled Leipzig in the wake of the revolutionary uprisings 
in 1848. He was born in Rochester, New York in 1867 and left home at the age of sixteen 
to ride the rails and do a host of odd jobs, including peddling patent medicine and playing 
on a semi-professional baseball team. He earned a reputation as a kind of maverick and 
his future prospects were bleak. Before he married his wealthy and well-connected wife, 
Rose Stein, in 1896, her family had begged her to give him up. Filene’s upbringing was 
not nearly as rough and tumble as Kirstein’s, but it was hardly more cosmopolitan. Also 
the son of German Jewish immigrants, Filene split his youth between his father’s small 
and moderately successful dry goods shops in Salem and Boston, Massachusetts. Neither 
Kirstein nor Filene finished high school, let alone college, and neither had traveled 
outside the country before the age of forty.222 By contrast, Wanamaker and Straus both 
received Ivy League educations (at Princeton and Harvard respectively), where they 
learned French and German and studied European art and history. As children, both 
Straus and Wanamaker spent considerable time in Europe and came to regard Paris as a 
second home; both would live there off and on over the course of their lives.223 
Wanamaker and Straus had grown up the sons of millionaires whereas Kirstein and 
Filene had grown up the sons of immigrants. Like John Wanamaker and Isidor Straus 
before them, Kirstein and Filene would bring their children to Europe and give them Ivy 
                                                      
222 Edward Filene, Lincoln’s older and better known brother did study some German and spent one year at 
the Handels Institute, an academy for boys in Seignitz, Germany where his mother’s family lived. He 
aspired to attend Harvard College and passed the entrance exams. Shortly before beginning his classes, 
Edward’s father fell ill and he took over the Filene’s business. Edward kept and cherished his invitation to 
Harvard College all his life. See: George E. Berkley, The Filene’s (International Pocket Library, 1998), 29-
30. 
223 Rodman Wanamaker lived in Paris between in the 1890s and Straus moved there in 1933 when he 
accepted an appointment from Roosevelt to serve as the U.S. Ambassador to France. 
  
122
League educations. However, when the two AMC executives went abroad in 1919 to 
establish the corporation’s first foreign trade offices they brought with them none of the 
advantages of their peers.224  
What Kirstein and Filene did bring to Europe was a vital connection to Frank 
Chitham, an influential member of the executive board at Harrods of London. Kirstein 
first encountered Chitham in 1909 while working under the direction of his father-in-law, 
Nathaniel Stein of Stein-Bloch Co. in Rochester, New York. At the time Chitham was 
running the men’s wear department at Selfridge & Co. and had contracted with Stein 
Bloch to sell what he claimed were the first American-made men’s suits in London. As 
Kirstein climbed the executive ladder at Filene’s beginning in 1911 he kept up his 
friendship with Chitham, who regularly advised Filene’s buyers on the latest trends in 
London and Paris. In fact, when Filene’s buyers traveled abroad they stopped first at 
Selfridges where Chitham put them in touch with local buyers in their lines. During the 
First World War, Chitham left Selfridges to join Harrods’ executive board and brought 
his friendship with Kirstein and connection to Filene’s with him.225 Under Chitham’s 
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direction in June 1919, Harrods officially joined the RRA/AMC, a move that added 
considerable prestige to the corporation’s activities in Europe.  
When Filene brought an AMC exploratory committee on a European trip to 
advance plans for overseas trade offices in September 1919, they relied heavily on 
Harrods’ resources. In fact, the committee spent three weeks studying British markets 
inside temporary offices Chitham arranged for them at Harrods flagship store on 
Brompton Road. Filene’s committee gained every possible advantage working alongside 
Harrods’ buyers who introduced them to local manufacturers and to the managers at the 
British trade offices of both Wanamaker’s and Marshall Fields. Beyond Harrods, Filene 
and his committee held meetings with representatives from the British Industries, the 
Board of Trade, and the American Chamber of Commerce, and became acquainted with 
the commercial attaché at the U.S. Embassy. “It is very evident,” Filene wrote to Kirstein 
in Boston, “that this market wants to sell to America and will strain every point to do so 
if they can produce the goods.”  Another member of the AMC committee, Charlie Steines 
of the Emporium in San Francisco, told Women’s Wear Daily, “We are ready to buy 
almost anything [the British] could produce: woolens, cottons, linens, hosiery, toys, 
brushes, porcelain wares. The world is hungering for British goods.”226 Although Filene 
and Steines recognized that British manufacturers, still recovering from the war, faced 
both labor shortages and industrial unrest, they agreed that a trade office in London 
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would be “of great value” to the AMC.  Before leaving London, they offered the job of 
managing the office to the current head of Wanamaker’s trade operations in the city.227   
By the time Wanamaker’s lead London buyer turned down the AMC’s offer, 
Filene, Steines, and the rest of the exploratory committee had already returned to the 
United States. Without missing a beat Chitham and Sir Woodman Burbidge, senior 
director and joint-owner of Harrods, continued the search for an AMC manager and even 
located an appropriate building to house the new office. In December Chitham and 
Burbidge recommended a man whom they had interviewed twice and considered the top 
candidate. AMC executives were initially skeptical of A. E. Robins who had spent thirty 
years as a manager in the banking industry. Robins had no experience in merchandising, 
but Chitham insisted he was the best man for the job.228 Burbidge, too, considered Robins 
a “a man of wide outlook, good general knowledge, and of proved ability.” Once the 
AMC executive board approved Robins’ hire, Chitham invited the new manager to spend 
several weeks at Harrods’ Paris office to study the retail trade and learn something about 
merchandising. Harrods’ “trade systems” in Paris, Chitham argued, could “in many 
respects be with advantage adopted in the proposed [AMC] London office.”229 Filene was 
thrilled. He considered Harrods’ Paris office the best in the city and had described its 
manager as a “very excellent man.” “If we could find his duplicate,” Filene once wrote, 
“we should ask nothing better” for the AMC offices.230 During the winter of 1919 and 
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1920 Robins spent weeks studying Harrods’ “trade systems” in Paris, and in the spring he 
set out on a tour of AMC member stores across the eastern United States to get a sense of 
American tastes.  
During the summer of 1920, Robins opened the AMC’s first foreign trade office 
on London’s Oxford Street, just a few blocks from the hustle and bustle at Selfridges. As 
Robins explained to Women’s Wear Daily, his staff aimed to “smooth out difficulties so 
that when an American buyer comes over here he will know just where to find the things 
he requires.”231 Ten British employees kept the office running, including a merchandise 
manager, a market reporter, and an office manager who oversaw six clerks and 
stenographers in charge of checking orders, processing payments, organizing shipments, 
and making any other necessary arrangements for visiting American buyers. Robins 
hosted thirty to forty AMC buyers during the 1920 fall season and he met with each one 
of them personally upon their arrival. Buyers also met with the merchandising manager 
who provided a detailed overview of the best current samples in their lines. Robins also 
compiled a twenty-five page “London Office Guide” designed to orient buyers not only 
to the office, but also to the best markets in Britain.232 The guide included information 
about shipping, exchange rates, and the best hotels and restaurants in the city. It also 
indexed the most important and most obscure manufacturing centers in Britain across  
every line from brass goods and boots to muslins and silk hosiery. Carpet buyers, for 
example, were encouraged to visit the lesser known centers of Ayr and Kidderminster, as 
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well as Edinburgh.233 Nearly one year after the London office opened, Kirstein happily 
reflected that “the more I see of this London office, the better pleased I am with it. I think 
they do an excellent job pleasing the buyers of the stores, which is not a particularly easy 
job.”234  
Harrods executives had done much to ensure that the AMC’s London trade office 
would be a success, but their reasons for doing so were hardly philanthropic. From the 
beginning, Chitham backed the AMC because he looked forward to setting up a powerful 
cooperative trade office in Germany. Despite their eagerness to take advantage of 
favorable trade conditions in German markets, both American and British retailers feared 
reprisals from consumers if they sold German wares too soon. “We have not met an 
Englishman, starting with Mr. Chitham on down who does not want to buy German 
goods at the earliest possible moment,” Filene had explained in 1919. But, he added, “so 
many sons have been killed and wounded by the Germans that there is a very strong 
antipathy here to anything German.”235 By 1920, however, that antipathy had faded, even 
in the United States where congress had yet to approve a peace treaty with Germany. As 
Women’s Wear Daily pointed out, American manufacturers had not met the standards set 
by their German counterparts, especially in toy lines. “German leadership in the industry 
has not been overcome,” noted one reporter studying the proliferation of German labels 
on department store shelves.  In October 1920, official trade reports indicated a steep rise 
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in German imports across the United States—quadruple the figures for the same month in 
1919 and not far behind figures for imports from France. Indeed, around the same time 
that Robins opened the office on Oxford Street, Harrods joined the AMC in negotiating 
an exclusive contract for joint representation in Cologne, Germany through Roger M. C. 
Day, a young Englishman who had overseen Harrods’ purchases in the region before the 
First World War.236 Less than one year later, in the spring of 1921, the AMC purchased a 
permanent regional trade office on Lindenstrasse in the center of the Berlin’s bustling 
export district. They sent Day to the London office to learn Harrods’ trade systems from 
Robins, including preferred policies on coding merchandise, placing orders, record 
keeping, and correspondence. For the next twenty years Harrods would conduct the 
largest trade through Berlin of any AMC member store, and Day remained at the helm 
until grave political differences with AMC leadership forced his departure in 1932.237 
 
For Kirstein and Filene, developing a trade office in Paris could not have been 
more different from their experiences in London and Berlin. Since at least the turn of the 
twentieth century, Filene’s and other AMC member stores had conducted their trade in 
Paris by paying foreign commissionaire firms to represent their interests in the markets. 
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Suspicions that foreign commissionaires did not deliver a fair deal on imports had always 
dogged the transatlantic trade. Even in 1879 when John Wanamaker sent his first buyer to 
reside permanently in Paris he explained that the buyer’s purpose was to “study foreign 
markets and skim the cream,” by which he meant to cut out commissions paid to 
unreliable middlemen.238 After 1900, however, a growing number of wealthy and 
college-educated American women moved to Paris to build careers as resident buyers, 
and they reinforced the idea that foreign commissionaires were cheats. In 1912 resident 
buyer and correspondent for Women’s Wear Daily, Edith L. Rosenbaum wrote a cover 
article in which she alleged that, “we Americans do not get as fair treatment when our 
business goes through a commissionaire.” An honest commissionaire, Rosenbaum 
lamented, “was a very good thing, but a very rare one.”239 Another resident buyer wrote 
in from Paris to agree with Rosenbaum, pointing that the French worked “both ends of 
the game” by collecting commission fees from manufacturers and passing them on in 
higher prices to retailers. Throughout the first two decades of the twentieth century 
Filene’s maintained contracts with several foreign commissionaires in France and across 
Europe, but American resident buyers Anne Evans and Faith Chipperfield were, far and 
away, their most valuable connections in Paris. Between 1912 and 1919, Evans and 
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Chipperfield ran a wildly successful buying operation and sent sketches, samples, and 
fashion reports to dozens of American department stores, including Bonwit Teller, 
Bambergers, and a number of future AMC-member stores, direct from Paris.240 
When Kirstein visited Paris in January 1919 to sell army surplus stocks, he relied 
on Evans as a tour guide, translator, and networker. She put him in touch with executives 
at the top department stores in Paris, including Le Printemps, Bon Marché, Louvre, and 
Galeries Lafayette, and she attended many of the meetings as a translator. However, none 
of the meetings amounted to much. At Louvre, an executive named Machart confided in 
Kirstein that he wanted to create an American department that would sell only 
merchandise produced in the United States. He inquired as to whether the AMC would 
serve as a commissionaire for his buyers in New York, but Kirstein demurred. The AMC 
was not in the business of selling American exports and the executives parted ways.241 
Kirstein had the most success with Théophile Bader, cofounder of the Galeries Lafayette, 
who revealed that his firm was preparing to send an executive to the United States for the 
first time to study American consumer markets and explore possibilities for establishing a 
manufacturing and retail branch in New York. Bader explained that the firm, which was 
then producing confections valued at over one hundred million francs annually, was 
making large investments in its factories and planned to sell lower-priced French fashions 
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abroad to American and German consumers.242  Bader’s plans placed the  Galeries 
Lafayette in direct competition with AMC member stores, unless Kirstein was willing to 
sign an fairly exclusive contract to buy fashions manufactured at the Galeries Lafayette—
he was not. Moreover, Bader resented the AMC’s proposed trade office in Paris, which 
only threatened to bring more competition in haute couture samples and manufacturing 
materials. Despite these conflicts of interest, for a brief period in 1919 Bader, Kirstein, 
and Filene seemed to think they could help each other. Each side was eager to learn more 
about markets and manufacturing on the opposite shores of the Atlantic.243   
When Filene visited Paris in October 1919 with the very same AMC exploratory 
committee that had spent three weeks together in offices expressly arranged for them at 
Harrods, they learned quickly that Bader would offer them no similar level of support. 
Filene had been under the impression that the committee would be welcome to use 
temporary offices at the Galeries Lafayette, permitted interviews with French buyers, and 
granted access to other administrative supports, but nothing of the sort came to pass. 
Instead AMC executives spent most of their time in Paris working out of the Hotel 
Continental and studying the trade offices run by large American and British firms, 
including Wanamaker’s, Macy’s, Gimbel Brothers, Marshall Fields, and Harrods. Filene 
only met with Bader sometime during the committee’s second week in the city and his 
goal was merely “try to get some clear idea of what they have in mind in the way of using 
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us and of our using them.” Not surprisingly, the meeting fell flat. Evans had not been 
available to accompany Filene as an interpreter and so the two executives relied on 
Bader’s son-in-law to translate. And according to Filene, his understanding of English 
was “very limited.” “I cannot tell you exactly what kind of progress we are making,” 
Filene wrote to Kirstein in exasperation. He concluded, however, that the Galeries 
Lafayette “are really too busy to be of use to us and are too busy for us to use them.” 
During the summer of 1919 the leading French retail and manufacturing firm had pursued 
its plans to expand to the United States, but by October they were no longer interested. 
After an extended tour studying American retailing and manufacturing, mostly in New 
York, one of the firm’s top executives, Pierre Wertheimer, told Women’s Wear Daily that 
they were abandoning plans to open a U.S. branch “at this time.” 244 Instead Bader, 
Wertheimer, and nearly every other manufacturer and retailer in France had their eyes 
fixed on Germany. 
 Despite their failures to establish any meaningful connection with a French 
retailer, the AMC committee nonetheless determined that the time was right to do so. 
Paradoxically, Filene argued that the inflated prices across Paris combined with the 
growing interest in German consumers made establishing a trade office there imperative. 
Filene wrote at length to Kirstein about how the prices across Paris were “beyond 
comprehension.” Inflation had affected every sector of the economy including food, 
lodging, and transportation, and the impact on the fashion industries appeared to be 
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especially acute. During the war two-fifths of the French textile industry’s productive 
capacity, especially in cottons and woollens, had been amputated by the German 
occupation, or otherwise immobilized. A considerable percentage of silk factories, too, 
had converted to wartime production, especially for the growing air force. Despite 
remarkable efforts to rebuild these industries, especially in the devastated north, only 
three quarters of those businesses damaged during the war were partially or fully 
operational by 1923. Although many French couturiers accordingly turned towards 
readily available silk blends like crepe de chine and satin, the shortage of domestic 
textiles drove up the prices of both couture and confections.245 Filene reported that 
French retailers were so short on gloves that their buyers were placing orders with 
manufacturers without even asking about the price. Steines described purchasing a pair of 
socks that might have cost thirty cents at home for nearly four francs at Bon Marché. 
Equally important, however, was the fact that the devaluation of the franc placed the 
French at an advantage when selling to Germany and at a disadvantage when selling to 
the United States. “You hear on all sides here,” Filene reported, “that France is going to 
sell to Germany just as soon as she can and as much as she can.” Given the high prices 
and the pivot towards Berlin in the French fashion industries, Filene reasoned that the 
AMC desperately needed a trade office “run in our own individual interest in order to get 
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a fair share for our markets of what is produced over here.”246 Without an office, he 
feared, the best fashions and the best prices would go to the Germans.  
 Setting up a Paris trade office, however, took almost a full year longer than it had 
in London where Chitham and Burbidge had smoothed the path. If there were any 
lingering hopes for an alliance with the Galeries Lafayette, they faded as soon as the 
AMC announced definitive plans to open a Paris trade office.247 Not only did AMC 
executives have no French allies in the city, their best connections to the trade were all 
American women: Evans, Chipperfield, and Millie Kahn, a fashion specialist who had 
done some contract work with Filene’s through another commissionaire firm, Schoeniger 
& Roditti. Despite the fact that American women had reliably managed the purchase of 
French fashions for most of the AMC member stores since at least 1912, no executive 
approved of placing a woman at the head of a foreign trade office. The corporation spent 
months trying to hire a British or American man to head their proposed office without 
any success. As Kirstein confessed to Chitham, the situation in Paris was “very 
disappointing.”248 Ultimately, a newly formed foreign office committee, headed by 
Kirstein, agreed to place Kahn in charge of the office temporarily. The internal 
announcement of Kahn’s appointment awkwardly noted: “It is the purpose of the 
committee to probably eventually have a man in charge of the Paris office with Miss 
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Kahn as his assistant.”249 Still, trade journals reported Kahn’s appointment as though she 
were, in fact, the AMC’s new Paris manager and an equal partner to Robins in the 
London office. Filene wrote confidentially to Kirstein that he ought to make crystal clear 
to Kahn that her leadership role was only temporary: “It might seem as if she was to be 
the head of the Paris office, but this I am sure you do not mean.” In fact, Kahn did run the 
Paris office for nearly nine months and even handled the foreign office committee’s 
bungled attempt to purchase a headquarters that Kirstein ultimately determined were not 
right for the work.250 Not surprisingly, Kahn left the AMC soon after the executive board 
hired Frank J. Scheidecker, a Swiss and and the longtime assistant manager of B. Altman 
Co.’s. trade office in Paris, to take her place.251 Kahn’s departure left a second vacancy in 
the leadership of the Paris office that would not be filled until 1921, although this time 
around the firm would promote a young French buyer already working in the Paris office 
named Edouard Léon.  
A wave of optimism for trade in Europe, especially in German markets, washed 
over the American retail industry during the summer of 1921. “The entire industrial 
Europe is doing its best to come back,” Horace A. Saks of Saks & Co. department store 
told reporters after returning from a tour of France, Germany, and England. Saks insisted 
that Europeans were “working hard to recoup their losses” and that this was most 
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noticeable in Germany. Scores of executives and buyers returning from their spring trips 
to Europe, including those from the AMC, echoed Saks’ hopeful assessment. Kirstein, 
too, marveled at how much improved was the “temperament and appearance of the 
German people,” and posited that the impending acceptance in congress of peace terms 
“will remove much of the uncertainty that has hampered Germany’s commercial 
operations.”252 Riding the wave of optimism, AMC executives, including Chitham, 
embarked on their first big ventures in cooperative buying. “I have always believed,” 
Kirstein wrote to Chitham in 1921, “that the future of our association depends on the 
AMC and the harnessing of the purchasing powers for the advantage of all.”253 Their first 
big deal came that same year, for “ten thousand dozens” of pairs of hosiery manufactured 
in Germany to be distributed to nearly two dozen stores across the United States, and to 
Harrods. No single retailer or group of retailers in Europe could place such large orders 
and none could secure lower manufacturing costs. Four years later, in 1925, the head of 
the National Department Stores Group, a new competitor to the AMC representing 
department stores mainly on the west coast, would tell the New York Times that group 
buying was “the most important step in the development of retailing in this country. The 
store that is ‘going it alone’ is finding itself at a disadvantage in competing locally with 
stores operating in a group abroad.”254 He was right. And no corporation did group 
buying better than the AMC—even in the highly competitive Paris markets. 
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Price, Piracy, and French: The Absence of an American Spirit in Paris 
“No matter how lovely our own [American] creations, nor how charmingly we 
wear them,” wrote the AMC’s buyer Barbara Lee in a November 1923 advertisement in 
Vogue, “there is always a craving for at least one Paris frock in the wardrobe. Not a 
copy—but an original, designed and made in France.” According to the advertisement, 
Lee had just returned from Paris with dresses made “entirely by hand” and available 
exclusively at seventeen department stores across the country for the “incredibly small” 
price of $39.50. Sketches featuring women with unmistakably French names modeled 
Lee’s new styles in Vogue. Noèmie, for example, wore the finest Georgette crepe traced 
with a “daring block design in steel beads” and Mariette’s jet black Georgette featured 
exquisite crystal beading from neckline to hem. Department stores carrying the Barbara 
Lee frocks followed up the national advertising program in fashion magazines like Vogue 
and Harper’s with their own local campaigns. “Never in the history of our buying 
experience,” announced a Filene’s advertisement in September 1923, “have we had a 
collection of French dresses as large, as varied, as intensively planned, or as rich in 
value.” Filene’s promoted the beadwork as more secure than the machine-made variety 
because “hundreds of French women working in the provinces” had fastened each one by 
hand with crochet hooks. Shoppers eager to purchase the Barbara Lee dresses 
overwhelmed the women’s department at Filene’s and the firm considered the new 
French line a success from every angle. Trade journals reported that American 
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manufacturers and retailers were “awed,” and irked, by just how low the Barbara Lee 
frocks were priced. While some criticized the quality of the materials, others called for 
higher tariffs to guard against bulk buying initiatives in France. Barbara Lee created a stir 
in Paris, too, where reporters from the local bureau of Women’s Wear Daily hassled Lee’s 
colleagues for advance details on the collection and competing American buyers pressed 
the AMC trade office for the names of manufacturers.255    
Implicit in the 1923 advertising campaign for Barbara Lee French frocks were 
American preoccupations with price, piracy, and national origins. Although high prices 
and wild currency fluctuations continually threatened to undermine the American retail 
trade in Paris, the United States became the second largest export market for French 
fashions by the middle of the decade.256 The number of haute couture houses nearly 
tripled in the twenties, and a much larger shadow industry in fashion piracy grew up 
around them. Nearly every retailer in Paris copied original designs without purchasing 
the right to do so, but as Parisian couturiers mounted an increasingly public resistance to 
the practice the competition among American buyers for seemingly authentic French 
fashions grew fierce. The Barbara Lee French frocks gave the AMC an advantage, but the 
corporation was not immune to growing tensions between Americans and French in the 
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fashion trade. Historians have argued persuasively that the Paris-based global fashion 
system spawned an “imagined community” of dress that spilled over national borders, 
and that was largely true for shoppers in Los Angeles or New York who encountered, for 
example, a cape designed in Paris by the Italian-born Elsa Schiaparelli and inspired by 
West African masks.257 However, for buyers working in the highly competitive and 
financially uncertain markets of interwar Paris, trade negotiations remained tense and 
often broke along national lines. In the AMC office visiting American buyers routinely 
suspected their French colleagues of working in the interest of their compatriot designers 
and manufacturers. In turn, the French staff resented their American colleagues who 
knowingly overlooked the unwritten rules of the trade and who made no effort to speak 
their language. Despite the AMC’s English language policy and its efforts to bring the 
office in line with administrative policies set by the London office, the Paris headquarters 
remained a French space, run largely by French buyers speaking the French language 
and, wherever possible, according to the traditions of the French fashion industries. 
American retailers did not, and could not, impose national models and methods on their 
foreign branches because the trade demanded transnational cooperation; the knowledge, 
expertise, and skills of local residents were too valuable. Remarkably, despite the 
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contested national identity of the AMC Paris headquarters, the corporation was among 
the most successful trade operations in the city. 
Barbara Lee’s French frocks made the AMC a major contender in the Paris 
fashion trade and, in many ways, set the mold for successful group buying in the 
American retail industry. Of course, Barbara Lee was fiction; a character created for the 
sake of sales promotions and clothing labels. In fact, a committee of five visiting 
American buyers from five independent AMC member stores were entrusted by the 
corporation to develop the frocks on behalf of all seventeen participating member stores. 
The committee spent four months during the summer of 1923 working closely with 
Scheidecker, then the Paris office manager, Léon, the assistant merchandise manager, and 
a number of clerks stationed at the AMC office in Paris to pull off the deal. They 
researched and selected twenty-four different styles of frocks inspired by haute couture 
(and likely copied from) models and manufactured en masse in France. The committee 
was able to secure such low prices because they placed orders that were unusually large 
for women’s dresses, a field that was not typically conducive to bulk buying given the 
frequent seasonal changes in styles. In the final tally, the AMC committed to purchasing 
7,500 Barbara Lee frocks at the price point $39.50 and several thousand additional silk 
and cotton dresses to be sold at higher price points not associated with the Barbara Lee 
name.258 Women’s Wear Daily began reporting on the deal as front-page news months 
before the frocks arrived in the United States. According to correspondents from the Paris 
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and New York bureaus, the Barbara Lee frocks had “stimulated the ambitions of several 
[competing American] dressmaking establishments to enter the bulk field” in partnership 
with French design copyists based in Paris.259 Staff at the AMC office also reported that 
Barbara Lee caused a “sensation” across the city and Scheidecker boasted that AMC 
buyers were now followed closely by competitors in the markets. “I can hardly move a 
finger,” Scheidecker wrote to Kirstein, “without making Lord & Taylor, Jordan Marsh, or 
McCreery wonder why I moved that finger and try their best to find out.”260 Between 
1923 and 1925, a number of influential American retailers followed the AMC by entering 
into the group buying model, including Lord & Taylor, which added seven smaller 
retailers to its offices and operated under the name Allied Purchasing Corporation, and 
Gimbels, which joined with Saks and the May Stores to form the Gimbel Group.261 By 
the end of 1925 the AMC released an internal memo announcing that group buying was 
no longer an experiment, but rather “a merchandising method that has come to stay.”262  
The Barbara Lee deal exemplified group buying at its best, but the financial 
uncertainties that plagued the Paris fashion industries in the years following the First 
World War caused similar initiatives to stumble as often as they succeeded. In the United 
States, the election of Republican President Warren G. Harding in the midst of a postwar 
                                                      
259 B.J. Perkins, “RRA Stores Place Large Order For French Dresses To Be Sold in the US,” WWD, July 
16, 1923, 1, 47; “French Design Copyists Seek US Bulk Trade,” WWD, August 3, 1923, 1, 18.     
260 FJS to LEK, August 14, 1822, “Barbara Lee,” Box 83; EL to LEK, letter, September 21, 1923, “Leon 
1923-1926,” Box 79, LEK HBL. 
261 “Lord and Taylor Group Announce Foreign Names,” WWD, March 27, 1923, 1; “Joint Buying By 
Groups of Stores,” NYT, May 31, 1925, E8; “Gimbel Saks May Group Opening Own Belgian Offices,” 
WWD, May 5, 1925, 29. 
262 “Principles and Practice of Group Buying in the Associated Merchandising Corporation,” January 1926, 
“Group Buying,” Box 83, LEK HBL. 
  
141
recession brought renewed support for high protective tariffs. Concerns that deflation 
abroad would bring a flood of cheap foreign imports into domestic markets fueled the 
aggressively protectionist 1922 Fordney McCumber tariff, which restored rates to more 
or less the same level as the 1909 Payne Aldrich bill. Although proponents of the 
Fordney tariff were much more concerned with agriculture and raw materials than they 
were with fashion, the effect on the Paris fashion trade was significant. Rates on imported 
French gowns, coats, and gloves were set as high as sixty percent.263 As prices on Paris 
fashions soared, Kirstein lamented the Fordney bill privately in letters to Chitham and 
denounced it publicly in interviews for Women’s Wear Daily.264 Scheidecker, too, 
speculated that the tariff would force French manufacturers to turn away from 
longstanding American contracts in search of new markets, thus pushing prices even 
higher for American buyers.265 To make matters worse, the instability of the franc meant 
that even as prices remained high across the board, they also continued to fluctuate 
enough that buyers resisted placing large advance orders. As the franc strengthened in 
1924, for example, an AMC group buying committee surveying the Paris millinery 
markets disbanded over fears that currency fluctuations might drastically increase landing 
costs (the price per item paid to manufacturers) after they placed orders.266 The same 
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fears hampered group buying efforts across merchandise lines, including for the Barbara 
Lee committee, and a number of AMC buyers left Paris without spending their full 
allotments.267 The head of the Paris bureau for Women’s Wear Daily reported similar 
trends across all the American retail trade offices in the city and even warned that there 
were signs of a U.S. buyers strike in France.268 One year later, in 1925, the rapid decline 
of the franc prompted new, and politically charged discussions over whether buyers 
ought to pay French manufacturers in francs or dollars and American buyers feared 
manufacturers’ ability to meet delivery deadlines.269 During the mid-twenties 
Scheidecker and Léon spent as much time writing letters and reports about currency 
exchanges and price fluctuations as they did orienting visiting buyers to the French 
markets.270 
In spite of these financial uncertainties, the haute couture industry grew 
significantly over the course of the decade, and alongside it a shadow industry in fashion 
piracy exploded. At the end of the First World War twenty-five couture houses 
dominated Paris, but by 1925 the industry ballooned to include seventy-five houses 
producing between one and three hundred original designs annually. In 1929 anywhere 
from 200,000 to 300,000 Parisians worked in haute couture, depending on the season, 
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and roughly 150,000 more worked in associated industries such as embroidery or glove-
making. The major couture houses employed up to 3,000 workers apiece and churned out 
large collections featuring dozens of original designs twice yearly, as well as smaller 
collections for two mid-season shows. Haute couture was a big business and it owed 
much of its growth to increasing consumer demand in Britain and the United States, the 
first and second largest export markets for Paris fashions.271 Yet, the industry had long 
fostered contradictory attitudes towards copying. Couturiers had a stake in selling their 
designs exclusively to maximize profits, but they also depended on global publicity and 
the widespread circulation of their styles to gain notoriety and uphold the primacy of 
Paris as the world’s capital of fashion. During the twenties, however, the growth of 
illustrated fashion magazines, the fast pace of transatlantic communication, and the 
simpler, loose lines of newer styles made copying much harder to identify and regulate. 
Between two and five hundred illegal copy houses sprang up on the side streets and back 
alleys of Paris in the twenties—more than three times the number of couture houses—and 
nearly every foreign retail and wholesale trade office engaged in some form of piracy. 
Macy’s Paris office, for example, paid an American sketch artist to copy haute couture 
models and send her sketches to Austria to be manufactured into gowns and then 
exported to the U.S. at much lower costs. The AMC also retained a “European stylist,” 
Renée Marihart, who studied haute couture and then took her ideas to the Berlin office 
where, once again, these designs could be manufactured and exported for less. 
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Scheidecker ordered staff at all the AMC offices to ensure that Marihart’s connection to 
Berlin was kept “strictly confidential from French manufacturers and designers who 
otherwise may not give her the fullest cooperation.”272  To protect their profits and 
reputations, couturiers increasingly used negative publicity, in-house surveillance, and 
legal suits to cut down on piracy in both domestic and foreign markets.273 In 1927, for 
example, Madame Vallet of the house of Martial & Armand took to the newspapers in 
Paris and New York when she learned that the American-owned Bijou Dress Co. falsely 
claimed to have her exclusive styles available at retail for half the typical price. Under a 
large headline announcing “A Lie Nailed!” Vallet’s advertisement accused the American 
firm of “treachery which no right-minded business man or woman will condone.”274 
However treacherous the practice may have been (copy houses, in particular, were 
regularly subject to police raids), fashion piracy remained so commonplace that by the 
end of the decade leading couturiers began developing their own inexpensive ready wear 
lines to undermine the practice.275  
Rising tensions over fashion piracy heightened competition among American 
buyers in Paris for exclusive access to haute couture designs that were demonstrably 
authentic. Macy’s became the envy of all American retailers when the firm’s Paris office 
secured exclusive rights to display sixteen haute couture gowns that were not only 
designed by the city’s most celebrated couturiers such as Callot, Worth, and Lanvin, but 
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also modeled by an impressive coterie of titled French women for the benefit of the 
French Red Cross. Macy’s celebrated “Fête of the French Red Cross” display filled the 
show windows in New York’s Herald Square during the summer of 1927 and featured the 
gowns placed alongside handwritten letters from the French noblewomen who modeled 
them in Paris. The New York Times hailed the gowns as true “works of art” that “could 
not be sold or copied, not commercialized in any way, only exhibited.” Upon hearing 
about the display, Kirstein immediately wired Léon, who had taken over the management 
of the Paris office in 1926, demanding an explanation as to why the AMC had not 
secured these models. After all, that they had made a charitable contribution to the Red 
Cross and paid to have resident French staff from their own office attend the event. Léon 
apologized and explained that Macy’s’ Paris office donated a substantial sum of over one 
hundred thousand francs, and in so doing secured the rights to display the gowns in New 
York.276 “Had we been as generous as Macy’s, we certainly would have obtained these 
models,” Léon admitted. The AMC’s loss was not so much because the firm was less 
generous, but rather because the corporation’s Paris office did not have the authority to 
make charitable contributions on behalf of all its member stores. Léon promised that if 
the corporation would grant him discretional spending in such cases “Macy’s will not be 
the only ones in the field when this happens again.” Still, he cautioned that the next 
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charity benefit to feature haute couture was sure to spark a bidding war between the top 
American retail trade offices in Paris.277 
Indeed, by the middle of the decade, the Paris fashion trade had become so 
competitive for American buyers that charity events sparked bidding wars and espionage 
became a regular feature of the work undertaken at the AMC office. When buyers from 
AMC member stores visited Paris they badgered their French counterparts working under 
Léon for information about what competitors at Macy’s, Wanamaker’s, and Lord & 
Taylor were doing in the markets. Léon’s staff actively collected information on their 
competitors in Paris even as they guarded closely the details about their own orders with 
manufacturers and designers. Léon himself begged visiting American buyers to keep their 
moves and intentions in Paris “strictly secret” and not to speak to reporters for fear that 
competitors might pick up hints and “spoil our operations.” Clerks in the Paris office 
fielded calls for information from competing American buyers posing as tourists and 
French buyers sometimes discovered that even trusted visitors working on behalf of 
AMC member stores were sharing information with competitors. When the AMC’s 
Bamberger’s of Newark sent Tobe Coller, an independent American fashion “stylist” 
(and most likely a haute couture copyist) to the Paris office, Léon’s French buyers 
discovered that she was also sharing information with Jordan Marsh, a local competitor to 
Filene’s and a member of the Allied Purchasing Co. in Paris. “Give her no information 
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except that authorized by Bambergers,” Kirstein wired immediately when he learned of 
Coller’s dual loyalties.278 Competition grew so tense that when the Associated Dress 
Manufacturers of America proposed a foreign branch to manage and systematize the 
Paris fashion trade for American importing firms (in fact, a thinly veiled plan to reduce 
competition from group buying and cheap Paris copies) one of the top benefits listed for 
members was: “to allow the world renown resident buyers of Paris—the Gimbel Group, 
Macy’s, the AMC, Lord & Taylor, Wanamaker, and Marshall Field’s—to share 
information like personal friends.” The proposal was quickly dismissed.279 
Although the exclusivity of haute couture set the pace and culture of the Paris 
fashion trade, very little of the AMC’s business went to these high-end fashion houses. 
Much to the chagrin of both the couturiers and the French buyers at the AMC Paris 
office, the symbolic importance of haute couture in the American retail industry vastly 
outweighed the sums of money American buyers spent on original designs. Léon had 
been repeatedly embarrassed by the tight wallets of the AMC’s visiting American buyers 
at the French dress openings and reported that the business managers of several couture 
houses “assailed” him personally for condoning their actions. In response, French 
merchandise managers at the AMC office developed a new orientation for visiting dress 
buyers, which emphasized the idea that “going to the opening in most cases means 
buying at least one dress per store represented.” Despite these efforts on the part of 
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merchandise managers to impress upon visiting American buyers the importance of 
buying rather than studying (and later copying) models, the practice continued. Of the 
eleven AMC buyers who attended the fall opening for Premet in 1927, only one 
purchased a single sample. Premet’s business manager subsequently issued a warning to 
Léon that such conduct could result in a ban on AMC buyers from future openings. Léon 
considered “the prestige of the AMC and its future in the style field at stake” if Premet 
took such actions and accordingly demanded that all American dress buyers consider the 
purchase of at least one dress model as an admission fee to attend any couture opening. 
He even forced several of eleven buyers to return to Premet and buy samples after the 
fact. From his office at Filene’s in Boston, Kirstein opposed Léon’s approach to haute 
couture and reminded him that the “high class model houses” comprised an 
“infinitesimally small part of our business.” “In my humble opinion,” he continued, “they 
are good for advertising purposes only.” Kirstein defended, even championed the rights 
of American buyers not to purchase samples they believed might be unprofitable. 
Eventually Kirstein assuaged Léon’s frustrations by conceding that there were “two sides 
to every story.”280 Indeed, there were two sides to every story, and there were two sides 
to the AMC Paris office, too: one French and one American. 
Situated in the heart of the commissionaire district at 5 Cité Paradis, on the same 
block as the trade offices of Macy’s and Lord & Taylor, the AMC Paris headquarters was 
one of the fastest growing and busiest trade offices in the city. The headquarters 
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underwent two renovations for expansion in 1922 and 1927 and ultimately fully occupied 
a five story building plus an annex devoted to packing and shipping. Unlike the AMC 
offices in London and Berlin, which relied on local manufacturers to pack and ship 
orders, in Paris no article left the country without first being inspected by several of the 
nearly three dozen French buyers, clerks, and advisors that staffed the office year 
round.281 When visiting American buyers arrived at the office they passed through a first 
floor devoted to the display of current merchandise samples selected by the French 
buying staff to highlight the best work of local manufacturers. Sales representatives from 
these firms regularly visited the first floor of the office to attract American business.282 
Individual sample rooms reserved for each AMC member store populated the upper 
floors and each one featured long high tables and the best in modern lighting for the close 
inspection of merchandise samples.283 When American buyers visited the office, Léon 
paired them with resident French buyers who had experience dealing with manufacturers 
in their lines.284 The office also retained a cadre of French fashion experts and stylists, 
such as Madame Odette or Mademoiselle Marihart, who sent regular fashion reports to 
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New York and advised American buyers in all lines on their trips to Paris.285 During the 
haute couture seasonal openings in the spring and fall, the office hosted as many as two 
dozen visiting American buyers at one time, along with a handful of AMC member 
executives, most of whom visited the office once each year. “I must say that the office is 
busy morning, afternoon, evening, and Sundays,” Léon reported during the fall openings 
in 1926.286 Although some of the AMC executives initially complained that the Paris 
headquarters was not equipped to handle so many buyers at once, the office only got 
more crowded as the decade wore on and a second round of expansion in 1927 was 
unavoidable.287  
In the harried climate of the AMC Paris office, the resident French staff always 
played the part of hosts to their visiting American colleagues. Despite the fact that the 
AMC was an American corporation, the office was run almost exclusively by the French 
(Scheidecker was Swiss). In a sense, the office mirrored the city around it in which 
American visitors had made themselves a commanding and conspicuous presence on 
French soil. As many as four hundred thousand Americans made a trip to Paris in 1925, 
and by their sheer numbers, these tourists fueled the remaking of parts of the city, such as 
the place de l’Opéra, which came to feature American saloons and institutions like 
Harry’s New York Bar. Despite the enthusiasm and excitement Americans felt over 
interwar Paris, the French were not always eager to play host. Many resented the 
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intrusion of modern American commercialism, buying power, and other values they 
perceived to be at odds with an idealized vision of the French way of life. At the national 
level, bitterness over the United States’ reversal on the League of Nations, insistence on 
war debt repayments, and approval of the Dawes Plan had long since displaced feelings 
of camaraderie over a shared victory in the First World War.288 In fashion circles these 
resentments were amplified by American buyers who did not follow the customs of the 
trade, such as buying models at couture openings, and who unapologetically engaged in 
piracy, thus undercutting an important national industry. The French staff at the AMC 
office registered their discontent in a number of ways. Between 1926 and 1929, Léon 
discovered three French employees who were engaged in long-term thefts of the AMC’s 
profits. An accountant named Paul Kelbert adjusted his recordkeeping in an attempt to 
cover up the more than forty thousand francs he pocketed over the course of a year, and 
in the mailroom two clerks worked together to steal and resell stamps totaling more than 
ten thousand francs.289 At no other time and in no other foreign office was the AMC the 
victim of a single insider theft, let alone three in as many years. By the early 1930s the 
Paris office earned an unwelcome reputation for fostering these kinds of “irregularities” 
and Léon was warned by the executive board to monitor his staff closely.290 Far more 
insidious and harmful than these thefts, however, was the ongoing reluctance of the 
French to speak English in the AMC office. 
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Paris may have been the epicenter of the American retail trade abroad, but very 
few American executives and buyers bothered to learn French. A 1921 survey of eighty-
seven retailers and hundreds of buyers working at department stores across the United 
States revealed no consensus as to what kind of training or experience best prepared 
buyers for their work. Only one respondent, an unnamed college-educated female buyer, 
insisted on language training. “Study Latin,” she noted, “as the foundation for the other 
languages used while traveling and buying.”291 It was good advice, but even in 1927 
Léon reported that almost none of the nearly one hundred fifty American buyers who 
visited the AMC Paris office annually spoke French.292 When Richard Owen, a drapery 
buyer for AMC member store J. L. Hudson Co. of Detroit, led his first group buying 
committee to Europe he lamented that their work was “not so easily done” in Paris as in 
London. “All of our talking,” he regretted, “had to be done through an interpreter.” In a 
summary report of his trip Owen pointed out that converting francs into dollars and back 
again in negotiations with manufacturers, especially given the currency fluctuations of 
the period, proved much more challenging when done through an interpreter.293 Because 
of the language barrier Léon worked carefully to hire French buyers with experience in 
the United States and enough knowledge of English to interpret for their American 
colleagues in the Paris markets. “I have an exceedingly good man for gloves,” Léon 
wrote to Kirstein when he hired Daniel Douillet. “He has spent four years in America, is 
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quite an expert in the line and I feel sure the [American] buyers will like him.”294 Kirstein 
was pleased. “I am looking for decided improvement along the language line by the time 
of my next visit to Paris,” he wrote to Léon in 1927. From the early days of the Paris 
office Kirstein had insisted that only English be spoken, and from the early days 
American buyers complained that the French buyers spoke entirely too much French. 
During the winter of 1927-28 Léon doubled down on the English-only policy in the office 
and reported that the staff was “gradually taking the habit of talking English.” However, 
he wrote, sheepishly, “I must say I have to watch them.”295  
French buyers’ reluctance to speak English did much worse than contribute to a 
few miscommunications, it bred a level of distrust between AMC buyers, managers, and 
executives that pitted Americans and French against each other. When the AMC 
established its first European offices it was fairly commonplace for all buyers, regardless 
of nationality, to accept extra commissions, gifts, and other bribes from manufacturers in 
exchange for orders, but the executive board passed a resolution explicitly forbidding this 
practice at the foreign offices in 1921.296 Still, American executives and buyers routinely 
suspected the French of advocating for French manufacturers rather than for AMC 
member stores in the United States. American buyers complained that they were too often 
encouraged to entertain sales pitches from manufacturers that did not offer merchandise 
of the right quantity or quality for their store.297 Moreover, when French manufacturers 
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refused to make modifications on samples, American buyers attributed their refusal to the 
French buyers’ unwillingness to advocate effectively for American, rather than French 
business interests. As often as Léon explained that French manufacturers did not accept 
modification requests along the same lines as American manufacturers, visiting American 
buyers and executives alike continued to question the loyalties of their French 
colleagues.298 When J. B. Shea of the AMC member store Joseph Horne Co. of Pittsburgh 
found that a shipment of French mufflers did not meet his expectations he reported that 
the Paris office “seemed to be more interested in finding excuses for their manufacturers 
than anything else.” Another buyer from the same firm further suggested that an 
American stylist would be a more effective advocate than the French buyer working in 
that line.299 In 1927 Kirstein undertook an informal survey of American buyers visiting 
the Paris office and concluded there was widespread belief that the office was to “a great 
extent representing the manufacturers and securing the best they can for them rather than 
representing the stores.” American buyers, he reported to Léon, arrived in Paris “with 
fear and trembling… that if they do not buy sufficiently large quantities to meet the views 
of the foreign office people, that they will be looked upon as pikers and made to feel 
so.”300 Kirstein explained that the continued use of French played a significant role in 
these suspicions and fears because the American buyers could not follow 
communications between French buyers, manufacturers, and designers. “This is why,” 
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Kirstein wrote, “I have always insisted that the English language shall be spoken.” Alas, 
French language training for American buyers who worked regularly in the Paris markets 
was never considered as a solution.301  
Insisting on an English language policy in the AMC office, however, could not 
change the fact that the highly competitive interwar Paris fashion trade was conducted in 
the French language and more or less on French terms, no matter how important the U.S. 
export market had become. Unlike the business and sales managers working for German 
manufacturers who willingly spoke English, accepted English language business orders, 
and produced invoices written in English, French manufacturers spoke and worked only 
in French. They produced French language invoices and would not do so in triplicate as 
did German, British, and American manufacturers. Despites requests from AMC 
executives for English invoices in triplicate the Paris office never managed to produce 
them.302 As the AMC executive board increasingly insisted that all the foreign offices 
follow the same policies and procedures they selected the London office as the 
administrative model to follow, not the larger and more influential Paris office.303 “As in 
administration office,” Kirstein wrote of the London staff in 1926, “they are almost 
perfect, though the merchandise side of it is lamentably weak.”304 In Paris, the 
merchandise was the strongest in the world, though relations between American and 
French in the AMC office remained “lamentably weak.” In 1928 Léon took great pains to 
                                                      
301 LEK to EL, January 6, 1928, “Leon 1927-28,” Box 79, LEK HBL. 
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303  Emphasis mine. “Minutes of Meeting Held by Foreign Office Managers in Brussels,” July 11-12, 1927; 
FJS to LEK, letter, July 19, 1927, “Scheidecker, 1927-31” Box 80, LEK HBL. 
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impress upon his French buyers the fact that they were paid based not on the volume of 
sales they produced, but rather on the quality of service they provided to American 
buyers; they were not under any circumstances to consider themselves as salespeople for 
French manufacturers. “I am having the people here gradually realize that they are part of 
an American organization,” Léon reported to Kirstein, “and as such should enter into the 
spirit of the American organization as much as possible while handling problems between 
American buyers and French manufacturers.”305 Léon’s initiative came at the height of 
the AMC’s expansion across Europe and when the realization of the “American spirit” at 
the Paris office seemed plausible, albeit unlikely. Two years later, however, in the throes 
of a worldwide depression, AMC executives were less concerned about the American 
spirit than they were about maintaining a bottom line.  
 
 
A “Policy of Retrenchment” Across Europe 
Despite the tensions that preoccupied the AMC office in Paris, purchases 
continued to increase in France and throughout Europe. In 1926 the New York Times 
reported that the AMC was doing the largest volume of business of any retail group 
anywhere in the world, totaling more than three hundred million dollars annually.306 The 
following year the number of orders placed by American buyers at the Paris office 
increased thirty percent.307 By 1928 the corporation had opened additional offices in 
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Belfast (1923), Brussels (1924), Zurich (1926), and Chenmitz (1926), and secured 
satellite representation in Vienna, Gablonz, and Milan.308 In January 1929 the AMC 
opened a second Paris bureau designed to serve American tourists and expatriates in the 
city, particularly those who patronized AMC member stores back home. Situated just 
around the corner from the fashionable shopping district on the Rue de la Paix and across 
from Harry’s New York Bar, the new bureau, which they named “Service Aimcee,” 
featured fashionable writing and rest rooms and lounges, and a broad array of services, 
from the travel, mail, and telephone departments to the popular personal service 
department, where research assistants fielded all manner of questions and requests. These 
ranged from the bizarre, such as where to buy carrier pigeons, to the herculean, such as 
setting up a home for Americans in Paris complete with a governess and primary school 
recommendations.309 The AMC executive board hoped the Service Aimcee would 
alleviate some of the pressure on the Paris office staff to welcome the ever-increasing 
number of American tourists and expatriates seeking advice about where to shop and 
what to buy.310 Alas, despite the overwhelming success of the Service Aimcee in 1929, 
its rest rooms and lounges were empty by the middle of 1930. “It has been very quiet 
indeed as we have only an occasional traveler to cheer on her way through,” reported 
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EL to P.J. Reilly, report & letter, February 17, 1930, “Service Aimcee,” Box 80, LEK HBL.  
  
158
Madam de Wardener, the French manager of the ill-fated Paris service bureau. By then, 
the AMC executive board had already begun negotiations to sell the property.311  
In July 1930 the managers of all the foreign offices gathered in Paris to meet with 
Kirstein and Philip J. Reilly, who had only recently assumed the directorship of the 
AMC. “The time has come,” Kirstein explained, “for two men to do the jobs of three.” 
The group discussed several strategies for adjusting to poor business conditions 
including: reducing budgets, seeking contracts to buy merchandise for stores located 
outside the United States, and becoming more “internationally minded.”312 This final 
point was key. During the height of the AMC’s expansion across Europe in the middle 
twenties, the foreign offices increasingly focused more or less on markets bound by 
national borders. That is to say, the Paris office focused on French markets while the 
Zurich office took over buying in Swiss markets, and so on. By 1932, however, the AMC 
closed or severely curtailed its foreign representation at all but the offices in Paris, 
London, Berlin, and Vienna. This “policy of retrenchment” expanded the work of the 
remaining AMC foreign offices back across national borders.313 Staff at the London 
office began processing orders for merchandise sourced in markets throughout the United 
Kingdom, and staff at the Paris office took over both the Swiss and Italian markets. After 
1932 the AMC executive board consolidated operations in Berlin and Vienna and placed 
all markets in Central Europe under the direction of a single manager who split his time 
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between the two capital cities. With the exception of the new office in Vienna, the onset 
of the Great Depression thrust the AMC back to the same foreign office configuration 
with which it began the decade: regional trade offices in Paris, London, and Berlin. Yet, 
while the retrenchment policy allowed the AMC to continue its foreign operations at a 
time when few Americans could afford to buy imports, the regional configuration of the 
Berlin office in particular would also bring a host of unforeseen problems after the rise of 
Adolf Hitler and the Nazi Party in 1933.  
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CHAPTER FOUR  
 
The Anti-Nazi Boycotts and the American Craze for Alpine Fashions 
How Fascism Changed the U.S. Retail Trade in Central Europe after 1933 
 
  
Introduction 
 
 
 
In mid-July 1934 a squad of six Anti-Nazi Minutemen, dressed in their blue and 
gold overseas caps, gathered outside the grand entrance of Macy’s department store in 
New York City’s Herald Square. The Minutemen distributed circulars bearing the 
headline: “Buy American, Boycott Nazi Goods.” Underneath the headline were copies of 
ship manifests proving that Macy’s had imported forty-seven bundles of baskets and 
sixteen cases of crockery and woodenware from Hamburg, Germany on June 14. The 
demonstration was peaceful, and, as the Jewish Telegraphic Agency noted, had little 
effect on the number of people entering the store. Several days later the Vice President of 
Macy’s, Edwin Marks, released an official response to the Anti-Nazi Minute Men, whom 
he described as careless and irresponsible. “It so happens that every dollar’s worth of this 
shipment only came from Czechoslovakia, Austria, and Poland,” Marks explained. He 
pointed out that the shipment was conducted through Hamburg because it was the only 
port available to transport goods from “interior countries.” Joseph Rosen, chairman of the 
boycott committee for the Anti-Nazi Minutemen, publicly accepted Marks’ explanation 
in the pages of the Jewish Telegraphic Agency, but cited another German purchase for 
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Marks to refute: thirteen cases of sweets consigned to Macy’s that arrived on the S.S. 
Deutschland from Bremen, Germany on July 7. It had been several months since the 
Macy’s firm announced that they would close their trade office in Berlin and stop selling 
German merchandise. As the largest department store in New York City, Macy’s 
compliance with the anti-Nazi boycott seemed to represent a major victory for the 
movement. Indeed, the rise of the Nazis in Germany would alter the course of the 
American retail trade in the mid-thirties, although not in the way that Rosen and legions 
of boycott proponents intended.314 
Only a handful of scholars have written about the anti-Nazi boycotts that erupted 
in March 1933 and all have focused on the conflicts between leading American Jewish 
organizations about how to respond to the movement.315 Although these studies offer 
detailed descriptions of how major American Jewish organizations developed and 
modified their positions on the boycott, none considers what the movement looked like 
from the perspective of importers and retailers who were directly involved in the German 
                                                      
314 “Charge Macy’s with Buying of Nazi Products,” Jewish Telegraphic Agency, July 20, 1934; “Macy’s 
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trade. Nor, has any study considered the impact the boycotts had on American consumer 
practices as Nazism continued to spread across Europe after 1933. Lawrence Glickman 
refers to the anti-Nazi boycotts in Buying Power: A History of Consumer Activism in 
America, but only as a small point of comparison to the far more successful anti-silk 
boycott that followed Japan’s war against China in 1937. As Glickman argues, the anti-
silk boycott was one of the most popular consumer campaigns in American history 
largely because proponents successfully linked Japanese militarism to the consumption of 
a single, popular, and highly visible product: women’s stockings.316 By point of contrast, 
the Anti-Nazi Minutemen criticized Macy’s for importing a disparate array of German-
made consumer goods, all of which were generally invisible to the public. Baskets, 
crockery, and sweets were not paraded in the streets as women’s stockings were, but 
rather packaged and carried home. Indeed, by 1930 German wares were so diffused 
across American stores that they could be found in dozens of merchandise lines. For 
example, a flyer produced by the Joint Boycott Council (JBC), one of the largest 
organizations supporting the anti-Nazi boycott, demanded consumers avoid purchasing 
nearly two dozen broadly conceived “types” of goods that were “possibly” German and 
ranged from cheap printed cloth and housewares to wine and optical products.317 While 
Glickman is right to point out that the anti-Nazi boycott was less successful than the anti-
silk boycott, the comparison is hardly a fair one. German merchandise was not only a 
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much, much more expansive category, it also funneled through Berlin, a trade hub that 
was vital to American retail networks across Europe. 
 Few American retailers were convinced that the boycott movement was the right 
response to Adolf Hitler’s rise to power in 1933. A great many preferred—and some even 
helped to draft—anti-boycott policies, and more still championed the free-trade policies 
of the Roosevelt Administration. When it was profitable to do so, many continued to buy, 
process, and ship merchandise through Berlin, in some cases right up until Germany’s 
declaration of war against the United States in 1941.318 Even so, most stopped selling 
German merchandise in their stores in March 1934. In New York City, the uncontested 
center of both American Jewish life and the American retail trade, many leading retailers 
were also prominent American Jews with ties to the elite American Jewish Committee 
(AJCOMM). Boycott proponents targeted these stores, from Macy’s to Bloomingdale’s, 
because their compliance promised an important victory both within Jewish circles and 
the commercial sphere. When, in the spring of 1934, nearly every major store in New 
York City renounced ties to Berlin and agreed to take German merchandise off their 
shelves, boycott leaders considered it a triumph, and, in a sense, it was. Most stores cited 
growing consumer resistance as the reason why they threw their support behind the 
boycott, but the truth was more complicated. The anti-Nazi boycotts erupted during the 
worst years of the Great Depression, at a time when sales of all foreign imports had 
already plummeted to record lows and when many Americans fell under the sway of 
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William Randolph Heart’s viciously nativist, but wildly popular “buy American” 
campaign. As a result, German merchandise accounted for less than one percent of total 
stocks at many large department stores by the spring of 1934, a fact that made boycott 
compliance an easy, almost de facto, business decision, rather than a political statement. 
More important, the absence of German made merchandise in some of the 
country’s most influential department stores in the United States did not prevent the sale 
of fashions from other regions of Central Europe where popular politics consistent with 
Nazi attitudes towards Jews and modernity also reigned. Although many American 
consumers had grown wary of German political conditions, few seemed to harbor 
concerns about neighboring Austria. When a new authoritarian government took hold of 
the country in 1934, rightwing officials ensured not only that Vienna would become the 
new center of trade in Central Europe, but also that Austrian exports would express a 
specific, even somewhat fascist vision for the country’s future. Most Austrian exports to 
the United States in the mid-thirties idealized the country’s poorest, most conservative, 
and predominantly Catholic Alpine provinces. They, in turn, also projected a national 
image that excluded the modern and predominantly Jewish culture of “Red Vienna”—
and Americans loved it. Just as Paris fashions symbolized American women’s desire to 
associate with an imagined world class of privileged and wealthy women, the rise of 
Alpine fashions captured Americans’ desire to be part of an idealized world that looked 
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Christian, timeless, and beautiful.319 The fact that the vision was a fiction, or that most of 
the manufacturers who produced the styles were Viennese Jews mattered little. 
Retailers did all they could to stoke and capitalize on this interest in Alpine, or 
what came to be called “Tyrolean” fashions. Wanamaker’s of New York installed an 
eighty-foot ski-slide and constructed a replica of an Alpine village in its flagship store, 
and dozens of retailers across the country began hosting Austrian or Swiss ski fashion 
advisors for regular tutorials in their stores. When the Viennese comedic operetta “White 
Horse Inn” opened on Broadway in 1936, with its stunning “Tyrolean” stage set and 
beautiful “folk” donning lederhosen and dirndls, Americans, especially New Yorkers, let 
out a collective swoon. The American retail trade in Vienna blossomed in the year 
following the premiere of “White Horse Inn,” with many firms reporting double and 
triple increases in sales. AMC member stores like Bloomingdale’s, Abraham & Straus, 
and Filene’s led the way in Alpine fashions and operated one of the most sought-after 
trade offices in Vienna, alongside Wanamaker’s and Macy’s. 
The American craze for Alpine fashions was not a conscious expression of 
outright support for the Nazi regime, but rather a trend that exposed the broad appeal of 
an anti-modern, anti-Semitic vision across the United States. Such hateful ideals not only 
emerged in the obvious places, such as the radio programs of Father Charles Coughlin or 
the publications of Henry Ford, but were also embedded in the fabric of fashions that 
Americans encountered everyday inside their own closets, on the pages of their favorite 
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fashion magazines, and at their local department stores.320 However, by shifting the 
center of this study from American closets and stores to the retail trade abroad, it 
becomes clear that fashion trends did not only emerge from consumer demand or the 
creative minds of designers, but also in accordance with shifts in international trade 
relations and retailers’ maneuvers within the internal politics of other states.321 Berlin and 
greater Central Europe proved too important to retail trade networks abroad, and 
subsequently to consumer demands at home to be simply abandoned after 1933. Only 
when Alpine imagery acquired the “Nazi” label after the Anschluss in March 1938 did 
Americans turn their backs on Tyrolean styles and, in turn, prompt American retailers 
and importers to look seriously at new markets. With the help of the U.S. Commerce 
Department, for example, Macy’s led the industry in promoting Latin-American wares 
that touted an imagined pan-American alliance and purported to sever Europe’s hold on 
American fashions. Yet as retailers scrambled to extract their business interests not only 
from Berlin and Vienna, but soon enough from Czechoslovakia, too, they discovered that 
the depth of their operations in Central Europe made it impossible for them to leave. 
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An Empty Victory in New York: American Retailers and the Anti-Nazi Boycott 
Movement 
 
In July 1935 Dr. Joseph Tenenbaum, prominent member of the American Jewish 
Congress and soon-to-be-leader of the JBC, observed that, “the American market is 
flooded with more German goods than ever since the beginning of the boycott.” Although 
the boycott campaigns had generated tremendous enthusiasm, “especially among the 
Jewish masses,” he believed they had failed to produce any genuine impact. Tenenbaum 
argued that outside New York City the campaigns were “totally disorganized” and that an 
“anti-boycott movement was spreading like wildfire.”322 Tenenbaum had good reason to 
be concerned. Two influential American Jewish organizations, the American Jewish 
Committee (AJCOMM) and B’nai B’rith, remained persistent in their opposition to the 
boycott for fear that it might inspire Nazi retaliation against Germany’s Jews, and 
alienate American Jews from their hard-earned alliances in Washington and among 
American Christians. And even though most major department stores in New York City 
had stopped selling German merchandise, he knew that compliance with the boycott was 
not the same as outright support for the movement. During his tenure as the Chairman of 
the JBC, Tenenbaum developed a special rating system to gauge department stores’ 
compliance and even organized a committee of women who regularly “shopped” for the 
purpose of ensuring that German merchandise stayed out of department stores.323 At no 
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point over the course of the decade did the JBC trust New York City’s retailers to remain 
compliant with the boycott, and for good reason. 
For most leading retailers, compliance with the anti-Nazi boycott movement had 
less to do with resistance to the Nazi Party than with the combined effects of the Great 
Depression and a buy national campaign that first captured American consumers’ 
attention in 1932. A great many retailers became, in a sense, de facto boycotters because 
German merchandise accounted for such a small percentage of their inventories—in 
some cases less than one percent. Even at one of the country’s largest firms, Macy’s of 
New York City, dwindling sales of German imports no longer justified the expense of 
maintaining a trade office in Berlin. Still, it took more than a year for leading New York 
retailers to publicly renounce ties to Berlin and take German wares out of their stores. For 
many retailers, support for the boycott was complicated by their close connections to the 
AJCOMM and the Democratic Party. Some of the most influential executives subscribed 
to the anti-boycott platform of the AJCOMM, and a few, namely Kirstein of Filene’s and 
the AMC, even helped draft that platform. Although consumer resistance to German 
goods ultimately pushed stores in the American northeast into tacit compliance with the 
movement, a number of firms, including Bloomingdale’s and Abraham & Straus, stayed 
connected to the German trade, especially through the AMC office in Berlin. Consumers 
in the middle United States and in England, Australia, and Canada, remained eager to buy 
German wares, especially toys, fabric gloves, linens, and china, and the AMC happily 
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supplied them. 324 Ultimately, New York-based department stores delivered a 
symbolically important but otherwise meaningless victory for the boycott movement in 
March 1934. For much of the American retail industry, German markets and ports 
remained a vital hub for trade through Central Europe, even as goods with “Made in 
Germany” labels were removed from displays in New York and Boston.  
At the start of 1930 the AMC executive board began calling on managers at the 
foreign offices to cut expenses and seek new contracts with stores outside the United 
States. At the Vienna office, resident local buyers kept the effects of the depression under 
control by purchasing large lots of steeply discounted merchandise from Austrian 
manufacturers that were going out of business.325 Visiting American buyers representing 
American and English department stores were eager to pick up the cheap Austrian wares, 
but trade conditions remained depressed. In 1932, the AMC executive board held a 
special meeting in New York City to address the “tremendous drop in sales volumes” that 
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affected all member stores and every foreign trade office. They imposed salary reductions 
across the corporation and gutted the staff positions and resources at the foreign offices. 
Even at the AMC’s largest and most important trade office in Paris, expenses were cut 
twenty percent.326 Resources allocated to trade offices in Berlin and Vienna were 
consolidated and the two offices placed under a shared manager, Austrian native and 
leather goods expert, Hanns Streicher. During his first few weeks in charge, Streicher cut 
twelve staff positions and imposed ten percent salary reductions on remaining staff in 
both cities.327 
Beginning in the fall of 1932, ongoing pressures wrought by the Great Depression 
helped foster widespread support for a buy national campaign that further undermined 
demand for imported goods.328 The British government had launched a massive “Buy 
British” campaign months earlier that had inspired American media mogul, William 
Randolph Hearst, owner of dozens of popular magazines and newspapers, to do the same 
in the United States. Convinced that cheap foreign goods and immigrant laborers were to 
blame for high unemployment rates, Hearst filled his publications with xenophobic and 
racist commentaries that urged “true” Americans to “Buy American.” Hearst’s arguments 
carried a much broader impact than the calls for fashion nationalism that followed the 
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Payne Aldrich bill and capitalized on the surging nationalist sentiments of the interwar 
years.329 Manufacturers, businesses, and labor organizations that stood to benefit from 
anti-immigration and protective trade policies backed the campaign. By early 1933 the 
movement had been so influential that President Hoover signed the Buy American Act, 
which required the federal government to grant preferences to American manufacturers in 
all its purchases.330 Alongside the aspirational rhetoric of the campaign, however, 
consensus emerged across the political spectrum that consumer purchasing power was 
down 30% due to unemployment, an uptick in part-time work, and wage reductions. 
Nearly one third of all wage earners were unemployed and another third were 
underemployed. For those who retained their jobs, wages had fallen sixteen percent.331 
More and more, what little money Americans had to spend was directed towards 
American made products rather than higher-priced foreign imports.  
With the “Buy American” campaign in full swing during the winter of 1932-33, 
AMC Executive Director P.J. Reilly cautioned Streicher that increasing “propaganda 
against the purchase of European merchandise” would continue to undermine sales in his 
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region. In addition to representing more than twenty American member stores, 
Streicher’s biggest client was Harrods of London, where “buy national” also threatened 
sales. But Streicher was quick to settle new contracts to represent four smaller British 
department stores connected to Harrods, and four major Australian department stores in 
hopes that their purchases would, as he explained to Reilly, “make up for the reduced 
volume of purchases from our American stores.”332 Indeed, Streicher’s talent for securing 
contracts with stores outside the United States at the height of the depression and the 
“buy national” campaigns kept the AMC’s trade offices in Berlin and Vienna operational. 
When the first calls for a nationwide anti-Nazi boycott came in mid-March 1933, 
purchases in Germany were already at record lows across the American retail industry. 
Early in the month Women’s Wear Daily announced that American attendance at the 
annual Leipzig Fair was “negligible” compared to previous years. One major U.S. retail 
combination that had sent more than a dozen buyers to the fair in 1932 sent only two in 
1933. German manufacturers were outraged and blamed the “Buy American” campaign 
for decreased sales in the United States. One manufacturing firm specializing in mid-
priced handbags reported that American purchases of certain models were eighty percent 
less than expected.333 Two weeks after the opening of the disappointing Leipzig Fair, 
William W. Cohen, a leading representative of the Jewish War Veterans of the United 
States, announced the first call for a nationwide boycott of Nazi goods. Since the 
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sweeping Nazi Party victories in German federal elections earlier that month, Americans 
had been reading news reports recounting violent attacks against German Jews and their 
businesses. “I doubt that the American government can officially take notice of what the 
German government is doing to its own citizens,” Cohen explained to the New York 
Times, “our only line of resistance is to touch German pocketbooks.” More than twenty 
thousand people attended a widely publicized boycott rally at Madison Square Garden on 
March 27, and tens of thousands more listened to a live broadcast of the event. The rally 
featured a powerful line up of speakers, including the President of the American 
Federation of Labor, Senator Robert F. Wagner, former Governor Alfred E. Smith of 
New York, and several prominent Catholic Bishops. Over the next few weeks calls for 
anti-Nazi boycotts made headlines in Britain, France, Greece, Egypt, Palestine, and 
Turkey. 334 
Despite such widespread enthusiasm for the boycott in March 1933 and early 
reports that some retailers were canceling their German orders, executives at New York’s 
leading department stores took no official position on the boycott until September.335  
Instead many retailers spent that time concerned over the development of regulatory 
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codes designed to bring the retail industry in line with the goals of the National Recovery 
Act (NRA). Louis Kirstein of Filene’s and the AMC spent the summer months in 
Washington, DC developing a massive and controversial publicity drive—known to 
many as the Blue Eagle campaign—that would cajole retailers into raising wages and 
lowering prices in accordance with new NRA retail codes.336 However, at the popular 
annual Boston Conference on Retail Distribution, Ira Hirschmann, a young and Jewish 
advertising director at Lord & Taylor who had recently traveled to Europe, gave an 
impassioned speech that suggested retail executives were not just preoccupied, but 
altogether avoiding any discussion of the boycott.337 Hirschmann explained how he had 
left for Europe as a pacifist, but after witnessing a Nazi Party political rally he “returned 
fighting mad.”338 He sharply criticized retailers for continuing to discuss the German 
“problem” only in “hushed tones,” and challenged American manufacturers to begin 
offering replacements for the German toys, gloves, linens, china, and novelties that many 
considered irreplaceable. “Let’s not pass by the problem that exists in trying to revive 
ourselves,” he challenged retail industry leaders.339 Hirschmann alleged that retailers’ 
preoccupation with economic recovery, which had come at the expense of any formal 
acknowledgment of Nazi violence in Germany. However, retailers’ silence was not only a 
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matter of preoccupation or avoidance. For many, it was also a carefully considered anti-
boycott position first articulated by the most influential Jewish organization in the 
country. 
At no point in the 1930s was there any consensus among leading American 
Jewish organizations about how to respond to the anti-Nazi boycott movement. From the 
beginning, the American Jewish Committee (AJCOMM), which represented the 
wealthiest stratum of American Jews with roots in the German Jewish migration of the 
nineteenth century, opposed the rally at Madison Square Garden for fear of further Nazi 
retaliation against German Jews.340 Their fears were realized when Nazi Party officials 
threatened a National Boycott Day directed at German Jewish business owners unless the 
rally was canceled—it wasn’t. On April 1 Nazi “brown shirts” splashed Jewish 
storefronts with yellow and black paint spelling out “quarantined,” and picketers 
thronged commercial thoroughfares throughout Germany.341 In June the executive board 
of the AJCOMM released a statement declaring that they “definitively and unequivocally 
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disapproved” of the boycott. 342 The AJCOMM argued that any interference with the 
German trade would not only worsen conditions for German Jews, it would also hamper 
economic recovery, alienate Jews from potential allies in the Christian community, and 
interfere with the free trade priorities of the Roosevelt Administration. Morris Waldman, 
President of the AJCOMM, characterized the movement as both “futile” and “possibly 
dangerous,” and insisted that their position was consistent with Jewish elites in Germany, 
such as Oskar Wasserman, director of the Deutsche Bank.343 Broadly speaking, the 
position of the AJCOMM reflected the concerns of many Jewish elites in the United 
States who believed that an anti-Nazi boycott would damage the very things that 
promised a better overall strategy for combating Nazism: hard-won political and non-
sectarian alliances, and a path towards global economic recovery.  
Without a doubt the AJCOMM’s position on the boycott influenced retail 
executives in New York, many of which had ties to the organization, or to the Roosevelt 
Administration, or both. During the 1930s Kirstein in particular was a giant in the 
American retail industry. In addition to his positions as Vice President of Filene’s and 
Founder and Chairman of the AMC, he also served on the executive boards of two 
additional New York department stores: Bloomingdale’s and Abraham & Straus. 
Moreover, when the AJCOMM developed its position on the boycott Kirstein was also 
serving one of his many terms as Vice President of the organization’s executive board. 
Several other influential retailers representing firms outside New York served on the 
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executive committee of the AJCOMM in 1933, too, including F&R Lazarus of 
Columbus, Ohio, Bambergers of Newark, New Jersey, and the national chain, Sears, 
Roebuck & Co.344 Conspicuously absent from the AJCOMM’s membership rolls, 
however, were any sons of Isidor Straus, who had run Macy’s for three decades prior to 
his death in 1912. Although the first generation of Straus brothers (Isidor, Nathan, and 
Oscar) had been among the founding members of the AJCOMM, there is no evidence 
that the second generation at the helm of R. H. Macy’s, Jesse Isidor Straus and Percy 
Straus (sons of Isidor), maintained their father’s historic ties to the organization.345 
However, both kept up their father’s close connections to the Democratic Party. Jesse 
Isidor Straus, who ran the Macy’s firm from 1919 to 1933 cultivated an enduring 
relationship with New York’s governor, Franklin D. Roosevelt. In 1932 Jesse Isidor 
established a nationwide network of businessmen who fundraised and advocated on 
behalf of Roosevelt’s presidential campaign, and in March 1933 the grateful incoming 
president appointed him Ambassador to France. When the first calls for an anti-Nazi 
boycott erupted, Jesse Isidor was preparing to leave for Paris and his younger brother 
Percy was transitioning into his new role as President of R.H. Macy’s. Given Percy’s 
close ties to the State Department through his brother, and his family’s historic ties to the 
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AJCOMM (at least two of Percy’s relations remained very active in the AJCOMM), there 
was little chance the R. H. Macy’s firm would endorse the anti-Nazi boycott.346  
In September 1933 the influential attorney Samuel Untermeyer emerged as the 
primary leader of the movement and he brought the boycott question to the feet of New 
York City’s influential and predominantly Jewish retailers. As a former Vice President of 
the American Jewish Congress (AJCONG), President of the American League for the 
Defense of Jewish Rights, and the foremost legal critic of Wall Street and money trusts, 
Untermeyer was a force to be reckoned with. By nearly every measure he ought to have 
been a member of the AJCOMM: he had German Jewish roots, had attended Columbia 
Law School, made millions as an attorney, and commanded the respect of many many for 
his impressive legal work.347 Yet Untermeyer preferred the pluralism of the AJCONG, 
which embraced multiple forms of Zionism and applauded cultural and ethnic differences 
among American Jews.348 Untermeyer’s successor as President of the AJCONG 
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supported the boycott movement from the beginning and pledged his resources to 
Untermeyer after a personal letter he wrote to German President Hindenberg asking for 
relief on behalf of the German Jewry was opened and returned to him with no reply.349 
With the full support of the AJCONG, Untermeyer organized a dinner at the Hotel Astor 
for over 250 boycott supporters who committed to raising $500,000 in order to 
“prosecute the boycott [nationwide] with all possible vigor.” The group voted to establish 
an information bureau in order to research replacements for German merchandise, and 
planned another committee to develop circulars, placards, radio talks, and films devoted 
to the boycott.350 Almost immediately, Untermeyer wrote to executives at New York’s 
leading department stores demanding that they, too, join the boycott movement.  
One week after Untermeyer’s dinner at the Hotel Astor, on September 19, 1933, 
the New York Times printed the first official statement on the boycott from the Secretary 
of the National Retail Dry Goods Association (NRDGA). Secretary Nelson spoke on 
behalf of twenty leading New York department stores including Lord & Taylor, R. H. 
Macy’s, Bloomingdale Brothers, Abraham & Straus, and Wanamaker’s. Nelson began by 
explaining that the anti-Nazi boycotts had become so extensive that German imports were 
down fifty to eighty percent across the industry. All twenty stores reported that German 
wares accounted for “much less than one percent” of their current stocks. Though much 
of that decline occurred before the first calls for a boycott emerged in March, Nelson 
credited pro-boycott consumers for keeping those figures so low. However, Nelson 
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further explained: “Although the [retail executives] abhor the political and religious 
persecution in Germany today, they feel that a boycott by the stores would set a 
dangerous precedent.”351 Nelson did not clarify exactly what kind of “dangerous 
precedent” the executives’ support of the boycott would set, but Untermeyer knew. So 
too, would anyone following the progress of the boycott movement in 1933. Just as 
AJCOMM officeholders had articulated in their own anti-boycott policy, the retailers’ 
statement suggested that deliberate interference with the German retail trade could have 
“dangerous” consequences for Germany’s Jews, global economic recovery, and non-
sectarian or political alliances for the American Jewish community. While several 
executives who signed the statement had direct ties to the AJCOMM, the firm that really 
mattered in shaping the decisions of the majority was Macy’s, which was, by far, the 
largest single department store in New York City. 
In the weeks following Nelson’s statement, Percy Straus of Macy’s became 
embroiled in a public debate with Samuel Untermeyer over the firm’s anti-boycott 
position. Macy’s had run a full-page advertisement in major New York newspapers in 
which Straus boldly explained the policy in greater detail and claimed to represent all 
department stores in the United States. In a personal letter,Straus insisted that although he 
was a “loyal Jew” who “bitterly resented” Nazi policies, he believed boycott proponents 
were making misguided decisions based only on their emotions. He boasted that Macy’s 
buyers stationed in Berlin gave special preferences to German Jewish manufacturers 
wherever possible and that doing so made “the present unbearable lot of Jews more 
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presently tolerable.” 352 Kirstein saved in his files a personal copy of the advertisement on 
which he signed his name and wrote: “This, in my opinion, has what it takes, i.e. namely 
guts.”353 The advertisement made Macy’s an important target for Untermeyer, who 
quickly penned, “An Open Letter to the Advertisement of R. H. Macy and Company,” in 
which he forcefully dismantled Straus’s logic point by point and concluded that “no self-
respecting man or woman of any race or creed” should shop at Macy’s. Three major 
newspapers, the New York Times, the American, and the Herald Tribune—all of which 
had longstanding advertising contracts with R. H. Macy’s—refused to print Untermeyer’s 
letter. The Nation picked it up, however, and dramatized the exchange between 
Untermeyer and Straus. Under the headline, “The Suppressed Advertisement Concerning 
R.H. Macy’s,” The Nation offered readers some background on the boycott debates and 
reprinted Straus’s original advertisement alongside Untermeyer’s rebuttal. The leftist 
journal further explained that the two leading Jewish figures had continued to correspond 
privately “without any meeting of the minds.” Straus was offered the final word in The 
Nation, but Untermeyer’s powerful rebuttal had left him with little to say. The Macy’s 
president’s only defense was that Untermeyer was “misinformed” about the German 
trade. He further admitted that the debate was moot because Macy’s would soon become 
a de facto boycott supporter, anyway: “If present tendencies continue, the small supply of 
German goods which Macy’s offers will in the course of another year dwindle down to 
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nothing.”354 Although Straus never formally rescinded his firm’s position on the boycott, 
Untermeyer, the foremost legal critic of Wall Street, clearly had the intellectual upper 
hand in the debate.  
Just a few days after The Nation article hit newsstands, executives at AMC 
member stores considered a proposal from Hanns Streicher about how to manage their 
own trade office in Berlin. Like the twenty New York stores represented in Nelson’s 
statement to the New York Times, American imports from the AMC’s office in Berlin 
were down 43% during the first six months of 1933. When AMC Executive Director P. J. 
Reilly first raised the question of closing the Berlin office in September 1933, he 
considered it alongside the ongoing problem of popular economic nationalism: “The 
boycott against German merchandise and organized labor’s growing opposition to all 
imported merchandise,” he argued, “undoubtedly will greatly restrict its sale in [the 
United States] during the next two or three years.”355 Reilly had asked Hanns Streicher, 
manager of both the trade offices in Berlin and Vienna, to propose a plan to address the 
problem. Streicher argued that because most German merchandise was produced not in 
Berlin, but in Frankfurt, Pforsheim, and Chenmitz, all purchasing could be done from the 
AMC’s trade office in Vienna or from a possible new outpost in Czechoslovakia. In fact, 
Streicher calculated that the AMC could cut their expenses in half by moving the center 
of their trade operations out of Berlin and into Vienna where taxes and labor were 
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cheaper. Alas, independent consultants concluded that the AMC’s building in Berlin 
could only be resold at a significant loss, so Streicher suggested keeping a small staff 
there to handle consular invoices.356 Executives at AMC-affiliated stores unanimously 
approved Streicher’s plan and, in turn, many announced triumphantly to the press that 
they had cut ties with Berlin. Michael Schapp, President of Bloomingdale’s, even sent a 
follow-up telegram asking Streicher to be sure that the firm’s name was removed from 
any signs posted at the Berlin office.357 
AMC executives celebrated Streicher’s plan because it allowed them to tell a 
growing number of consumers in the United States who were unwilling to buy Nazi 
merchandise that they would stop selling German wares without undermining the 
corporation’s contracts to represent department stores in England and Australia in Berlin. 
In late October 1933, Kirstein reluctantly informed Streicher that: “It is a fact that the 
antipathy for Germany and German goods is growing here and we at Filene’s voted the 
other day not to buy any more German merchandise.”358 The official report on the vote at 
Filene’s cites “increasing consumer resistance” as the reason why executives voted 
against purchasing more German goods. Indeed, Kirstein had begun receiving letters 
from angry customers, such as Mrs. H. Epstein who threatened to remove her Filene’s 
charge account because she found German-made gloves on the store’s shelves.359 
Beginning in the fall of 1933 many AMC executives publicly severed ties with Berlin 
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because enough consumers demanded it and sales were negligible anyway, but no one 
wanted to lose the AMC’s business selling German wares in regions where consumers 
were willing to buy them.360  In early 1934 Streicher was busy securing new contracts to 
represent non-member stores in Wisconsin, Illinois, Oregon, and (surprisingly) 
Connecticut in the German markets. The four remaining staff members in the Berlin 
office—two buyers, a shipping manager, and a secretary—were also processing large 
increases in orders from department stores in Australia, Canada, and Britain. Harrods of 
London remained an especially important contract for the AMC to keep up at both the 
offices in Vienna and Berlin. Not only had the London firm been vital to establishing the 
Berlin office in 1921, by the mid 1930s nearly half of all the buyers who visited the 
AMC’s office there represented Harrods.361 
 In March 1934, while Streicher secured contracts to represent new stores in the 
German markets, Macy’s finally announced it would close their trade office in Berlin; 
they, too, cited “consumer resistance” as the reason. The decision was not terribly 
surprising, but it was influential. Straus had anticipated the gradual end of Macy’s 
German trade four months earlier during his debate with Untermeyer in the pages of The 
Nation. In January, he told the Jewish Telegraphic Agency that Macy’s “used to be 
probably Germany’s best department store customer,” and in March the firm reported a 
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98% decline on orders for German goods over the previous six months.362 Not 
surprisingly, other leading New York stores that signed the anti-boycott statement 
published in the New York Times in September 1933 soon followed R. H. Macy’s lead. 
Michael Shaap, President of AMC-member store Bloomingdale Brothers, used the 
opportunity to remind Americans that his firm had closed their trade office in Berlin 
months earlier.363 A representative from Samuel Untermeyer’s organization told the 
Jewish Telegraphic Agency that while he was satisfied with R.H. Macy’s recent decision 
he blamed the firm for waiting so long to set a positive example for other stores.364 
“Better late than never,” he chided Straus.365 In April, Straus announced that the firm 
would become the first American retailer to open a trade office in Prague. In just a few 
months time the Macy’s representatives stationed in Prague established contracts to 
represent several other American firms, and inspired other large retailers to expand their 
trade in Czechoslovakia, too.366  
 Although Macy’s received the most critical attention in the press for its anti-
boycott leadership, for the remainder of the decade the firm maintained one of the best 
boycott ratings of all New York department stores according to the JBC. Established as 
an umbrella organization for the boycott movement in 1936, the JBC, with Dr. Joseph 
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Tenenbaum at its helm, overpowered the work of Samuel Untermeyer.367 A JBC 
committee focused on the retail industry developed a rating system to accurately gauge 
the ongoing compliance of major department stores. Macy’s was one of five major stores 
in New York City, along with Gimbels, Saks, Stern Brothers, and Lord & Taylor, which 
earned a “non-violator” rating in 1934 and maintained it over the course of the decade. 368 
Like R. H. Macy’s, the path towards compliance was far from smooth for most of these 
firms. For example, just days before Lord & Taylor executives signed the anti-boycott 
statement alongside Macy’s in September 1933, Hirschmann had publicly announced that 
Lord & Taylor had boycotted German wares for months. In December, Hirschmann, who 
was an adamant boycott proponent, gave an interview to the Jewish Telegraphic Agency 
in which he pronounced himself “disgusted” with American Jewish leaders that opposed 
the movement. Days later he issued an apology and made clear that his remarks reflected 
only his personal views and not the views of the Lord & Taylor firm.369 Although Lord & 
Taylor ultimately complied with the movement, the firm’s very public disagreements 
with Hirschmann reveal considerable tension among executives about how to manage 
their boycott policy.370 
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 AMC-member stores Bloomingdale’s and Abraham & Straus, however, were the 
subjects of ongoing personal investigations conducted by JBC members until 1939.371 
Although neither store sold German merchandise in New York, both were classified as 
boycott violators because, according to the JBC, they persisted in using German 
steamliners to transport merchandise. The JBC either did not know or could not explain 
the bigger picture: both AMC member stores continued to purchase merchandise made 
outside Germany (in nearby regions, such as the Sudetenland) that was processed in the 
Berlin office. Moreover, as members of the AMC, both firms condoned the ongoing trade 
in German wares for stores located in England, Australia, Canada, and even for American 
stores located outside New York and Boston. In fact, the AMC’s trade office in Berlin 
grew significantly between 1933, when the firm reduced the staff to four, and 1938, when 
the firm employed twenty people. In 1935, the office processed orders totaling  $650,000, 
though seventy-three percent of those orders were shipped to stores in England and 
Australia.372 For point of comparison, in the six months before Macy’s closed its own 
trade office in Berlin, the firm processed orders totaling little more than two thousand 
dollars. In short, the AMC trade in Berlin, which primarily targeted consumers living 
outside the northeastern United States and beyond national borders, was operating on a 
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scale one hundred and sixty times larger than Macy’s trade in Berlin, which specifically 
targeted consumers in New York. 
 The compliance of New York City’s department stores may have seemed an 
important symbolic victory for boycott proponents, but they came no closer to the 
ultimate goal of undercutting Germany’s economic engines, nor did they gain powerful 
allies in the commercial sphere. Although Time magazine touted Macy’s decision to close 
their Berlin trade office as “good news for Jews on the front lines of their boycott war 
against Nazi Germany,” the decision carried little to no economic significance and no 
material aid from industry leaders.373 To be sure, consumer support of the boycott played 
a role in undermining Macy’s German trade, but the twin forces of depression and the 
1932 buy national campaign had already done the worst of the damage. Moreover, 
retailers who could still turn a profit selling German goods in places where consumers 
were willing to buy them, continued to do so. AMC member stores in the northeastern 
United States did stop selling German merchandise at their flagship stores, but they 
continued to pay dues to support the AMC office in Berlin, which, in fact, grew 
significantly between 1933 and 1938. Ultimately, leading retailers were more swayed by 
the arguments of the AJCOMM and their own bottom lines than by the ideology that 
underpinned the boycott movement.  
Yet even for a firm like Macy’s, which closed its Berlin office in early 1934, it 
was hard to escape associations with Germany. Rumors circulated through the retail 
industry alleging that buyers were ordering gloves cut in Germany and then shipping 
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them to Czechoslovakia for finishing to avoid German labels. Some suspected that 
retailers had employed a similar tactic by contracting with American manufacturers to 
sew cuffs that carefully disguised the labels on German gloves.374 In Boston the Jewish 
Daily Forward denounced Filene’s after receiving complaints from numerous readers 
that the firm was still selling German gloves after publicizing its decision not to do so.375 
As described in the introduction to this chapter, Macy’s remained an important target for 
the Anti-Nazi Minutemen even after the firm closed its Berlin office because shipments 
continued to arrive from German ports or on German ships, even if the merchandise itself 
had been produced outside German national borders. Despite the relative strength of the 
anti-Nazi boycotts in New York and Boston, Germany remained a vital hub for retail 
trade in Central Europe. That is, Berlin remained the key headquarters until retailers 
redirected their focus to the Vienna trade and the Alpine aesthetic. 
 
 
 
 Anti-Semitism, Anti-Modernism, and Alpine Fashions  
 
In 1936 Bloomingdale Brothers opened a new department called the North Bound 
Shop. Designed to look like a “real” country store, the department featured an old coal 
stove for shoppers to warm their hands by and sold both ski fashions and ski equipment. 
The North Bound Shop was also created expressly to host Maria Springer, an Austrian 
expert skier and ski style advisor, during her biannual visits to the United States between 
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1935 and 1938. Springer developed a popular program in which she led shoppers through 
a series of “dry” ski exercises, such as the Arleberg crouch, a method of skiing developed 
by fellow Austrian, Hannes Schneider. After the exercises, she modeled and discussed 
the latest fashions worn by Europeans visiting popular ski resorts in the Alps.376 
Bloomingdale’s was not the only department store to embrace ski and knitwear 
emanating from the Alps in the mid-1930s. Wanamaker’s constructed a picturesque 
Swiss Winter Village replete with yodelers an eighty-foot ski slide, the longest ever built 
indoors, at its New York store. The firm contracted with two prominent ski experts, one 
Austrian and one Swiss, who offered on-site ski demonstrations and lessons for 
shoppers.377 Even the high end fashion magazine Vogue devoted its most accomplished 
photographer, Edward Steichen, to a ski fashion spread featuring styles from Saks-Fifth 
Avenue and B. Altman Co. “No, these are not Mitzi and Gretel in the Carpathian Wilds,” 
one of the captions explained, “but two ardent skiers of this fair land.” Smiling, fair-
skinned American models posed in front of studio screens donning peasant scarves and 
Alpine folk-style braids. In one photograph a model joyfully hoists a pair of skis over her 
shoulders, and in another, two models giggle as they sniff ski wax. The styles and images 
were so new to the fashion world in the mid-thirties that Vogue posed the question: 
“What is this thing called skiing?”378  
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While the Alpine fashion craze seemed to escape associations with Berlin and the 
violent taint of the Nazi regime, the aesthetics and politics that underlay Alpine fashions 
were, in fact, not so far removed from Nazi attitudes towards Jews and modernity. When 
retail industry leaders looked for a trade hub to replace Berlin in the spring of 1934, civil 
and political unrest in Austria drove many towards Prague. However, by the end of the 
year the new and quasi-fascist government of Austria worked hard to increase exports to 
the United States, and by 1935 Vienna became the undisputed new trade hub for 
American retailers in Central Europe. Yet, the Alpine imagery, which Americans came to 
know as “Tyrolean,” that the Austrian government adopted to promote business and 
tourism abroad expressed a very specific vision for the country’s future: one that 
excluded Jews and the modern, progressive culture of Vienna. No cultural export 
captured the new vision for Austria better than the comedic operetta “White Horse Inn,” 
with its colorful Tyrolean-inspired stage sets and beautiful chorus girls donning dirndls 
and peasant scarves. When the show premiered on Broadway in 1936, a virtual Tyrolean 
fever overtook New York City and retailers stoked the craze for the better part of two 
years with all manner of related promotions, events, and stunts. Sales at nearly every 
American retail trade office in Vienna doubled or tripled or more, and many hired new 
staff or moved into larger quarters to keep up with the demand. In their enthusiasm for 
the imagery of the Tyrol, a broad swath of American consumers revealed themselves to 
be not unlike their provincial Austrian contemporaries. Still reeling from years of 
depression, a majority of Americans feared the influence of Jews in national life and 
many blamed modern abundance and excess for economic failures. It should hardly be 
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surprising then that so many welcomed the seemingly peaceable vision of traditional 
Alpine life and the beautiful Christian “folk” who lived there, regardless of what they 
understood about Austrian politics. Only after the Anschluss in March 1938, when so 
many provincial Austrians revealed their allegiance to and enthusiasm for the invading 
Nazi forces, did Americans begin to reject Tyrolean imagery. Ironically, the trade could 
not have survived the Anschluss, anyway, as the majority of manufacturers who produced 
Tyrolean fashions were Viennese Jews. 
 When Macy’s announced plans to close its Berlin office in March 1934 Austria 
was in the throes of a brief but brutal civil war. The combination of a weak constitutional 
government and the failure of the country’s largest bank, the Credit Anstalt, in 1931 
compounded the already severe effects of the global Great Depression. By the spring of 
1934 unemployment in Austria had reached nearly forty percent. In March, conservative 
Austro-fascist forces provoked days of fighting that sent the progressive leadership of the 
Social Democratic Party into exile. Forebodingly, the victory of conservatives in Austria 
signaled the triumph of the economically depressed but more traditional and Catholic 
provinces over the comparatively prosperous, progressive, and predominantly Jewish 
“Red Vienna.”379 From the perspective of American retailers, this period of severe 
political and civil unrest briefly threatened to undermine trade in the region. The building 
that housed the AMC’s trade office, for example was owned by the Austrian government 
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and, for many months in 1934, it was used as a soldier barracks.380 As Streicher recalled, 
“the entire building was occupied by soldiers, which did not give a very favorable 
impression to visiting buyers.” Even worse, a machine gun had been positioned at the 
entrance to the building and was not removed until Streicher finally filed a formal protest, 
months after the civil war ended.381 Given the militarized appearance of Vienna at the 
moment leading American retailers cut ties with Berlin, it hardly seemed a city in which 
to expand business investments. 
 Despite its brevity, the Austrian Civil War erupted at just the right time for many 
retailers eager to establish a new trade hub in Central Europe to overlook Vienna and 
rush into Prague instead. Czech markets had long been a vital, if less visible, part of trade 
in the region, so much so that the AMC ran a small office in Gablonz between 1925 and 
1929.382  Even though the stock market crash forced the closure of the Gablonz office, it 
did not adversely affect the American-Czech retail trade. Instead resident buyers at the 
AMC Vienna office increased their purchases of low-priced gloves in Czechoslovakia 
after 1929.383 And as more American retailers looked to replace German-made 
merchandise in 1934, exports of Czech cotton gloves to the United States doubled and 
                                                      
380  The AMC established its own trade office in Vienna in 1930 when executives purchased the firm of 
longtime Viennese commissionaire Max Grab upon his death. Hanns Streicher, a native Austrian and Max 
Grab’s top leather buyer, was placed in charge of the new AMC office, and he worked hard to make Grab’s 
firm more innovative and efficient. See: “Memorandum of points to be covered in subsequent written 
agreement entered into by Mr. Max Grab and the Associated Merchandising Corporation of New York,” c. 
1930; “Passing of Max Grab Leaves Void in Europe’s Trade Circles,” WWD, August 29, 1930; both 
sources in folder “Vienna Office Grab Death,” Box 82, LEK HBL. 
381 HS to LEK, letter, March 22, 1935, in “Streicher Berlin,” Box 81, LEK HBL. 
382  See “Czechoslovakia,” Box 76, LEK HBL. 
383 HS to LEK, letter, February 13 & December 9,1931, LEK to HS, letter, April 8, 1931, “Hanns Streicher 
Vienna,” Box 82, LEK HBL. 
  
194
exports of silk and woolen gloves tripled.384 Macy’s decision to open a new trade 
headquarters in Prague after closing their Berlin office made sense because, although 
Prague did not register as a fashion center in the American imagination, Czech 
manufacturers were highly skilled with lower production costs. Almost as soon as 
Macy’s made the announcement three large stores signed on to do their buying through 
the new the New York firm’s office in Prague: Bamberger’s of Newark, Carson, Pirie, 
Scott of Chicago, and Lasalle Koch of Toledo.385 Soon thereafter, Marshall Field’s of 
Chicago announced it would open a Prague office, and so too, would the AMC member 
store, J.L. Hudson Co. of Detroit. The director of the European Headquarters for 
Women’s Wear Daily, B.J. Perkins, followed the parade of visiting American buyers 
travelling through the Czech markets in 1935 and noted that “Germany’s loss has been, in 
part, Czechoslovakia’s gain.” He explained that retailers were attracted to the region 
because labor unrest was limited, access to materials was unfettered, and laborers were 
cheap, especially in the “home-working districts” around Gablonz and in Moravia. Still, 
Perkins had lots of criticism for Czechoslovakia, namely that transportation and 
hospitality services were woefully underdeveloped. Between Prague and the home-
working districts, buyers had to travel long distances by car on “heavily rutted roads.” 
Along the way they stayed at shabby hotels and slept on “bumpy beds.” They had no 
choice but to follow a long-since-outdated “pitcher and washbowl regime.” Perkins 
complained that, “there are insufficient stars in the modern Baedeker to suggest the 
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inferiority of most of the hotels at which buyers are compelled to stay while they work 
with the manufacturers, sometimes for weeks at a stretch.” Despite the many advantages 
in labor and materials (and the occasional pleasure of a “real Pilsner”), Perkins found his 
journey alongside American buyers in Czechoslovakia barely tolerable.386 
 The AMC, too, had been eager to follow the rush of retailers to Prague until 
Streicher submitted a report in 1935 recommending against investments in the Czech 
capital. Streicher had been consulting with American and Czech diplomats for months, 
and in each case he learned that the chances of an office in Prague turning a profit were 
small. John Bruins, a U.S. consular official based in Prague, cautioned Streicher that the 
capital city was simply too far from the Czech manufacturing districts along the Austrian 
border to be a suitable place for business. And after a visit with the incoming president of 
the new Czechoslovakian Export Institute, Streicher determined that his own resident 
buyers stationed in Vienna had amassed more accurate information on nearby Czech 
manufacturers. In the end, legal advisors to the Macy’s office in Prague from the Vienna-
based legal firm of Fousek and Klein, gave Streicher his greatest insights into the Czech 
markets. Klein revealed that Macy’s’ business in Prague had fallen far short of 
expectations—sales were a staggering 78% less than the firm had hoped. In addition, the 
manager (who had formerly run Macy’s Berlin office) reported excessive local taxes and 
repeated difficulty maintaining working permits for his buyers.387 Klein predicted that the 
firm’s Prague office would not last long. Finally, Streicher paid a visit to the American 
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Minister to Austria, George S. Messersmith, who further encouraged him to forget 
Prague and focus on Vienna, which was only an easy day trip from the home-working 
districts in Gablonz and Moravia.388 Without hesitation, the AMC executive board 
approved Streicher’s recommendation against opening an office in Prague and instead 
channeled their resources towards Vienna.  
 Streicher’s research on the viability of Prague as a trade center came during an 
important shift in Austro-American trade relations. Conservative officials in the new 
quasi-fascist Austrian government actively pursued more balanced trade relations with 
the United States even as they remained ambivalent to the growing influence of Nazism 
on the country’s northwestern border. The Austro-American trade deficit was significant. 
Between January and March 1934, the U.S. exported more than 15.4 million schillings 
worth of goods to Austria, but imported only 2.6 million schillings worth of Austrian 
goods. However, in the months following the departure of American retailers from 
Berlin, Austrian exports of manufactured textiles, especially in women’s clothing, began 
to climb.389 In March, just weeks after the Civil War ended, the new Austrian Trade 
Commission sent a delegation to the United States to lay the groundwork for establishing 
reciprocal trade treaties between the two countries. The New York Merchants 
Association invited Edgar Prochnik, Austrian Minister to the U.S., to speak at a luncheon 
held in honor of Austrian trade delegation. Prochnik told retailers that Austria was the 
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key to peace and stability in Europe: “What you do for Austria,” he insisted, “you do for 
Europe.” He added a veiled threat, however, that Austrians would only continue to buy 
American goods if Americans bought more Austrian goods.390 Two months after the 
Austrian trade delegation’s American tour, the Austrian Handelsmuseum (a foreign trade 
organization) set up a special “American Bureau” to study problems related to the 
Austro-American trade.391 And shortly after that, officials at the newly founded Austrian 
Export Promotion Institute announced plans to establish a trade office in New York City 
by the end of 1935.392 
 Austria’s renewed investment in trade with the United States came at the right 
time for leading department stores eager to disassociate with Berlin and disappointed by 
trade prospects in Prague; the response from the retail and fashion industries was swift. 
During the first five months of 1935 American purchases through Vienna increased 100% 
over the previous year and the U.S. registered the second largest increase of all Austrian 
export markets.393 Women’s Wear Daily, which had only sporadically printed a column 
on the Viennese markets beginning in 1931, breathed new life into its Vienna bureau. In 
1934 and 1935, the “Glimpses of Vienna” column appeared several times each week with 
correspondents regularly reporting that more American buyers were visiting the city. 
Moreover, Viennese designers who had been only marginally popular in the United 
States prior to the anti-Nazi boycotts experienced a marked increase in demand in the 
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mid-thirties. When the popular Viennese milliner Thea Marsi began doing tours of the 
United States in 1927, she visited three to five American department stores annually to 
mold custom hats inspired by her clients’ personalities.394 In October 1934 Streicher 
noted that, “Mme. Marsi creates a bigger sensation this year than ever before,” and the 
following year Marsi visited nearly thirty American department stores, many of them in 
such unlikely places as Louisville, Kentucky, Birmingham, Alabama, and Youngstown, 
Ohio.395  Yet while Marsi aspired to create custom designs, most of the fashions coming 
out of Vienna followed an aesthetic and a set of ideas that had little to do with the 
progressive culture and influential Jewish population of the city itself. When Vogue 
began printing feature articles on Austria and advertisements from the Austrian National 
Tourist Office in 1935, each one promoted folk styles and scenic imagery from the 
Alpine regions, most often associated with the Tyrol provinces. In a Vogue article penned 
by the Austrian Baron Hubert Von Pantz, for example, the author insists that touring 
Americans be fitted for “genuine” Tyrolean outfits at the Lanz Brothers shop in Salzburg 
before trekking into the Alps for skiing, mountaineering, and a stay at the “charming, old 
timbered White Horse Inn immortalized in the operetta.”396  
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Americans had long been fascinated by folk traditions and costumes from around 
the world, but the growing interest in Alpine fashions in the mid-thirties upended typical 
associations with the trappings of folk life. Since the 1890s, folk “costumes” (typically 
not folk “fashions”) had made regular appearances in fashion magazines, on trade cards, 
and in popular ethnographic writings. Images of foreign women dressed in native 
clothing, however, were often employed to demarcate the distance between wealthy, 
fashionable, and western or white women who followed Paris trends and backward, lower 
class, and often non-white and/or colonized women who did not follow Paris. In a 1916 
report on women in Bulgaria, for example, National Geographic Magazine juxtaposed a 
photograph of women in traditional “peasant garb” with one of female college students 
donning contemporary “European dress” to dramatize the cultural gulf between them. 
Just as wearing Paris fashions helped American women associate themselves with the 
monied, the privileged, and the aristocratic of Europe, so too, did the romanticization of 
seemingly timeless folk costumes. To admire the “folk” was to draw a line and set 
oneself apart from it.397 Yet, Tyrolean fashions struck an entirely different chord than 
folk costumes from other parts of the world, including from eastern, southern, and far 
northern Europe (only France, Britain, Germany were routinely exempt from folk 
characterizations in American popular culture).  Heavily promoted by the new 
conservative government in Austria, Tyrolean imagery explicitly defined beauty as fair-
skinned girls in dirndls and rural, mountainous scenery untrammeled by the distasteful 
elements of the modern, cosmopolitan city. Like other renderings of the folk, “Tyrolean” 
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denoted an aesthetic that was decidedly anti-modern, but unlike them, it also carried 
associations with wealth, privilege, and purity. Since the development of sanatoriums and 
air cure towns in the western Alps in the mid-nineteenth century, the Tyrolean town of 
Meran had been the most popular and accessible destination for titled or wealthy 
Europeans eager to cure disease, escape the stultifying air of cities, or reinvent 
themselves in the fresh mountain air. Despite the fact that Tyrolean natives were 
generally isolated, sickly, and poor, air cure tourism recast them as hearty, strong, and 
attractive. Swept up in a decades-long movement to commodify mountain air for sale to 
European elites, Tyrolean “folk” combined all that was desirable about the seeming 
contentedness and timelessness of the lower class with the beauty and privilege 
associated with the air cure industry.398 It was no accident, of course, that it was a man of 
wealth and title, Baron Hubert Von Pantz, who encouraged Vogue readers to get outfitted 
in traditional Tyrolean styles during their Austrian Alpine vacations.  
Still, embedded in the imagery and ideas associated with the Tyrol in the mid-
thirties was a not-so-subtle exclusion of Jews from that which was considered beautiful 
and desirable. In Austria, the decade that preceded the Anschluss was marked by a culture 
clash that pitted the modern and “Jewish” culture of Vienna against the conservative and 
Christian culture of the rest of the country, particularly the rural, poor, and mostly 
Catholic provinces like Tyrol. Despite the fact that Jewish intellectuals and artists were 
central to the creation of the popular culture that came to anchor the new “Austrian” 
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national identity, many non-Jewish Austrians regarded Jews as foreigners; they were not 
recognized as bodenständig, or belonging to the land. The project of recasting Austria in 
the image of the Tyrol to promote tourism and business abroad was a deliberately 
conservative strategy; and it was sponsored by a quasi-fascist government that masked 
deep-seated ambivalence about Nazism with official commitments to religious equality. 
Alpine imagery enshrined traditional, patriarchal, and Christian social and familial 
patterns. It fostered economic development in the provinces without the need for 
industrialization and all its social ills. To uphold the Tyrol as central to the new national 
identity of Austria was to imagine a country defined by its Christian provinces, to the 
exclusion of cities that had been shaped by the intellectual and artistic achievements of 
Austrian Jews. Despite the political tensions that plagued Austria in the mid-thirties, the 
aesthetics and assumptions that underpinned Tyrolean imagery—and more specifically, 
what and who was left out of the new national picture—existed comfortably alongside 
Nazi racial ideologies. And indeed, as provincial Austrians fell further under the sway of 
Hitler’s Germany between 1935 and 1938, the omnipresence of Nazi attitudes towards 
Jews could no longer be masked by official declarations of religious tolerance.399  
There is no more revealing example of how Americans encountered Alpine or 
“Tyrolean” imagery in popular culture than to look at the reception of one Austria’s most 
successful exports, the comedic operetta, “White Horse Inn,” or Im Weissen Rössl, on 
Broadway in 1936.  When “White Horse Inn” premiered in Vienna in 1930, the plot 
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centered on romantic intrigues, a series of marriage proposals, and tensions between the 
innkeeper and staff at the well-known White Horse Inn nestled in the Upper Austrian 
Alps (not, as it happens, in Tyrol). However, it also featured a Jewish character as the 
standard bearer of technological progress and drew heavily on Freudian psychology for 
its humor. Karl Farkas, perhaps the best-known Jewish comedian of the era, directed and 
starred in the premiere and several lesser known Viennese Jews filled out the cast and 
contributed to the show’s musical score. Even as it shamelessly promoted the beauty of 
the Alpine landscape and provincial Austrian women, “White Horse Inn” also offered a 
sharp critique of economic hard times and some compelling social commentary about the 
importance of Jews in bringing progress and modernity to Austria. At the end of the 
operetta, it is a Jewish character named Sulzheimer who resolves the plot with a 
technological innovation—a “wedding dress with a zip!”—albeit a comedic one.400 After 
seven hundred performances in Vienna, “White Horse Inn” traveled to Berlin, Munich, 
London, and Paris. However, as the show was adapted for new audiences the social 
commentary was either gradually edited out of the script or otherwise lost in linguistic or 
cultural translation. A reviewer for the London Times heaped praise on the “White Horse 
Inn” stage sets, colors, and jolly music that moved to “the hearty thumping of beer mugs 
on tables.” At the same time, he lamented that the stars of the show had been “so poorly 
supplied with material.” That point mattered little, however, because, as the reviewer 
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concluded, any spectator who noticed the thin script would soon be “rescued by some 
fresh turn of the kaleidoscope.”401 
“White Horse Inn” had generated such a sensation across Europe that by the time 
the show premiered on Broadway in October 1936, Americans felt slighted by the delay. 
One New York Times correspondent irreverently noted that the show, “which has been 
seen almost everywhere else in the world, finally opens this evening.402 Brooks Atkinson, 
the city’s foremost theater critic similarly remarked that, “even the oldest citizen was 
beginning to believe that an American version of “White Horse Inn” was only a rumble 
in some producer’s office.”403 Indeed Americans had been reading about “White Horse 
Inn” for years. Vogue had reviewed or referenced European productions of the show at 
least one dozen times before its Broadway premiere.404 When the show finally opened at 
the Center Theater on October 1, 1936 American critics lavished praise on the 
extravagant “Tyrolean” spectacles, which included breathtaking mountain vistas, scores 
of yodelers, hornpipe players, and traditionally outfitted chorus girls, water-filled lakes, 
moving steamboats, a large chalet, and a replica of the real White Horse Inn that 
extended well beyond the stage. Indeed the show was so extravagant and so filled with 
“mechanical contrivances” that it required investment from the Rockefellers and 
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warranted an exclusive behind-the-scenes feature in the New York Times.405 Alongside 
enthusiastic praise for the sets, costumes, and music in the production, most critics 
admitted that “White Horse Inn” was also “incurably dull.” Some speculated as to 
whether dialogue was necessary at all, as it seemed only to interfere with the fantastical 
scenery. Even Brooks Atkinson described the story line as one in which, “nothing 
happens really.” Nonetheless, he concluded that the “beautiful style [of “White Horse 
Inn”] should endear it to the hearts of all showgoers.”406 
“White Horse Inn” was a visual feast and American retailers eagerly embraced 
promotions tied directly to the show or otherwise inspired by the so-called “Tyrolean” 
scenery that the show made famous. Macy’s secured exclusive rights to transform the 
lobby at the Center Theater into an Alpine village street lined with “Tyrolean shops” 
featuring the latest in imported Austrian knits, hats, and novelties. In anticipation of the 
show, the firm even sponsored citywide knitting contests. Women who produced the best 
“Tyrolean” hats and scarves were rewarded with tickets to see the show.407 Even 
Boston’s Jordan Marsh & Co. built a replica of the “White Horse Inn” stage-set in order 
to sell Tyrol inspired merchandise at the National Winter Sports Exhibition in December 
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1936.408 Both Vogue and Women’s Wear Daily celebrated “White Horse Inn” with 
features and photo-spreads; the latter calling the show “as close to perfection as any 
audience is permitted to enjoy.” Nearly two hundred articles referenced “White Horse 
Inn” in Women’s Wear Daily in the year following its American opening.409 Alongside 
the enthusiasm over “White Horse Inn,” ski fashions, too, had an “unprecedented” season 
of sales. Two months after the show’s opening, many retailers were “cleaned out” of ski 
merchandise. American manufacturers reported that their phones were ringing all the 
time with buyers desperate to restock reproductions of Tyrolean ski suits and sweaters.410 
European ski experts and style advisors saw an increase in their American business, too. 
When Maria Springer debuted her dry ski exercises and ski fashion program in the United 
States in 1935 she spent just a few weeks at Bloomingdale Brothers. In 1936-37 the AMC 
offered her a contract to spend six weeks studying the latest fashions at ski resorts in the 
Austrian and Swiss Alps, and four weeks in Vienna to develop clothing samples based on 
her findings, and three months in the United States leading her programs in stores.411 
Each winter she spent three months visiting department stores in New York, Boston, 
Philadelphia, Detroit, and Columbus for a few weeks at a time. She became so popular 
that AMC executives argued about which stores she should spend the most time at and 
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when. 412 Springer’s influence extended beyond the retail industry, too, and in 1936 she 
began writing articles about ski racing in Europe for the New York Times.413    
Back across the Atlantic in Vienna, the American retail trade expanded by every 
possible measure between 1936 and 1937. Shortly after “White Horse Inn” opened on 
Broadway the Macy’s firm transferred its fledgling business in Prague to Vienna and 
enlarged its headquarters there.414 Two months later, in December 1936, the AMC, too, 
moved out of the Austrian government building it had inhabited since 1930 and into a 
new space that was double the size and equipped with more modern amenities.415 
Consider that in 1933-34 the AMC’s Vienna office employed nine people and only four 
of them as buyers, including Streicher, who split his time with the Berlin office. Total 
annual sales in 1934 amounted to around $150,000. 416  However, during just the first 
eight months of 1936, sales at the Vienna office totaled $390,000. Streicher reported that 
the staff could not keep up with the extra work and that every one of them was pulling 
extra late hours.417 In 1937, the first eight months brought in $600,000 in total sales. 
During that same period 175 foreign buyers visited the AMC Vienna office representing 
department stores in the U.S., England, Canada, and Australia, but a whopping sixty 
percent came from the U.S. By comparison, Americans comprised less than thirty percent 
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of visiting buyers at the AMC’s Berlin office. Streicher hired ten new staff members—all 
Austrian—and records indicate that sales doubled or tripled in every major merchandise 
line from infant’s wear and linens to gloves, toys, and, of course, women’s fashions.418 
The growth of the AMC trade in Vienna was not unique; it reflected a larger trend in the 
industry. In one month alone, March 1937, total exports of Austrian merchandise to the 
United States amounted to three million schillings, marking a one hundred percent 
increase over March 1936.419 Similar increases were reported nearly every month over 
the two-year period.420 Those figures are all the more remarkable considering the United 
States imported only 2.6 million schillings worth of Austrian merchandise during the first 
three months of 1934.421   
However much or little Americans understood about political conditions in 
Austria in the mid-thirties, it is hardly surprising that so many gravitated towards Alpine 
or “Tyrolean” fashions. In the United States, as in Austria, the deepening economic crisis 
fueled the explosion of anti-Semitic fervor at unprecedented levels. Christian 
demagogues like the Catholic Father Charles Coughlin and William Dudley Pelley, 
founder of the notorious Silver Shirts, spread hateful rhetoric about the Jewish 
domination of the United States and rumors circulated the President Roosevelt was being 
controlled by self-interested Jews or was himself Jewish. Between 1933 and 1941 
Americans created more than one hundred anti-semitic organizations as compared with 
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perhaps a total of five in all previous American history.422 Beyond the rising tides of anti-
Semitism across the United States, Americans, too, romanticized rural life and questioned 
modern values in the face of a depression that many believed stemmed from the false 
comforts and superficiality of an overabundant and immoral life. During the depression 
years, celebrated representations of the flappers and feminists of the twenties gave way to 
Dorothea Lange’s stolid “Migrant Mother” and John Steinback’s indefatigable Ma Joad. 
To be sure, these strains of anti-modernism and anti-Semitism materialized differently in 
the United States than in Central Europe. In Austria and Germany such ideologies 
energized powerful fascist and Nazi political parties, but no party platform in the United 
States officially endorsed either anti-modernism or anti-Semitism.423 Yet, while 
enthusiasm for the provincial Christian aesthetic of Tyrolean folk life may not have been 
etched into the structure of American politics, it was nonetheless an important and 
growing force in American popular culture, including in fashion circles. A broad swath of 
American consumers may have rejected the blatant violence of Nazism, but many found 
the comparatively idyllic, peaceful, and desirable folk life of the Tyrol wholly 
satisfactory, even thrilling. Perhaps few Americans noticed that Alpine imagery 
reinforced the same ideas about race, modernity, and religion that so many had rebelled 
against at the height of the anti-Nazi boycotts in 1933-1934. No matter, Americans 
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bought heavily into the Alpine aesthetic, anyway, because it captured a vision that many 
found appealing and did not (yet) bear Nazi label.    
Between 1935 and 1938 Vienna emerged as the new trade hub of Central Europe 
in the American retail industry with Alpine imagery dominating the styles and 
merchandising of exports, especially in women’s and children’s knitwear and skiwear. 
Yet, as a 1938 AMC report on “Tyrolean fashions” makes clear, Tyrol natives had very 
little, if anything at all, to do with the production of their own highly desirable image in 
the fashion trades. Most of the manufacturers who produced Tyrolean knits and skiwear 
were, in fact, Jewish and based in Vienna.424 And if they were not based in Vienna, they 
were based in Czechoslovakia, mainly in the home-working districts of Bohemia and 
Moravia, a region filled with German speakers that was also known as the 
Sudetenland.425 In fact, American purchases in Czechoslovakia increased apace with 
those in Austria. During the first seven months of 1937 visiting American buyers ordered 
twice as much Czech merchandise as they had in 1936 and the U.S. became the largest 
export market for Czech products anywhere in the world, though few Americans would 
have known it.426 Buyers prized contracts with Czech manufacturers not because of any 
distinctive Czech style, but because of their ability to copy foreign styles and reproduce 
them en masse at lower costs. When an American jewelry buyer for Filene’s visited 
Gablonz in 1937, for example, she searched for styles that best reflected the latest 
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innovations seen at the recent Paris Exposition. “The newest things they are making here 
are definitely influenced by the Couturier Jewelry in Paris,” she reported happily.427 
Despite the dominance of Tyrolean imagery in the Vienna trade, Czech manufacturers 
had become so vital to the burgeoning Austro-American retail trade that major U.S. 
retailers began opening or reopening small offices there, mainly in the Sudetenland 
during the first months of 1938.428  
At the end of 1937 Streicher had submitted a report that was full optimism for the 
future of trade in his region. “It is generally believed in Central Europe,” Streicher wrote, 
“that the period ahead holds out promise of gradual progress in improvement in spite of 
the hindrances of tariffs, quotas, and currency manipulations.”429 Of course, Streicher 
could not have been more wrong. After the German takeover of Austria in early March 
1938, tariffs, quotas, and currencies were the least of the problems facing American 
retailers entrenched in Central Europe. American department stores that had pursued a 
policy of boycotting merchandise made in Nazi Germany in their flagships since 1934, 
including a number of AMC-member stores, immediately adopted the same policy 
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towards Austrian merchandise. On March 30 the AMC executive board approved a 
special trip for the French buyer Christine Neurand stationed at the London office to 
spend several weeks with Streicher in Vienna. Her purpose was to get “ideas for 
merchandise that can be developed in the English market to replace the Austrian 
merchandise.”430 Despite the spread of the boycott to Austria, the AMC executive board 
feared that American enthusiasm for Tyrolean styles would not wane in the months 
following the Anschluss. After studying the Austrian markets in May 1938, however, 
Neurand recommended against any attempt to copy Tyrolean fashions in other countries 
for two important reasons. First, the primary producers of Tyrolean fashions were Jewish, 
and as Neurand concluded, “we can assume they will leave at the first opportunity and 
thus we don’t know if Vienna will remain a centre of fashion.” Second, Neurand argued 
that because Tyrolean imagery “gets a very definite characteristic from the country itself, 
it would be quite useless to transplant it into another country.”431 Ironically, Tyrolean 
fashions faded in the absence of the Jewish manufacturers who created them, and the 
Nazi invasion of Austria suddenly rendered the “characteristics of the country” 
undesirable to most Americans, anyway. Neurand expected that the Anschluss signaled 
the end of the American craze for Tyrolean fashions, and she was right. In much the same 
way the rise of the Nazi Party in 1933 had made German merchandise unacceptable to an 
important group of consumers in the American northeast, so too, did the expansion of the 
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Nazi rule into Austria reveal the Tyrolean fantasy for what it really represented: a vision 
of life wholly consistent with Nazi ideologies. 
 
 
 
 
“Americans All”: The American Retail Trade After the Anschluss 
In December 1938 Lincoln Filene, President of Filene’s in Boston, sent a note to 
Kirstein with a clipping from a feature article in the Boston Sunday Globe, titled, “The 
Big News of Nineteen Thirty-Eight in Photos.” Filene had cut out two carefully chosen 
photos for Kirstein. The first featured British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain 
meeting with German Chancellor and Führer Adolf Hitler at Berchtesgaden to lay the 
groundwork for the Munich Agreement, which first “dismembered” and ultimately 
dissolved Czechoslovakia beginning in October 1938. The second photograph featured a 
group of aging German Jewish men forced to scrub the streets of Berlin before a 
“guffawing Nazi throng.” That image had been superimposed against a backdrop of 
storefronts in Berlin smeared with yellow paint spelling out the word “Jude” or depicting 
the Star of David. In the attached note, Filene hastily scribbled: “Don’t you feel that in 
Berlin and perhaps in Italy our corporation name should be taken from signs, letterhead, 
etc.? Particularly in Berlin as we are not buying German wares and I should say this was 
  
213
a consistent policy for us?”432 Filene’s note captures the paradox that confronted 
American retailers in the late thirties. That is, that by the many time industry leaders 
sought to remove their business interests from the expanding Nazi territories, they were 
so entrenched in the Central European trade that leaving was nearly impossible. Filene 
did not suggest that the AMC make plans to close the trade office in Berlin, or that the 
Filene’s firm cancel its membership in the AMC. Instead, Filene merely recommended 
that all evidence of Filene’s’ connection to the Berlin office be erased from public view, 
to appear consistent with the boycott policy adopted by the firm’s flagship in 1933. 
Although Vienna had become a trade hub for exports from Central Europe shipped to 
many American stores, Berlin remained a trade hub for exports shipped to consumers in 
England, Australia, and Canada, as well as to a number of American stores located 
outside the northeast. Despite the phenomenal growth of the Austro-American trade and 
the widespread influence of Tyrolean fashions, visiting buyers at the AMC’s Berlin office 
still placed over $100,000 more in merchandise orders than those visiting the Vienna 
office in 1937.433 
When Nazi troops entered Austria on March 11, 1938 they encountered virtually 
no opposition. In the conservative Alpine provinces the invasion looked more like a 
victory parade.434 However, many American retailers responded immediately. In a front-
page story for Women’s Wear Daily, Perkins argued that, “the Nazification of Austria 
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will result in severe contraction of buying there by those American stores which have 
long boycotted German merchandise.” Indeed almost no American buyers visited the 
Vienna Spring Fair in 1938 and many opted to visit the Prague Spring Fair instead.435 A 
number of retailers took steps to transfer the resources in their Vienna offices back to 
Prague, and the Czech Export Institute predicted that American purchases in Czech 
markets would soar.436 Yet, as Perkins noted in July, “a cloud of politics has darkened the 
outlook for trade in Czechoslovakia.” That summer, signs of political unrest in the 
country reached American department stores directly. In one case, a group of pro-German 
Czech workers inserted Swastika labeled propaganda circulars advocating for another 
Anschluss in cases of chinaware and gloves bound for department stores that had 
boycotted Germany for years.437 Indeed, the great majority of people in the home-
working districts around Gablonz, where more than three quarters of the country’s textile 
manufacturers were located, spoke German and identified as Germans. When British, 
French, German, and Italian leaders signed the Munich Agreement in September, they 
ceded this region, the Sudetenland, to the Third Reich and paved the way for the 
subsequent German invasion of Bohemia and Moravia. All hopes for a blossoming of the 
American-Czech trade faded as the Sudetenland fell under Nazi rule. “It has been an 
exciting, puzzling year in Europe’s commercial markets,” Perkins reflected in a 
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December issue of Women’s Wear Daily, “and what 1939 has to offer when the new 
Continental map is jig-sawed together is anyone’s guess.”438 
When P. J. Reilly, executive director of the AMC, made an urgent trip abroad to 
deal with the political changes in Central Europe in December 1939, he stopped first in 
London. Since the beginning of the AMC’s expansion abroad in 1921 Harrods of London 
had been a vital alliance and source of business for the American corporation, especially 
in Central Europe. Since the eruption of the anti-Nazi boycotts in 1933-34, Harrods 
buyers had become only more essential to the success of the AMC office in Berlin. 
During 1937 and 1938 visiting buyers representing Harrods’ interests purchased more 
than forty percent of the AMC’s total sales through the Berlin office.439 For point of 
contrast, visiting buyers representing six department stores in Australia and Canada 
purchased another thirty-seven percent of sales, and the remaining twenty-three percent 
was distributed among more than a dozen stores in the United States.440 Without a doubt, 
Harrods’ buyers had the power to sustain or shutter AMC operations in Berlin after 1934, 
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but the London firm had up to that point never wavered in its purchasing levels. By 
December 1938, however, Reilly was ready to close the door on the AMC’s office in 
Berlin. When he arrived at Harrods’ flagship store on Brompton Road for a meeting with 
partial owner Sir Richard Burbidge, he offered the London firm an opportunity to take 
over the management of the AMC office in Berlin and run it on the basis of a 
commissionaire. “I frankly told him that we had decided to close the Vienna office, 
possibly Gablonz, and really would like to get out of Berlin if we could work out any 
practical means of having someone else take over our building,” Reilly later recounted in 
a letter to Kirstein. Burbidge not only declined to buy into the Berlin office, he did his 
level best to persuade Reilly to keep the office open at all costs. He expected that 
Harrods’ buyers would place orders at the same rate as they had in previous years despite 
the growing threats posed by the expanding Nazi regime.441 Burbige even insisted that 
Reilly visit Berlin because he believed that Americans had developed some 
“misconceptions as to the real situation there.” In fact, Reilly did proceed to Berlin after 
his visit with Burbidge, but not to admire what did indeed seem to him like “prosperous 
times” in the German capital. Instead, Reilly offered to give over the Berlin office on the 
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have their imported merchandise merely stamped “Imported,” and the country of origin need not be 
specified. Ordinarily they avoid specifying the country of origin except in the case of French and American 
merchandise because in these two cases it helps to sell the goods over here.” It may be the case then, that 
Harrods shoppers were buying German merchandise without realizing it was German. See: PJR to LEK, 
letter, December 9, 1938, “Closing Vienna Office,” Box 82, LEK HBL. 
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same commissionaire basis to Streicher and his top buyer, fellow Austrian Hanns Marss, 
who could run the business together as commissionaires working for the AMC. Alas, 
they declined to take over the Berlin office, too.442  
The problem with getting out of the AMC office in Berlin was not that the 
business was bad—thanks, in large part, to Harrods, business was quite good—but that 
the AMC owned the building. As Reilly lamented in the official report on his 1938 trip, 
the building on Lindenstrasse could be sold “at a reasonable price, but the money could 
not be taken out of Germany.”  Nearly all the offices that the AMC established across 
Europe had been leased, but the corporation purchased their headquarters in Paris and 
Berlin in the aftermath of the First World War. At that time, currency rates and real estate 
investments were in the corporation’s favor, but by the end of 1938 German legal codes 
worked against the sale of the Berlin headquarters; Nazi officials had enacted laws that 
made it impossible to remove substantial amounts of capital from Germany.443 When he 
returned from Europe, Reilly first proposed selling the building to a German entity, 
taking up a short-term lease elsewhere in the city and using the proceeds from the sale to 
cover expenses in the new headquarters until the money from the sale ran out.444 Several 
members of the AMC executive board, including Kirstein, suggested another option: 
selling the building outright and donating the proceeds to the Joint Distribution 
                                                      
442 “Report of Director’s December 1938 Trip to Europe,” January 5, 1939; PJR to LEK, letters, December 
9 & 23, 1938, “Closing Vienna Office,” Box 82, LEK HBL; On Hanns Marss, see: HS to LEK, letter, 
February 13, 1931, LEK to HS, letter, April 8, 1931, “Hanns Streicher Vienna,” Box 82, LEK HBL. 
443 See David S. Wyman, Paper Walls: America and the Refugee Crisis, 1938-41 (Amherst, MA: 
University of Massachusetts Press, 1968), 53-56. 
444 “Report of Director’s December 1938 Trip to Europe,” January 5, 1939; PJR to LEK, letters, December 
9 & 23, 1938 in “Closing Vienna Office,” Box 82, LEK HBL. Also see Wyman, Paper Walls, 53-56. 
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Committee, a Jewish relief organization focused on redressing the worsening refugee 
crisis.445 Either the idea proved unfeasible or otherwise unacceptable to the majority of 
AMC stakeholders (most likely to Harrods), and in May 1939 the corporation voted not 
to sell the Berlin building at a loss. After months of deliberation, the executive board had 
approved a proposal from Streicher to drastically reduce operations in Berlin and set him 
up as a commissionaire paid by the AMC to fulfill orders in Central Europe for longtime 
clients in Britain, Austria, and Canada. In turn, Streicher would rent out the majority of 
space in the AMC building and use the rental income to pay himself and a skeleton staff 
of five, all on reduced salaries. The plan worked within laws restricting the flow of 
German capital and fulfilled what Reilly considered to be a “moral” obligation to 
Harrods, which continued to place large orders through the Berlin office in mid-1939. 
(Although these orders were not necessarily for merchandise made in Germany. In 1939 
the Berlin office purchased merchandise in markets as far south as the Balkans and as far 
north as Scandinavia.) What was most striking, however, about the AMC’s plan for the 
office on Lindenstrasse is that even in mid-1939 the corporation took into account 
possibilities for future trade in Germany. “By maintaining a nucleus of an organization,” 
Reilly explained to Streicher, “we will be prepared again to build it up if and when 
conditions become so different as to justify a larger organization.”446 
                                                      
445 Correspondence between P.J. Reilly, William B. Thalhimer, and LEK, April 4 ,5,7, “Streicher 1938-42,” 
Box 81, LEK HBL. 
446 P.J. Reilly to LEK, letter, January 27, 1939; Correspondence between HS and P.J. Reilly, February 3, 
March 13, May 20, June 5 1939; “List of Personnel Berlin Office,” June 1939, “Streicher 1938-1942,” Box 
81, LEK HBL. 
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The AMC held on to Streicher and their office in Berlin until Germany’s 
declaration of war on the United States in 1941 made it illegal for them to do so. Despite 
the corporation’s seemingly interminable connection to the city, however, the AMC also 
followed larger trends in the American retail industry by sending buyers into new 
markets beyond Europe. In November 1939, several months after the German occupation 
of Paris in 1939, the United States Department of Commerce facilitated a meeting 
between sixteen leading American retailers, including Kirstein, and commercial officials 
representing fifteen countries in South and Central America. The Under Secretary of 
Commerce, Edward J. Noble, told the New York Times that the “principal objective of the 
meeting was to arrange for purchases in Latin America… of articles formerly bought in 
Europe.”447 In 1940 the Department of Commerce completed the first comprehensive 
study of handicrafts produced in Latin America that might be “suitable for sale” in the 
United States and established the Inter American Development Committee to “develop 
non-competitive consumer goods industries” in the region. Although the study 
determined that these markets would require significant investments to develop products 
beyond souvenirs and novelties in commercial volume, a number of retailers jumped at 
the opportunities.448 The AMC sent Edouard Léon, the former manager of the 
corporation’s Paris office (disbanded during the German occupation) to develop new 
contracts in South America, but Macy’s led development in the region.449 In January 
                                                      
447 “Retailers Devise Latin American Trade Plan,” NYT, November 2, 1939, 10.  
448 Donald S. Parris, ed., Latin American Handicraft: Types Available and Sources of Supply (Bureau of 
Foreign and Domestic Commerce, 1940), “Department Stores—Correspondence with 1941 re: Inter-
American Cooperation Week,” Box 1, Records of the Committee for Inter-American Cooperation, NYPL.  
449 “Leon in South America for Products for AMC Units,” WWD, December 11, 1941, 38. 
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1942 the New York firm transformed its flagship in Herald Square into a “Latin 
American Fair” devoted to the exhibition and sale of merchandise made in Latin 
America. More than six hundred distinguished guests, including First Lady Eleanor 
Roosevelt and Ambassadors representing countries across Central and South America, 
attended the opening gala and more than 820,000 people visited the fair during its three 
week run. Visitors entered the fair by passing through reproductions of grand doorways 
famous colonial church at Arequipa, Peru and a colonial ranch in San Jose, Mexico, and 
were treated to “folk” performances in “Fiesta Square,” and a replica of a “typical coffee 
plantation hut.” To be sure, Macy’s Latin American Fair was rife with the kind of 
disparaging characterizations so often attributed to colonized “folk” life and fashions, but 
in the official program for the fair Macy’s executives framed the exhibition in 
aspirational political terms framed by the Second World War: “The many great problems 
that face the world today place new emphasis on the word American… if we would solve 
those problems successfully, we must face them not as North Americans or South 
Americans, but as Americans all.”450  
 
 In March 1934, shortly after the Macy’s firm announced they would close their 
trade office in Berlin, the AJCONG formed a committee to promote and support the 
boycott movement. The committee’s first task was to compile an “authentic and reliable 
data concerning substitute and equivalent articles produced by American and foreign 
                                                      
450 “Latin Americans Honored at Fair,” NYT, January 17, 1942, 30; “Latin America Fair Ends,” NYT, 
February 8, 1942, 51; “Macy’s Latin American Fait, January 17 - February 7, 1942, “R.H. Macy’s,” Box 
86, LEK HBL.  
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manufacturers.”451 Replacements for German merchandise had long been a vital tenet of 
the anti-Nazi boycott movement, but few anticipated that the most popular substitutes for 
German wares in the mid- thirties would tacitly support Nazi attitudes towards Jews. 
Only formal declarations of war pushed American retailers fully beyond the scope of 
trade in Central Europe and opened the door to spirited promotions of Latin American 
merchandise in the United States. While the decision that many retailers made not to 
support the anti-Nazi boycott movement reveals only that they preferred other methods of 
resistance to or negotiation with the Nazi regime, the widespread frenzy over Alpine 
fashions suggests something greater, and more disturbing, about American attitudes 
towards Nazi ideologies. That, perhaps, a great many Americans identified more closely 
with the anti-Semitic and anti-modern vision that the Nazi Party endorsed than most 
would have been willing to admit. For if the label “Nazi” had become repugnant to many 
in New York City, the “Tyrolean” folk imagery exported from quasi-fascist Austria had 
not. Still, the firm roots that American retailers had planted in Central Europe during the 
mid-thirties shaped much more than their response to the anti-Nazi boycott movement. In 
many cases, those roots granted a degree of political power and access that allowed them 
to aid Jewish refugees—even as they promoted the image of the Tyrol.  
 
 
 
                                                      
451 Memorandum from Mr. William Z. Spiegelman to Dr. Joseph Tenenbaum, March 13, 1934, Untitled 
Folder, Box 17, JBC NYPL. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
“Sometimes It Is Like I am Sitting on a Volcano”: Retailers, Buyers, Diplomats,  
and the Refugee Crisis before and during the Second World War 
 
 
“The Jewish tragedy opened by the rise of Hitler to power hit him like a heavy personal blow. 
Like so many others he had blood relatives caught in the clutches of Nazi barbarism; time and again he, 
too, said, “There but for the grace of God go I.” But his pain went far deeper than that, far deeper than any 
sense of personal fear and outrage… Kirstein gave of his heart and his substance to Jewish relief.” 
-Benjamin Selekman, tribute to Louis E. Kirstein  
in American Jewish Yearbook 1943.452 
 
“The little man who was to become the most violent figure in modern history was belaboring the 
audience with a harangue on the injustices of the Versailles Treaty. He vowed to tear it to shreds. Suddenly 
he shifted his vituperation to focus on the Jews… Hitler’s anti-Semitism was no secret. His threats against 
the Jews were a well-advertised part of his political program. But to hear him and see him spew forth his 
hatred hit me hard. He was talking about me.” 
-Ira Hirschmann on witnessing Adolf Hitler speak 
at a Nazi Party rally in Germany in 1933.453 
 
 
Introduction  
In late April 1938 Nazi storm troopers burst into the Vienna trade office of the 
Associated Merchandising Corporation (AMC).454 The notorious brown shirts ransacked 
the desk of the AMC’s longtime merchandise buyer Kurt Schwartz, a former German 
citizen and a Jew, before arresting him.455 Schwartz was one of twenty thousand Jews 
arrested in the immediate aftermath of the German-Austrian Anschluss in March. In the 
                                                      
452 Benjamin M. Selekman, “Louis Edward Kirstein,” American Jewish Yearbook 35 (1943-44): 35-46. 
453 Ira Hirschmann, Caution to the Winds (New York, David McKay, Co.: 1962), 42. 
454 The details of Schwartz’s case are taken from dozens of letters and telegrams included in “Schwartz,” 
Box 81 in Louis Kirstein Papers, Baker Business Library, Harvard University [hereafter LEK HBL]; Hanns 
Streicher [hereafter HS] to Phillip J. Reilly [hereafter PJR], letter, May 30, 1938, “Hanns Streicher, 
Vienna,” Box 82, LEK HBL; HS to PJR, June 3, 1938, “Streicher, 1938-42,” Box 81, LEK HBL. 
455 Although Streicher refers to Schwartz as a German citizen in his letters, the Nazi Party stripped 
Schwartz of his citizenship with the enactment of the Nuremberg Laws in September 1935. 
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course of a few terrifying months Austrian Jews were stripped of their citizenship, 
deprived of nearly all their legal and civil rights, and more or less banned from public 
life. In late March thousands of Austrians cheered at a political rally in Vienna when 
German Field Marshal Herrmann Goering threatened the city’s Jewish population. 
“Vienna must become German again,” Goering inveighed. “The Jew must know we do 
not care to live with him. He must go.” During the two weeks following Goering’s 
address, more than thirty thousand Jews, Kurt Schwartz likely among them, crowded the 
U.S. Consulate in Vienna seeking visa applications and information about 
immigration.456 Around the same time Schwartz sent a cable to a friend in the United 
States regarding an affidavit he needed to secure a U.S. travel visa.457 Nazi authorities 
intercepted the cable and, upon further investigation, learned that Schwartz was illegally 
manipulating currency exchange rates to keep up with the excessive taxes levied on 
                                                      
456 For a concise overview of Austria in the weeks following the Anschluss, see Steven Beller, A Concise 
History of Austria (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 231-36; Articles in the Jewish 
Telegraphic Agency [hereafter JTA] and the New York Times offer a more detailed picture of Vienna after 
the Anschluss. I have cited a sample here: “30,000 Sought US Visas in Vienna in Two Weeks,” JTA, April 
7; “Goering’s Warning Sends Thousands to US, British Consulates in Rush for Visas,” JTA, March 29, 
1938; “Hundreds Seek Visas to Quit Austria,” March 15, 1938;”Hitler Proclaims Austria’s Inclusion in 
Reich; Jews Lose Citizenship,” March 16, 1938; “500 Jews Seized in Austria As Nazi Purge Enters Third 
Day, Shops Looted, Wrecked, JTA, March 17, 1938; “Suicides Mount, Austrian Jews Besiege Consulates 
as Terrorism, Sacking of Shops Rises,” JTA, March 18, 1938; “Vienna Jews Don Top Hats, War Medals to 
Clean Streets,” JTA, March 25, 1938; “Jewish Suicides in Austria Put at 2,000, Arrests 12, 000 Since 
Anschluss,” JTA, April 28, 1938; “Organized Nazi Terrorism Goes On Secretly in Vienna,” NYT, 
1;“Goering Is Acclaimed in Vienna; Warns Jews Must Quit Austria,” NYT, March 27, 1938, 1.  
457 With unemployment on the rise in 1930, the Hoover Administration sought to curb immigration by 
urging consuls abroad to deny visas to anyone who might become a public charge in the United States (this 
was a reinterpretation of the “Likely to Become a Public Charge” or LPC clause in the Immigration Act of 
1917). Thereafter visa applicants were required to provide affidavits demonstrating that friends or relatives 
in the United States could provide for them in the event that they could not find work. Although the 
Roosevelt administration abandoned this policy following the Anschluss, the Visa Division failed to 
establish a new policy, leaving individual consuls to develop idiosyncratic and often unreasonable demands 
of refugees. See David S. Wyman, Paper Walls: America and the Refugee Crisis, 1938-1941 (New York, 
Pantheon Books, 1985), 4-5, 155-58. 
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Jewish-owned properties in the Third Reich.458 Nazi storm troopers arrested Schwartz at 
the AMC trade office soon after the investigation and even visited Schwartz’s home to 
warn his mother that any attempt to seek American consul would only bring harm to her 
son.  
Louis Kirstein, Chairman of the AMC’s foreign offices, learned of Schwartz’s 
arrest on May 17, 1938, when he received an urgent telegram at his office on Washington 
Street in Boston, where he also served as Vice President of Filene’s. The telegram came 
from the AMC trade office in Paris, where two American merchandise buyers had just 
returned from a business trip to Vienna and brought news of Schwartz’s arrest. Hanns 
Streicher, an Austrian native and head of the AMC offices in Berlin and Vienna, did not 
send word directly to Kirstein because he feared that any communication from his offices 
to the United States would make things worse for Schwartz. Though Streicher made 
several trips to see Schwartz’s mother, he found her unwilling to cooperate with him 
because of his ties to the United States. Streicher later wrote that he felt “powerless” to 
help Schwartz, but he and other AMC managers and buyers suspected that, if anyone 
could help, it would be Louis Kirstein. They were right. In a burst of transatlantic 
telegrams and letters, Kirstein called on retailers and diplomats stationed in Vienna, 
Berlin, Paris, New York, and Washington, D.C., to facilitate Schwartz’s release in less 
than one week. Though Schwartz was only one of hundreds of thousands of Jews 
                                                      
458 Hanns Streicher sent a letter to Louis Kirstein after Schwartz was safely out of prison to explain that 
these were the reasons for the arrest. During Schwartz’s imprisonment there was no explanation given for 
his arrest. See HS to Louis E. Kirstein [hereafter LEK], letter, June 3, 1938, “Streicher Berlin 1938-1942,” 
Box 81, LEK HBL. For details regarding taxes and regulations imposed on Jewish-owned properties 
throughout the Reich in April 1938 see Wyman, Paper Walls, 6, 29. 
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terrorized by the expanding Nazi regime in the spring of 1938, he was fortunate enough 
to be one of the comparatively few who made it to the United States before the end of the 
year.459 More remarkable still, by October, Kurt Schwartz was gainfully employed in 
New York City at Bloomingdale’s, a longtime member of the AMC stores network. 
 
Historians have long charged Americans, especially leading American Jews and 
government officials, particularly those serving in the U.S. State Department, of inaction 
and ambivalence in the face of violent Nazi persecution. More recently, studies have 
acknowledged the extent to which a rising tide of virulent anti-Semitism and a political 
climate hostile to any interventions abroad crippled American responses to the refugee 
crisis. 460 These studies, however, have tended not to emphasize relief and rescue efforts 
undertaken by influential Americans working outside traditional channels—that is to say, 
Americans working beyond the field of traditional government action and outside the 
                                                      
459 Wyman estimates that perhaps thirty thousand Jews left Austria and Germany for the United States in 
1938. See Wyman, Paper Walls, 37. 
460 For less critical treatment of the response from leading American Jewish organizations and people, see: 
Henry L. Feingold, Bearing Witness: How America and Its Jews Responded to the Holocaust (Syracuse: 
Syracuse University Press, 1995), 205-224; Hasia Diner, Jews of the United States, 1654-2000 (Oakland: 
University of California Press, 2004), 210-217. For more critical treatment of the response from American 
Jews and government officials, see: Arthur D. Morse, While Six Million Died: A Chronicle of American 
Apathy (New York: Random House, 1968), Wyman, Paper Walls; Henry L. Feingold, The Politics of 
Rescue: The Roosevelt Administration and the Holocaust, 1938-1945 (New Brunswick: Rutgers University 
Press, 1970); Barbara M. Stuart, United States Government Policy on Refugees from Nazism, 1933-1940 
(New York: Garland, 1984). On anti-Semitism and the political climate in the United States during the 
1930s-40s, see: Leonard Dinnerstein, Antisemitism in America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994) 
105-127; Michaela Hoenicke Moore, Know Your Enemy: The American Debate on Nazism, 1933-45 (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 78-86; Neil Baldwin, Henry Ford and the Jews: The Mass 
Production of Hate (New York: Public Affairs, 2001); Alan Brinley, Voices of Protest: Huey Long, Father 
Coughlin, and the Great Depression (New York: Knopf, 1982); Brooke Blower, “From Isolationism to 
Neutrality: A New Framework for Understanding American Political Culture,” Diplomatic History 38 
(2014): 345-376; also see: Wyman, Paper Walls.  
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reach of formal relief and rescue initiatives. While many historians have acknowledged 
the herculean efforts of Ira Hirschmann, an executive at Bloomingdale’s who forced his 
way onto the War Refugee Board before it was officially formed, none has explored how 
a retail executive forged such an extraordinary path.461 To be sure, Hirschmann was a 
man of unusual courage and conviction, and he possessed the kind of exemplary 
negotiation skills that led to the release of tens of thousands of prisoners from 
concentration camps in Romania. Still, Hirschmann’s roots in the American retail 
industry were not incidental to his outstanding interventions in Europe’s refugee crisis. 
No field of American commerce was as deeply shaken by the rise of Nazism in Europe, 
in part because retail executives were not dependent on third-party news reports or other 
intermediaries for information. Through regular communication with their foreign trade 
offices abroad, retailers were reliably informed about the dangers wrought by Adolf 
Hitler’s violent anti-Semitism from the very beginning. More importantly, though, the 
leaders of the American retail industry were overwhelmingly Jewish. In 1937, American 
Jews owned two thirds of the wholesale and retail establishments in New York City, the 
nation’s commercial capital, including the largest and most influential firm, R. H. 
                                                      
461 Hirschmann’s work on the War Refugee Board appears in several scholarly studies, see: See: Rebecca 
L. Erbelding, “About Time: The History of the War Refugee Board” (PhD diss., George Mason University, 
2015); Charles King, Midnight at the Pera Palace: The Birth of Modern Istanbul (New York: W.W. Norton 
& Co., 2014); Rafael Medoff, Blowing the Whistle on Genocide: Josiah E. Dubois, Jr. and the Struggle for 
a US Response to the Holocaust (West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 2009); Richard Breitman and 
Alan M. Kraut, American Refugee Policy and European Jewry, 1933-1945 (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1987), 143; Jean-Claude Favez, The Red Cross and the Holocaust, edited and translated 
by John and Beryl Fletcher (London, England: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 111. For his work as 
special envoy to the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration after the war, Hirschmann 
appears in: Hasia Diner, We Remember with Reverence and Love: American Jews and the Myth of Silence 
After the Holocaust, 1945-1962 (New York: New York University Press, 2009), 150, 296. Hirschmann also 
wrote two books that touch on his experience on the WRB, see: Hirschmann, Caution to the Winds; 
Hirschmann, Life Line to A Promised Land (New York: The Vanguard Press, Inc., 1946). 
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Macy’s. Studies have shown that similar patterns of Jewish leadership in the retail and 
wholesale fields emerged in major cities across the country.462 Retail executives were 
acutely aware of the realities facing Europe’s Jews not only because of their professional 
connections in the capital cities of the Third Reich but also because of their familial and 
social ties to countless men and women victimized by Nazi anti-Jewish policies.  
When Hirschmann accepted an executive post at Bloomingdale’s in 1938, he also 
joined the AMC network, which had grown to include twenty-two department stores 
located in twenty cities across thirteen states. On the eve of the Anschluss, AMC member 
stores maintained large, cooperative trade offices in London, Paris, Berlin, Vienna, 
Brussels, and Florence, and six smaller offices stationed throughout China and Japan. 
The firm also managed export accounts for department stores based in Canada, England, 
Scotland, Holland, Sweden, France, South Africa, and Australia. Scores of cooperative 
buying groups based in New York City operated trade offices in Europe by the mid-
thirties, but the AMC had three times the buying power of any one of them. In addition, 
the AMC had developed more than two hundred lines of its own branded merchandise, 
such as Barbara Lee women’s wear or Baby Crest infant goods, which were sold in 
department stores around the world. Without question, it was the United States’ largest 
and most innovative retail corporation during the interwar period. And, equally important 
to this story, nearly all of the leading executives at the stores that formed the core 
                                                      
462 See Feingold, Bearing Witness, 209-210.  
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membership in the AMC, from Abraham & Straus in Brooklyn to Bullock’s in Los 
Angeles, were Jewish.463  
Retailers associated with the AMC went to great lengths to undermine the 
influences of Nazism on their business abroad and to intervene in Europe’s refugee crisis 
after 1933. If Hirschmann’s work as the first special attaché to the War Refugee Board 
marks the culmination of these efforts, then Kirstein’s efforts to shield his relations, 
friends, and colleagues in Germany and Austria from Nazi persecution must be 
considered the foundation. A towering figure in the retail industry and well beyond it, 
Kirstein cultivated professional and social connections that granted him privileged 
insights into the terrible conditions facing Europe’s Jews. Over the course of the decade 
he supported a growing number of relations and friends through his partnership with the 
AMC manager stationed in the region, Hanns Streicher. After the German invasion of 
Austria in March 1938, Kirstein and Streicher called on their many contacts in the U.S. 
State Department, especially Assistant Secretary of State, George S. Messersmith, to help 
a handful of refugees make their way out of the Third Reich to safety in the United 
States, England, and even Cuba. Although these efforts were not always successful and 
                                                      
463 The following stores were AMC members in 1939: Abraham & Straus of Brooklyn, L.S. Ayres & 
Company of Indianapolis, Bloomingdale’s Inc. of New York, The Boston Store of Milwaukee, Bullock’s of 
Los Angeles, Burdine’s of Miami, The H.C. Capwell Company of Oakland, The Dayton Company of 
Minneapolis, The Emporium of San Francisco, William Filene’s Sons Company of Boston, B. Forman 
Company of Rochester, Joseph Horne Company of Pittsburgh, The J. L. Hudson Company of Detroit, 
Hutzler Brothers of Baltimore, The F. & R. Lazarus & Co. of Columbus, The Rike-Kumler Company of 
Dayton, The John Shillito Company of Cincinnati, Stix, Baer & Fuller Company of  St. Louis, Strawbridge 
& Clothier of Philadelphia, The William Taylor Son & Co. of Cleveland, Thalimer Brothers, Inc. of 
Richmond, R. H. White Company of Boston. All information on the formation of the AMC is gleaned from 
letters in Louis Kirstein’s personal papers, and especially from: Philip J. Reilly, Story of the Retail 
Research Association and the Associated Merchandising Corporation, 1916-1939 (New York, New York: 
Associated Merchandising Corporation, 1939), “AMC Story,” Box 82, LEK HBL; PJR to LEK, letter, 
December 27, 1939, “AMC Story,” Box 82, LEK HBL. 
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affected only a small and select group of refugees, they reveal how influential 
businessmen and diplomats collaborated privately to resist Nazi influences and aid 
individuals suffering under the anti-Jewish policies of the Third Reich.  
It was Kirstein who brought Hirschmann into the fold of the powerful AMC 
network during the early stages of Austria’s refugee crisis in the summer of 1938. 
Hirschmann drew on an overlapping constellation of social and professional contacts, 
including Kirstein and Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter, to contrive a position on 
the War Refugee Board, where his impact was far reaching. From his post in Ankara, 
Turkey in 1944, Hirschmann negotiated a series of deals that spared the lives of tens of 
thousands of Europe’s Jews. AMC retail executives were uniquely positioned to respond 
to the refugee crisis—in ways both large and small—because of their connections within 
the borders of the Third Reich and the contacts they cultivated in Washington, largely 
through diplomats stationed abroad. That so many retail executives were themselves 
Jewish was also paramount. AMC executives confronted the dangers of Nazism long 
before most other Americans because of their extensive familial, social, and professional 
ties to Jews living in Germany and Austria. And although Jewish retailers like Kirstein 
and Hirschmann did not always agree on the answers to critical questions facing 
American Jewry about how to respond to the threat of Nazism, in one vital respect they 
shared some common ground.464 Both men felt a calling to leverage their powerful 
                                                      
464 Kirstein and Hirschmann disagreed over the anti-Nazi boycotts, the former was a vocal advocate and 
the latter was ideologically opposed. See Chapter Four for a detailed account of the boycotts. 
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transatlantic resources and contacts in the U.S. State Department to respond meaningfully 
to the greatest humanitarian crisis of the twentieth century. 
 
 
 
Anti-Nazis and the AMC: Networks between Washington and Berlin 
Hanns Streicher had been in charge of the AMC trade office in Berlin for less 
than a year when he received an ominous knock on the door. It was October 1933 and a 
uniformed Nazi officer presented an order for Streicher and his staff to decorate the 
exterior of the AMC building with swastika flags. AMC executives had purchased the 
building that housed its foreign trade office on Berlin’s Lindenstrasse in 1921, when the 
street was at the heart of the city’s promising export district. In 1933, however, the Nazi 
Party chose Lindenstrasse as a central thoroughfare for political parades.465 Much to the 
surprise of the Nazi officer, Streicher boldly refused to comply with the order. “If all 
businesses are going to be decorated,” he calmly explained, “we shall do likewise and put 
out the American flag and the German black-white-red flag.” The officer insisted under 
the threat of force, but Streicher was resolute. He later learned that, by German law, no 
foreign firm could be forced to display the swastika flags. Regardless, Streicher’s refusal 
was no small act of courage. Nazi thugs had already beaten enough foreigners in the 
                                                      
465 Interestingly an AMC real estate report notes that in 1933 Lindenstrasse was also riddled with empty 
and deteriorated storefronts. The swastika flags would have obscured these symptoms of a depressed 
economy. See: “Translation of Survey Given by Messrs. ISR Schmidt Söhne, September 16, 1933 
“Streicher Berlin,” Box 81, LEK HBL; For a description of the Lindenstrasse district, see: “Toys Largest 
Item Bought in German Market,” Women’s Wear Daily, June 14, 1921. 
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streets for refusing to appropriately honor party symbols that U.S. Ambassador William 
Dodd had requested a personal meeting with Chancellor Hitler to demand state 
intervention.466 Streicher wrote at length about the episode with the Nazi officer in a 
letter to Kirstein at Filene’s in Boston. “Sometimes,” Streicher confessed with an eerie 
prescience, “it is like I am sitting on a volcano.”467 
In order to defend his relations, friends, and colleagues against the influences of 
Nazism as early as 1933, Kirstein cultivated the close support and friendship of many 
influential people, but two men in particular stand out: Hanns Streicher, a leather goods 
buyer from Gmunden, Austria, and George S. Messersmith. While Streicher’s name is all 
but lost to history and the details of his life are scant, Messersmith is well known to 
historians, particularly for his rigid adherence to restrictive immigration policies that kept 
thousands of would-be immigrants out of the United States. Messersmith was arguably 
the best-informed official in the State Department as to the crisis facing Europe because 
of the critically important posts he held over the course of the 1930s: first as Consul 
General at Berlin (1930-34), then as Minister to Austria (1934-37), and finally as 
Assistant Secretary of State (1937-1940). Although Messersmith is by far the better 
known of these two important figures in Kirstein’s circle of contacts, Streicher’s role 
ought not to be overshadowed. It was through Streicher’s visits to the U.S. Consulate in 
                                                      
466 “Stern Nazi Orders Protect Americans,” New York Times, October 23, 1933, 1; “Another American 
Beaten by a Nazi,” New York Times, October 11, 1933, 1; “Dodd to See Hitler Today on Assaults,” Special 
to New York Times, October 13, 1933, 15. Also see: Jesse H. Stiller, George S. Messersmith: Diplomat of 
Democracy (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1987), 44-45. 
467 In his response to Streicher’s letter, Kirstein wrote: “I think you showed a good deal of courage and 
certainly did the right thing in refusing as an American concern, to display the swastika flag.” See: LEK to 
HS, letter, October 26, 1933; HS to LEK, letter, October 10, 1933, “Streicher Berlin,” Box 81, LEK HBL. 
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Berlin that Kirstein learned first-hand of the extent of Messersmith’s anti-Nazi feelings. 
More importantly, Streicher himself was Kirstein’s most intimate ally in a quiet 
campaign against Nazi anti-Jewish policies, for it was Streicher who personally attended 
to the needs of Kirstein’s relations and friends in Germany and Austria. In 1933 and 1934 
Kirstein promoted Streicher to manager of the AMC offices in both Berlin and Vienna 
and entrusted him with dispensing aid to his relations in Germany. Over the same period, 
both Kirstein and Streicher developed connections to Messersmith that would prove 
indispensable after the German invasion of Austria in 1938. A close look at these 
overlapping professional, political, social circles reveals how Kirstein established a 
private network of anti-Nazi retailers and diplomats who would provide vital assistance 
to his relations and friends, especially after 1938. 
Louis Kirstein was the son of a Jewish lens grinder, Edward Kirstein, who fled 
Leipzig in the wake of the revolutionary uprisings in 1848.468 He was born in Rochester, 
New York in 1867 and, after a youth checkered with failed business ventures, married 
Rose Stein, daughter of the successful owner of the men’s clothing company, Stein-
Bloch. Eventually Kirstein found his way to Filene’s in Boston and rapidly ascended the 
executive ladder to become a partial owner in the business by 1911. Though he was never 
a religious man, Kirstein was deeply committed to his social and civic obligations as a 
                                                      
468 The details on Kirstein’s life in this paragraph are taken from: Martin Duberman, The Worlds of Lincoln 
Kirstein (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2007); George E. Berkley, The Filene’s (International Pocket 
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Jew and as an American.469 During the First World War he entered into important 
Democratic Party circles when he served as Chairman of the Board of Control for Labor 
Standards, and in the 1920s he became a leading figure in several Jewish organizations, 
especially the elite American Jewish Committee (AJCOMM). By the mid-thirties, 
Kirstein had become a giant in the American retail industry, was regularly elected to the 
executive board of the AJCOMM, and Roosevelt had appointed him to serve as an 
administrator on the Industrial Advisory Board. Kirstein was widely celebrated for his 
fairness, modesty and generosity. At his seventy-fifth birthday celebration, he was called 
“Boston’s first Jewish citizen,” and it was said that he had given away “practically his 
entire income for philanthropic causes.” Thus, during the period that Adolf Hitler rose to 
power in Germany, Kirstein commanded a vast network of social and professional 
contacts that were rooted in the country’s leading Jewish organizations and retail 
corporations but also extended deep into the inner circles of Washington and as far as the 
foreign offices of the AMC. 
Although Kirstein was meticulous in his oversight of all the foreign offices in the 
AMC, he took special care to ensure that the right person took charge of the Berlin office 
in the spring of 1932.  When AMC executives voted to purchase a building in Berlin in 
1921, they agreed to place their head representative in Central Europe, a former Harrods’ 
buyer and Englishman named Roger Day, in charge of the new trade office. Day 
                                                      
469 In many memorials published at Louis Kirstein’s death, his equal devotion to being a patriotic 
American and an exemplary Jew is a constant theme. In his tribute, Benjamin Selekman reflected on 
witnessing the life of Kirstein: “There moves—every inch of him—an American and a Jew.” See 
Selekman, “Louis Edward Kirstein,” 36. 
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successfully developed the AMC’s German trade through the 1920s, but by the early 
1930s the global depression and a surge of popular economic nationalism in both the 
United States and Britain decimated sales in the region. The AMC’s offices in Berlin and 
Vienna experienced a tremendous drop in sales volumes.470 During the spring of 1932, as 
AMC executives debated how to cut costs and consolidate their buying operations in 
Central Europe, Adolf Hitler established himself as a major force in German politics by 
earning more than one third of the vote in the presidential elections. Roger Day wrote to 
Kirstein from the trade office in Berlin with some positive reflections on Hitler’s 
triumph: “The majority of serious thinking people here cannot help but welcome the fact 
that the sword has now fallen,” Day conceded. “It is now up to Hitler to fulfill the many 
promises he has made.” Less than three weeks later Kirstein wrote to Day with the 
support of the AMC’s executive committee to ask for his resignation.471 In turn, 
executives agreed to promote a relative newcomer to the organization to serve as the head 
of operations in both Berlin and Vienna: Hanns Streicher. 
While there is very little information on Streicher’s personal background in the 
archival records of the AMC, enough of his correspondence with Louis Kirstein and other 
AMC executive survives to provide a glimpse into his politics, which were avowedly 
anti-Nazi, and his character. A native of Gmunden, Austria, Streicher was a top leather 
goods buyer for the popular Vienna firm, Max Grab & Co., which represented the 
                                                      
470 See Chapter Three for an early history of the Berlin Office. See Chapter Four for a discussion of the 
German trade, economic nationalism, and the depression. 
471 Roger Day to LEK, letter, April 26, 1932; LEK to Day, letter, May 21, 1938, “Day, 1925-37,” Box 80, 
LEK HBL. 
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AMC’s buying interests in that region for most of the 1920s. When the founder of that 
firm died in 1930, the AMC purchased the business, made it their own, and placed 
Streicher in charge.472 Within two years Streicher was promoted over Day to serve as the 
head of operations for the AMC in both Berlin and Vienna. When he first arrived in 
Berlin, Streicher expressed his disdain for Nazi political propaganda in letters to Kirstein. 
“I saw on a poster four words, ‘Hitler… our last hope,’” Streicher lamented in August 
1932. “Surely a country must have reached the bottom when such words can appear on 
posters.”473 During his first year in Berlin, Streicher became devoted to “curing the whole 
office of Nazi spirit.” His efforts included the delicate task of discharging an employee, a 
German citizen named Mr. Klippel, who had become an official member of the Nazi 
Party. In order to manage Klippel’s dismissal responsibly and legally, Streicher appealed 
to the U.S. consulate in Berlin for guidance. Fortunately for Streicher, who had as yet 
spent little time in Berlin, a friend of his in the American embassy in Vienna granted him 
a personal introduction to the most influential consular official in Berlin: Consul General 
George S. Messersmith.474  
Messersmith’s connection to Streicher, and later to Kirstein, offers a rare insight 
into the private actions of an influential diplomat whose legacy has long confounded 
historians. Messersmith’s principal biographer argued that, in the context of the anti-
                                                      
472 See PJR to Mr. Paul Fischer, letter, November 28, 1932, “Streicher Berlin,” Box 81, LEK HBL. Also 
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Semitism that gripped the United States in the 1930s, the diplomat’s record on “Jewish 
matters” was relatively good, but “by any ethical standard, it was not good enough. He 
failed the persecuted when they most needed him.”475 For a brief period in the mid 1930s, 
a number of influential American Jews, Justice Louis D. Brandeis and Rabbi Stephen 
Wise among them, considered Messersmith their best ally in the State Department, but, as 
historians have noted, this fact says more about the attitudes of the State Department than 
it does about Messersmith. Born in rural Pennsylvania in 1883, Messersmith trained as a 
secondary school teacher and worked as a school principal before finding his way to a 
career in the State Department. He was twice counseled against pursuing the diplomatic 
branch of the Foreign Service because he lacked the financial resources, educational 
background, and social connections to succeed on that track.476 Instead, Messersmith 
entered the consular service in 1914 and spent his first years at an inconsequential consul 
in Fort Erie, Canada. Fifteen years later, however, as Consul General at Berlin, 
Messersmith witnessed the rise of Adolf Hitler and supplied Washington with the best 
daily analyses of German affairs. No one in the State Department was better informed as 
to the threat Hitler posed to Europe and to Jews, and none was more openly critical of the 
Nazi regime. Yet Messersmith neither put forth any proposals for asylum in response the 
refugee crisis nor did he yield in his unbending commitment to upholding restrictive 
immigration policies. As late as 1936 Messersmith insisted that the State Department 
                                                      
475 See Stiller, George S. Messersmith, 50-51. 
476 These recommendations to enter the consular service came despite the fact that Messersmith fared well 
enough on the Foreign Service exams to earn an appointment in 1914. See Stiller, George S. Messersmith, 
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guide for consular officials include a reminder that they should not aim “to maintain the 
United States as an asylum or refuge for dissatisfied and oppressed people in other parts 
of the world.”477 At a time when U.S. immigration procedures made no official 
exceptions from the usual visa requirements for refugees, Messersmith’s rigid adherence 
to restrictive policies sealed the fates of thousands of Jews trapped in the Third Reich.478 
While it is not surprising that Streicher found Messersmith to be a wellspring of 
advice on how to cure the AMC’s Berlin office of the Nazi spirit, it is surprising that he 
also found the Counsel General willing to aid two aspiring Jewish immigrants. In the 
early 1930s, U.S. consular officials in Germany issued visas at a rate far below the annual 
quotas (sometimes up to 75-80% below). Due to the widespread influence of restrictionist 
immigration attitudes in Washington, consular offices were woefully understaffed and 
many officials adhered to financial requirements so stringent that few would-be 
immigrants could meet them.479 In 1934, Alan Steyne, a young consular official and also 
Louis Kirstein’s nephew, described his work at the consulate in Hamburg as “exciting, 
                                                      
477 Bat Ami-Zucker, “American Refugee Policy in the 1930s,” in Frank Caestecker and Bob Moore, eds., 
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but too busy… at times I feel like a one-armed paper hanger.”480 In this harried climate, 
Messersmith, the top-ranking consular official in Germany, made time for several 
meetings with Streicher in which he offered guidance on how to discharge the AMC 
employee who had joined the Nazi Party. Moreover, Messersmith was “most obliging” in 
his acceptance of visa applications that Streicher had completed on behalf of two men 
whom he had never met: the German Jewish nephews of Julius Baer, a longtime friend of 
Kirstein and founder of the AMC member store, Stix, Baer & Fuller in St. Louis, 
Missouri.481 As the nephews of a wealthy American retailer, the Baer nephews would 
have had no trouble meeting the financial requirements for immigration to the United 
States; however, direct access to Messersmith through Streicher allowed them to 
circumvent a lengthy screening process by which consular officials could reject 
applicants on the grounds of physical, mental, or moral defects, or for political and 
economic reasons.482 In a letter to Kirstein, Streicher marveled over Messersmith, who 
had “really gone out of his way to help in every respect.”483 Streicher and Messersmith 
remained friendly and met for occasional dinners even after the latter received his 
appointment as Minister to Vienna.484 
 In December 1933 Kirstein acknowledged that he was “anxious” to meet 
Messersmith, but so too, was the diplomat eager to meet Kirstein. Through his nephew at 
                                                      
480 Alan N. Steyne to LEK, letter, September 7, 1934, “Alan Steyne, 1932-42,” Box 54, LEK HBL. 
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the consulate in Hamburg, Kirstein learned that Messersmith was looking for 
introductions to Supreme Court Justices Louis D. Brandeis and Benjamin N. Cardozo 
(the first and second Jewish Justices, respectively). While it is possible that Messersmith 
was seeking the social connections that might help him advance into the Foreign Service, 
it’s more likely that he wanted to confer with leading American Jews who shared his 
concerns over the rise of Hitler in Germany.485 In January 1934 Messersmith and Kirstein 
met for the first time at a dinner in New York City given by Dr. Jacob Billikopf, a vocal 
advocate for Jewish civil rights who was especially concerned with the plight of refugees. 
Kirstein described the event as a “Jewish who’s who” of the country, with the exception 
of Messersmith and James G. McDonald, a fellow diplomat who would later become 
Chairman of the President’s Advisory Committee on Refugees.486 Several weeks 
following that dinner, Messersmith accepted an invitation to visit Kirstein at his home in 
Boston. Over the course of an afternoon, Messersmith imparted what Kirstein called 
“valuable information and suggestions” regarding the “German situation.” Thereafter, the 
two men met whenever they could, either in Washington or Boston, and Kirstein 
introduced Messersmith to several influential friends and acquaintances, including the 
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two Supreme Court Justices, Felix Frankfurter (founding member of the American Civil 
Liberties Union and future Supreme Court Judge), Senator Robert F. Wagner (D-NY), 
and the influential journalist Walter Lippmann.487 In turn, Kirstein’s nephew at the 
Hamburg Consulate received a rare double promotion and Messersmith’s own troubled 
nephew was offered a job at R. H. White’s department store, in which Kirstein was a 
partial owner.488 Increasingly, Messersmith and Kirstein also made social engagements 
that included their wives. In early 1937 the two couples even planned to meet in Vienna 
during one of Kirstein’s trips to the AMC foreign offices, but the gathering never took 
place because Messersmith was called back to Washington to serve as Assistant Secretary 
of State.489 Instead, Kirstein and his wife spent several days touring Austria with 
Streicher and his extended family.490 
In 1934, however, while Kirstein was still building his connection to 
Messersmith, Streicher traveled to the United States, where, among other business, he 
held an important private meeting with Kirstein. Due to the rise of consumer-driven anti-
Nazi boycotts, Streicher’s trade office in Berlin had fared the worst of all the AMC’s 
foreign offices during the lowest point of the Great Depression (1933-34). Regardless, 
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AMC executives had selected Streicher as the sole representative from the foreign offices 
to travel to the United States carrying merchandise samples from all the European sales 
regions. Streicher spent most of his time traveling the country to visit the flagships of 
AMC member stores, but he also attended the annual meeting of AMC executives. At 
some point during that meeting, Kirstein met privately with Streicher and asked him to 
take on more responsibility providing financial support to his relations living in Berlin, 
whose suffering under Nazi anti-Jewish policies was growing more severe. While there 
are no records of the words exchanged in this conversation, it is clear that Streicher 
obliged. When Streicher returned to Berlin from his American trip he received a visit 
from Kirstein’s cousin, Rosi Bohm, and her husband, who had become seriously ill. The 
couple learned that, due to the effects of anti-Jewish policies on the medical profession in 
Germany, they would have to leave the country to secure appropriate medical care, but 
they had neither the financial means nor the ability to make such arrangements.491 
Without hesitation, Streicher helped the Bohms make travel arrangements to Denmark 
and he set up a draft account through the AMC that they could access once they left 
country. To be sure, Kirstein reimbursed the firm for the Bohm’s expenses, but such a 
transaction could not have taken place so readily without the AMC office in Berlin—or 
without Streicher’s support. In reflecting on Streicher’s handling of the Bohm’s 
circumstances, Kirstein wrote, “I am sure that their lives are a good deal brighter because 
                                                      
491 Shortly after Hitler came into power he passed series of decrees that cut Jews off from medical practice, 
which, in turn, made it difficult for Jews to secure medical care. Additionally, new tax regulations made it 
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28; HS to LEK, letter, October 3, 1934, “Streicher Berlin,” Box 81, LEK HBL. 
  
242
they realize there is someone who understands their situation and has some sympathy for 
them.”492 
Over the course of the decade Streicher would become a vital intermediary 
between Kirstein and a growing number of distant cousins, nieces, and nephews living 
under the Nazi regime. Kirstein first became acquainted with these family members in 
Germany during a trip to Europe on government business after the First World War.493 
Following that trip, Kirstein and his two siblings began sending occasional financial aid, 
clothing, and even foodstuffs to their cousin, Ida Maria Zachart, who had lost her 
husband in the war, and her grown daughter, Ilse Sternberg, who had left an abusive 
husband and cared for their children on her own. Around 1925 Kirstein began 
transferring occasional funds to Zachart and Sternberg through the AMC office in Berlin 
rather than directly to their homes, at least in part because the two women moved 
often.494 However, after a series of decrees in 1933-35 stripped Jews of their citizenship 
and expelled them from nearly all forms of professional labor, many more families found 
themselves in need of financial assistance. Kirstein responded by providing regular 
monthly allowances, and any other support as needed, to at least five families connected 
to him through blood or marriage. Streicher facilitated the distribution of these 
allowances by using AMC merchandise receipts to record “orders” to family members 
and forwarding these receipts directly to Kirstein’s secretary at Filene’s, who paid for the 
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orders through Filene’s accounts. Kirstein then reimbursed Filene’s from his personal 
funds, to which both his sister and brother also contributed.495 Above and beyond these 
transactions, Streicher became an important personal friend to several of Kirstein’s 
relations, especially to Dr. Heymann and his extended family. Although Heymann was 
pushed out of his teaching position in 1933 he was offered another post as long as he 
agreed to teach in the “nationalistic spirit.” At his new school, Heymann was forced to 
begin every morning with a salute to Hitler and attend Nazi parades. While at dinner with 
Streicher one evening, Heymann exclaimed hopelessly: “You can put me in a 
concentration camp tomorrow….”496 Streicher kept up his friendship with Dr. Heymann 
and regularly updated Kirstein on the professor’s wellbeing. 
On the eve of the German invasion of Austria in March 1938 Kirstein had 
developed connections to Streicher and Messersmith that extended well beyond business 
concerns. Streicher was closely intertwined with Kirstein’s private efforts to support his 
relations with financial assistance, and checked in with them monthly. Messsersmith had 
returned from Europe to serve as Assistant Secretary of State in Washington, D.C., a post 
he held over the critical period between 1937 and 1940. While both Streicher and 
Kirstein lamented Messersmith’s removal from Europe, in fact, the position granted him 
even greater influence over consular officials stationed in Berlin and Vienna. It also 
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the first time in 1925. However, a brief survey of correspondence between Streicher and Kirstein reveals 
that they began transferring monthly allowances to a number of additional family members in 1933. See 
Secretary to Louis E. Kirstein to American Express Company, letter, September 28, 1925, “G Financial”; 
Ilse Sternberg Receipt, March 18, 1930, “Germany Financial,” Box 8, LEK HBL. Also browse “Streicher 
Berlin” in Box 81 and the family files in Box 8, LEK HBL. 
496 HS to LEK, letter, October 10, 1933, “Streicher Berlin,” Box 81, LEK HBL. 
  
244
provided more opportunities for Kirstein and Messersmith to meet personally in 
Washington to discuss what they called the “German situation.” Despite Messersmith’s 
official opposition to changing immigration policies for refugees, he worked with 
Kirstein to expedite visas on behalf of several people after the Anschluss. And despite 
Streicher’s citizenship in the Third Reich, he continued to act as Kirstein’s intermediary 
in Berlin and Vienna on behalf of people whose suffering he had come to know so well. 
 
 
Retailers, Dignitaries, and Refugees After the Anschluss 
 The American diplomat John C. Wiley arrived in Vienna to begin his new post as 
Consul General shortly before the German invasion of Austria in March 1938. In the 
aftermath of the invasion, he received a missive from George Messersmith, then serving 
as Assistant Secretary of State in Washington, instructing him to make no changes to any 
immigration policies at the consulate. There was, at the time, considerable apprehension 
as to the status of U.S. diplomats in Austria given the dissolution of the government 
there. Over the next few months, however, the anti-Jewish measures that had evolved 
over a five-year period in Germany went into effect rapidly across Austria. Reporters 
estimated that across the country nearly 80,000 Jews had been dismissed from their jobs 
and not a single Jew in Vienna was permitted to retain an automobile. Nazi fanatics 
regularly picketed, vandalized, and looted Jewish owned shops and businesses, and gangs 
of Nazi thugs publicly humiliated and injured Jews with little to no repercussions from 
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the government or police.497 In June, as tens of thousands of Austrian Jews rushed the 
foreign consulates desperate to emigrate, Consul General Wiley wrote to Messersmith to 
express concern about the “constantly increasing” dimensions of the catastrophe. He 
characterized Nazi policies as “utterly lunatic” and lamented that consular officials in 
Vienna were immersed in “heartrending misery.” Although Wiley reiterated his 
agreement that the State Department ought to remain “aloof” from such matters, he 
confided in Messersmith that the “instinct to do something for everybody is 
overwhelming.” Private organizations, Wiley concluded, or “a private person with tact 
and energy might be able to alleviate matters with the Austrian authorities.”498 
 Kirstein was indeed a private person with both tact and energy who tried to 
improve the circumstances of a select group of people living in Austria and Germany 
after March 1938, but he did not manage it alone. On behalf of his relations, a handful of 
friends, and some AMC employees, Kirstein called on all of his contacts in the State 
Department and in the retail industry to intervene where he could. In some cases, most 
notably in the case of Kurt Schwartz, who, as described in the introduction to this study, 
was arrested in the aftermath of the Anschluss, the results were dramatic. Most other 
cases, however, involved a complicated exchange of paperwork and considerable 
financial commitments. When Kirstein feared legal complications or other delays at the 
consulates might prevent the emigration of people dearest to him, he wrote to 
Messersmith, who tried in some cases to expedite the visa approval process. Messersmith 
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also met with Kirstein frequently to offer privileged insights into conditions in Germany 
and Austria and to help connect the retailer with people who might aid broader public 
rescue and relief efforts.499 In the archives that hold Kirstein’s personal and business files 
at Harvard’s Baker Library, there are well over one thousand documents detailing the 
retailer’s efforts to help individual refugees, mostly between 1938 and 1941.500 This 
study will highlight a handful of cases in which Kirstein intervened, sometimes 
successfully, to aid the emigration of Jewish relations, friends, and colleagues from the 
Third Reich after the Anschluss. These cases bring to light how Kirstein leveraged his 
close connections to Streicher, Messersmith, and other influential retailers and diplomats, 
to cut through the chaos that enveloped Vienna and Berlin during this critical period. 
While several cases reveal the depth of Kirstein’s influence in retail and diplomatic 
circles, others expose the limits that confronted a “private person” working against the 
tremendous forces of bureaucracy in the State Department and the violence of the Nazi 
regime. However, that Kirstein had the contacts, resources, and support to intervene at all 
                                                      
499 Kirstein’s involvement in and financial commitments to public relief operations are legion. They 
include the American Jewish Committee, Associated Jewish Philanthropies of Boston, the United Jewish 
Appeal, the Joint Distribution Committee, the Jewish Welfare Board, and the National Refugee Service, 
among others. See “National Refugee Service Launches Its First Drive for Funds,” JTA, January, 20, 1941; 
Selekman, “Louis Edward Kirstein”; “Louis E. Kirstein Dies at 75,” JTA, December 11, 1942; Leon Arkin, 
“Louis Kirstein,” speech, “Death 1942,” in Box 6, LEK HBL. 
500 Curiously the finding aid for Kirstein’s papers gives this archival box a simple title, “Property,” and 
lists only a few words in the description: “Beach Bluff, 1921, 1 envelope.” Beach Bluff was the name of a 
property in Beverly, Massachusetts that Kirstein rented for several summers. While the box contains a 
small folder with several documents pertaining to Beach Bluff, there are also hundreds of documents 
tucked inside folders organized either by last names of refugees or, more generally as “G-A Refugees” or 
“G Financial.” More documentation of Kirstein’s efforts is sprinkled throughout files pertaining to Hanns 
Streicher, George Messersmith, Alan Steyne, and the AMC offices in Berlin and Vienna. See Boxes 8, 28, 
54, 80, 81, 82, LEK HBL; The Nazi government closed the German borders to emigration at the end of 
1941. See: Wyman, Paper Walls, 191-205. 
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provides some insight into both the influence and empathy that underpinned the AMC 
network as Nazism took root across Europe.  
 Just a few weeks after the Anschluss, in April 1938, Louis Kirstein began 
receiving urgent requests from Austrian Jews eager to leave the country, some of whom 
he had never met. One woman named Lisolette Chiger, who described herself as the 
daughter of a manufacturer in Vienna with whom the AMC had contracted for years, 
wrote to Kirstein begging him to sign an affidavit to sponsor her family for an American 
visa. Applicants were required by most consular officials in Austria and Germany to 
provide affidavits proving that a friend or relative in the United States could provide for 
them financially in the event that they could not find work. For many would-be 
immigrants, this requirement proved a major barrier to entry in the United States.501 
Chiger begged Kirstein: “The situation is so earnest,” she wrote, “that we must ask you to 
treat this as an SOS service.” Kirstein immediately wired Chiger for more information 
and wrote to his lawyer to draw up the appropriate papers. Fearful that his tenuous 
connection to Chiger would undermine the entire process and cause delays, Kirstein 
called his lawyer directly. “Do you think it would help any to send the whole thing to 
Messersmith?” Kirstein asked.  His lawyer advised against contacting Messersmith in the 
Chiger case, but it is not surprising that Kirstein asked. Messersmith had already 
expedited at least three visa applications on behalf of people connected to the AMC.502  
                                                      
501 See fn 6 for a brief explanation of the affidavit requirement. Also see: Ami-Zucker, “American Refugee 
Policy in the 1930s,” 154-56; Wyman, Paper Walls, 4-5, 155-58. 
502 That figure includes the applications for the Baer nephews, as well as Thea Marsi, an influential 
Viennese designer who contracted with the AMC (and whose brother was Streicher’s second in command 
  
248
Although Messersmith took care never to disclose anything of consequence in 
writing, after 1938 his correspondence with Kirstein makes clear that he shared 
privileged insights and connections that might help Jewish refugees. More often than not, 
Messersmith filled his letters with broad impressions of his opinions: “Far be it for me to 
be a pessimist,” he wrote of Europe in May 1938, “but I am not at all satisfied that things 
are going for the better.”503 Some letters do, however, offer better insight into the content 
of their personal meetings. In 1939, for example, Messersmith alluded to recent 
conversation he had with the former German Chancellor Joseph Wirth, who had been 
exiled in 1933 for his opposition to the Nazi Party. The diplomat explained that Wirth 
was “extremely useful in matters connected with Germany, the refugee problem, et. 
cetera” and added that Wirth wished to meet Kirstein. “I have some interesting things in 
this connection to tell you,” Messersmith explained, “which I would rather not put in 
writing.”504 Kirstein traveled to Washington, D.C. for a private meeting with 
Messersmith less than one week later.505 In correspondence with his nephew, Kirstein 
often mentioned his dinners with Messersmith, and sometimes expressed surprise at how 
“freely and frankly” the Assistant Secretary of State talked with him on matters in 
Germany.506  Equally important, however, Messersmith provided Kirstein with personal 
                                                      
at the AMC’s office in Vienna). See HS to LEK, letter, December 30, 1935, “Streicher Berlin,” Box 81, 
LEK HBL. 
503 GM to LEK, letter, May 11, 1938, “Messersmith, GM,” Box 28, LEK HBL. 
504 GM to LEK, letter, March 8, 1939, “Messersmith, GM,” Box 28, LEK HBL. 
505 GM to LEK, letter, March 8 & 13 1939, LEK to GM, March 11, 1939, “Messersmith, GM,” Box 28, 
LEK HBL. 
506 Kirstein often referenced confidential conversations with Messersmith in his letters to Alan Steyne, see: 
LEK to Alan N. Steyne, letter, October 15, 1938, “Alan Steyne, 1932-42,” Box 54, LEK HBL. 
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introductions to ambassadors and consul generals in Berlin, Vienna, Paris, London, and 
any other location that Kirstein requested. While Kirstein, in some cases, was already 
acquainted with the leading diplomats in these cities through the AMC offices, his 
endorsements from Messersmith ensured the cooperation of these officials with Kirstein’s 
requests.507  
 In no case were these diplomatic connections more vital than in that of Kurt 
Schwartz, the AMC’s German Jewish merchandise buyer who was arrested by Nazi 
storm troopers in Vienna following the Anschluss. Although the circumstances 
surrounding Schwartz’s arrest were described in the introduction to this chapter, the 
details of his rescue reveal more precisely how retailers and diplomats came together, 
under Kirstein’s direction, to facilitate Schwartz’s release.508 When two merchandise 
buyers arrived at the AMC’s Paris office with news of Schwartz’s arrest, they enlisted the 
help of not only the longtime manager of the AMC’s Paris office, Edouard Léon, but also 
Charles D. Hutzler, owner of the AMC member store Hutzler Brothers of Baltimore.509 
                                                      
507 It is worth noting here that AMC foreign office managers worked regularly with consular officials to 
keep up to date with international trade policies, tax regulations, and currency exchanges among other 
things. However, high-ranking consular officials also relied on AMC managers to purchase gifts from local 
markets on their behalf and probably for additional insight into trade conditions. It is not hard to imagine all 
that a U.S. diplomat might learn, for example, from the local managers of an American trade office that 
maintained contracts with dozens of manufacturers distributed throughout the region. And while it is 
unclear whether Messersmith used the AMC to purchase merchandise in Berlin, his predecessor in Vienna, 
Minister to Austria, George Howard Earl, did use the AMC. When Messersmith moved to Vienna, he, too, 
kept up with Streicher’s second in command, Hanns Marss, who was permanently stationed at the AMC 
office there. See: HS to LEK, letter, February 16, 1934, “Streicher Berlin,” in Box 81; GM to LEK, letter, 
September 18, 1934, “Messersmith, GM,” Box 28, LEK HBL. 
508 All details related to Schwartz’s case in this and the following paragraph are taken from dozens of 
letters and telegrams included in “Schwartz,” Box 81, LEK HBL and in HS to PJR, letter, May 30, 1938, 
“Hanns Streicher, Vienna,” Box 82, LEK HBL. 
509 At the time, Charles Hutzler was on a tour of the foreign offices of the AMC. His brother, Albert, was 
then serving on the AMC’s Board of Directors and Foreign Office Committee along with Louis Kirstein. 
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Hutzler had a good sense of Kirstein’s far-reaching influence and immediately wired him 
about Schwartz. Upon receipt of Hutzler’s telegram, Kirstein sent urgent messages to 
officials at the U.S. Embassy in Paris and to Wiley at the U.S. Consulate in Vienna. He 
also wrote directly to Streicher in Berlin and asked him to personally visit the consulate 
in Vienna to inform Wiley that, if he could not facilitate Schwartz’s release, Kirstein 
would call on Messersmith to intervene. 
Meanwhile, Hutzler and Léon followed up on Kirstein’s telegrams to the 
Ambassador’s Secretary in Paris who “dropped everything” when he learned of 
Kirstein’s personal interest in the case.510 After a series of coded communications were 
exchanged between the embassy in Paris and Wiley in Vienna, Nazi authorities released 
Schwartz on the condition that he leave Austria within the week. Wiley immediately 
arranged a U.S. visa for Schwartz while another AMC manager in London set up a 
temporary travel visa to England for Schwartz’s mother.511 In advance of Schwartz’s 
arrival in the United States, Kirstein worked with fellow AMC executives at 
                                                      
See: Reilly, Story of the Retail Research Association and the Associated Merchandising Corporation, 
1916-1939 in “AMC Story,” Box 82, LEK HBL. 
510 The official who responded in Paris was Carmel Offie. He was friendly with Louis Kirstein not only 
because Kirstein was personally acquainted (through Messersmith) with the Ambassador, but also because 
Offie was friendly with Kirstein’s son, the prominent writer and artist, Lincoln Kirstein. For an example of 
friendly correspondence between Offie and Kirstein see LEK to Offie, letter, May 27, 1938, in “Schwartz,” 
Box 81, LEK HBL. For more information about Lincoln Kirstein, as well as some detailed biographical 
information about Louis Kirstein, see Duberman, The Worlds of Lincoln Kirstein; For more about Offie, 
see Hugh Wilford, The Mighty Wurlitzer: How the CIA Played America (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2009), 58-67. 
511 Of interest to the larger study is the fact that Schwartz passed through Brussels on his way to the United 
States and spent time advising AMC buyers there on how to connect with Jewish manufacturers in Austria. 
See: Edouard Léon to LEK, letter, August 7, 1936, “G-A Refugees, Gotts Chalk,” Box 8, LEK HBL; John 
C. Wiley was also personally acquainted with Kirstein, and a good friend of his nephew, Alan N. Steyne, 
who was then working in the American consular office in London. See LEK to Lisolette Chiger, April 14, 
1938, “G-A Refugees,” Box 8, LEK HBL; “Also see: Hanns Streicher to Phillip J. O’Reilly, letter, June 3, 
1938, “Streicher 1938-1942,” Box 81, LEK HBL. 
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Bloomingdale’s to ensure that Schwartz would have a job waiting for him in New York 
City.512 This too, was no easy feat. The American economy had taken another downturn 
in 1938 and rumors circulated that Jewish retailers intended to dismiss large numbers of 
cash-strapped American workers and replace them with refugees. No one denied these 
rumors as loudly as the President of Bloomingdale’s, Michael Schapp, who publicly 
testified that he had only hired eleven “possible” Jewish refugees. Schwartz was one of 
eleven.513 “I am convinced,” wrote a grateful friend of Schwartz in a letter to Kirstein, 
“that no one but yourself, through your friends in the diplomatic service could have 
accomplished this.”514 That was probably true, and Schwartz was not the only AMC 
employee who benefitted from Kirstein’s friends in the State Department.    
Although Schwartz’s case was unique among those that crossed Kirstein’s desk, 
archival records indicate that the AMC transferred at least three other Jewish employees 
from the offices in Berlin and Vienna to member and affiliated stores in the United States 
                                                      
512 Michael Schaap, President of Bloomingdale’s had been working to raise funds for the relocation of 
German Jews since 1934, and probably welcomed Schwartz with open arms. Moreover, Schaap and 
Kirstein were deeply connected in ways both professional and social. The two executives had enjoyed 
traveling through Europe together to visit the AMC foreign offices in 1934, and Schaap had happily 
employed Kirstein’s son George ever since. Kirstein also served on two executive boards that oversaw the 
business of Bloomingdale’s: Federated Department Stores, Inc. and the AMC. Bloomingdale’s was 
acquired by Federated Department Stores, Inc. in 1929 and joined the AMC in 1930. Kirstein joined the 
Board of Directors for the Federated Department Stores, Inc. in 1938. See: “Federated Directors Re-
elected,” New York Times, May 26, 1936, 34; This is Federated Stores, Inc. (Cincinnati, Ohio: Federated 
Dept. Stores, Inc., 1977), 1; O’ Reilly, Story of the Retail Research Association and the Associated 
Merchandising Corporation, 1916-1939, 2; On Michael Schaap: “M. Schaap to Head Businessmen’s Body 
for Palestine Drive,” Jewish Daily Bulletin, Monday, January 29, 1934, 2; “Jewish Appeal Pays Tribute to 
Schaap,” New York Times, May 11, 1944, 10; “Schaap and Kirstein Sail Abroad, July 4,” Women’s Wear 
Daily, June 25, 1934, 24. 
513 “Stores Here Deny Refugee Rumor,” New York Times, November 26, 1938, 4; Wyman, Paper Walls, 6. 
514 Hanns Marss to LEK, letter, May 30, 1938, “Schwartz,” Box 81, LEK HBL. 
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and England.515 Messersmith intervened in at least one of these cases, on behalf of Eva 
Lustig who had worked for thirteen years as a guide for American retail buyers visiting 
the German markets. In 1935, AMC executives had managed to create a position for 
Lustig’s brother at the firm’s headquarters in New York. When Kirstein began to “take 
steps” on Lustig’s behalf, he wrote to Messersmith, who assured him that the case would 
receive “very careful and sympathetic attention.” From his post in Washington, 
Messersmith wrote to the Consul General at Berlin with a request to expedite Lustig’s 
application. Although the Consul General quickly agreed to Messersmith’s request, when 
he looked further into the case he found that Lustig had never completed a proper visa 
application, even though she had supplied all the supporting materials. The Consul 
General at Berlin wrote directly to Kirstein to explain that, without an application, he 
could do nothing for Lustig. Streicher, however, stepped in not only to help Lustig secure 
a temporary travel visa to England, but also to connect her personally to retailers in 
London. By mid-1939 Lustig was on her way to England with a scheduled interview at 
the London trade office of an AMC-affiliated Australian department store, Myer’s 
Emporium. 516    
Kirstein also reached out to Messersmith in April 1938 on behalf of a dear friend 
of his, Julius Marx of Vienna. For years the AMC Vienna office had contracted with 
                                                      
515 In addition, the AMC created a position for a German Jewish executive at Wertheim’s in Berlin at the 
personal request of the German retail magnate, Georg Wertheim. See “Weigart,” in “German-Austrian 
Refugees,” Box 8; Also see HS to LEK, letters, July 16 & August 2, 1938, “Streicher Berlin, 1938-42,” 
Box 81, LEK HBL. Also see: “Former AMC Accountant Here,” Women’s Wear Daily, October 27, 1938, 
22. 
516 I have yet to find any documents pertaining to Lustig’s case after her departure for England. For details 
on Lustig’s case, see: “G-A Refugees AMC Lustig,” Box 8, LEK HBL.  
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Marx, who owned a large shoe factory just outside the city. In the mid-1930s Kirstein and 
Marx had taken several trips together to the spas in Bad Gastein, Austria, where Kirstein 
had often encouraged Marx to leave the region—but he refused. Several weeks after the 
Anschluss, however, Marx departed to a sanatorium in Zurich, from which he cabled 
Kirstein that he “will not return anymore to Vienna.” Marx requested Kirstein’s help 
getting to the United States, at least for a few weeks, to determine what he might do next. 
Kirstein immediately appealed to Messersmith on Marx’s behalf. As was characteristic of 
Messersmith’s replies, the Assistant Secretary of State cautioned Kirstein that he had no 
direct authority over the decisions of consular officials. Regardless, Messersmith sent a 
personal telegram to the Consul General in Zurich attesting to Marx’s character and 
urging the quick issue of a U.S. travel visa. Despite the fact that Marx had not yet 
submitted a visa application, the Consul General at Zurich immediately issued a visa for 
him upon receipt of Messersmith’s telegram. Less than two weeks later, Marx was on a 
steamship bound for the United States.517 After consulting with Kirstein in Boston, Marx 
determined to apply for American citizenship and hired a lawyer in Zurich to obtain the 
appropriate documents for him in Vienna, including a birth certificate. Tragically, after 
spending several days in pursuit of the birth certificate, Marx’s lawyer informed him that 
the document could not be secured. Moreover, he advised Marx against pursuing the case 
any further for fear of reprisals from Nazi authorities against friends and relatives still 
living in the Third Reich. Doubtful of his prospects for securing American citizenship, 
Marx departed for Tel Aviv with a personal introduction from Kirstein to a Chancellor at 
                                                      
517 See correspondence and telegrams in “G-A Refugees, J Marx,” Box 8, LEK HBL. 
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Hebrew University who would help him get settled. In December 1938, Kirstein wrote to 
Marx reflecting on the year’s events: “A halt must be called sooner or later,” Kirstein 
insisted, “or all civilization will be destroyed.”518 
In order to help his family members escape Germany and Austria, Kirstein relied 
not only on Messersmith’s interventions but also on the managers at the AMC foreign 
offices across Europe, especially Streicher. When the violence subsided following the 
two days of terror in November 1938, known as Kristallnacht, or the Night of the Broken 
Glass, Streicher trekked past the shattered windows of the capital city to visit the families 
he had supported for years with the monthly allowances from Kirstein. While Streicher 
found all the women and their children shaken but uninjured, he learned that at least two 
men, including Dr. Heymann, had been taken under “protective arrest,” and no one had 
seen or heard from them. Nor, at least as far as archival records indicate, would they ever 
see or hear from them again. After Kristallnacht, Streicher dared not communicate 
important details about the Kirstein relations by mail or telegram to the United States. 
Instead, he increasingly relied on the manager of the AMC Paris office to relay messages 
to Kirstein or merely included vague references to visiting the family and finding them 
well. 519 While several of Kirstein’s relations had filed applications for U.S. or British 
travel visas before Kristallnacht and Streicher continued to follow up on these 
applications, some were reluctant to leave their homes. Rosi Bohm, for example, had lost 
                                                      
518 For details on Marx’s case, see correspondence and telegrams in “Julius Marx,” Box 28; Also see: GM 
to LEK, letter, May 11, 1938, “Messersmith, GS,” Box 28; LEK to Alan Steyne, letter, April 27, 1938, 
“Alan Steyne,” Box 54, LEK HBL. 
519 William S. Sleap, manager of the AMC office in London remained in regular touch with both Kirstein 
and the London consulate to help relations and friends who preferred to go to England. 
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her husband to illness and did not want to leave his possessions and memories behind.520 
In stark contrast to Bohm, another relation of Kirstein, a young man named Fritz Levi 
living in Vienna, fled the Third Reich on foot without so much as a hat or a coat. 
Remarkably, Léon of the AMC Paris office tracked down Levi in Bordeaux weeks later 
and supplied him with clothing and money from Kirstein’s funds. He also helped the 
young Levi and his parents, still in Vienna, begin the visa application process from 
consulates in France and Austria. 521  
Between 1938 and 1940, Kirstein intervened in ways both large and small on 
behalf of refugees whom he knew personally or who were connected to friends or fellow 
retailers. With the help of another personal note from Messersmith, Kirstein aided the 
emigration of Dr. Heymann’s wife, mother-in-law, and two daughters, who settled 
permanently in Los Angeles. 522 And with the help of Streicher, his staff in Vienna, and 
Léon in Paris, Kirstein also located and passed along information to friends in Boston 
eager to learn about the circumstances of relations with whom they had lost touch. In one 
case, Streicher sent a trusted merchandise buyer out to interview a cousin of Dr. Paul 
Sachs of Harvard University and relayed the horrendous news that the family’s 
photography business in Vienna had been placed under the control of a Nazi commissar 
and that the patriarch was facing trial for misusing his passport. For Sachs, the 
                                                      
520 HS to LEK, letter, June 2, 1937, “Streicher Berlin,” Box 81, LEK HBL. 
521 In all the correspondence Kirstein saved detailing the rescue and relief of his relations, I have not found 
any references to Dr. Heymann dated later than November 1938. Also see: Miss Beverly to Julia 
Mannheimer, letter, Dec 3, 1938, “G-A Refugees Miscellaneous,” Box 8; Julia Mannheimer to Miss 
Beverly, letter, November 29, 1938 “G-A Refugees Miscellaneous,” Box 8; Edouard Léon to LEK, letter, 
November 16, 1938, “G Financial,” Box 8, LEK HBL. 
522 See correspondence and memos in “Heymann,” Box 8, LEK HBL. 
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information was vital and enabled him to begin the work of passing financial and legal 
aid on to his cousin.523 Kirstein also found a position at the AMC headquarters in New 
York City for the last employee classified as a “non-Aryan” still working at one of 
Berlin’s most successful Jewish-owned department stores, Wertheim’s.524 Kirstein also 
helped, if he could, in smaller, but meaningful ways on behalf of refugees who arrived in 
Boston, as in the case of a skilled leather glove maker whom he personally introduced to 
a Filene’s glove buyer.525 After 1940, however, it became much harder to for Kirstein to 
intervene personally in cases that involved emigration from Germany. 
In 1941 widespread fears about the presence of fifth columnists among the ranks 
of refugees entering the United States prompted the State Department to pass more 
restrictive guidelines for visa approvals. At the age of seventy-three, Kirstein was deemed 
too old to sign affidavits to sponsor immigrant visas.526 In the midst of these policy 
changes, Ilse Sternberg, whom Kirstein had supported financially through the AMC 
office in Berlin for more than a decade, decided at last that she was ready to leave her 
home in Germany. “We still love our Fatherland,” she wrote to Kirstein, “but we want to 
live and see what the future has in store for us.” Sternberg specifically requested a 
temporary pass that would allow her to return to Germany “at will.” Kirstein again 
appealed to Messersmith who had by then left Washington to serve as the U.S. 
Ambassador to Cuba in Havana. Although Sternberg’s case was too complicated, and the 
                                                      
523 See correspondence and memos in “Sachs/Schostal,” Box 8, LEK HBL. 
524 See correspondence and memos in “Weigart/Wertheim,” Box 8, LEK HBL. 
525 Lottie Bergas to LEK, letter, February 8, 1939; LEK to Dr. Blumgart, letter, February 7, 1939; Dr. 
Blumgart to LEK, letter, February 8, 1939, “G-A Refugees, Miscellaneous,” Box 8, LEK HBL. 
526 See Wyman, Paper Walls, 191-205. 
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backup at the U.S. consuls in Germany too overwhelming, to arrange a U.S. visa, 
Messersmith used his influence to secure permits for Sternberg to travel to Cuba—but it 
was too late. Germany’s borders closed to emigration before Sternberg could secure 
passage aboard a steamship to Cuba. Thirty-five years later, in 1974, Dr. Heymann’s 
daughter, who became a U.S. citizen, filed a report with the Council of Post-War Jewish 
Organizations in her adopted hometown of Los Angeles. According to Heymann’s report, 
Sternberg was deported to an unknown concentration camp sometime in 1942, shortly 
after the German borders closed. 527 
 
When Germany declared war on the United States in December 1941 the AMC 
cut all ties with its trade office in Berlin, the last point of access Kirstein had into the 
Third Reich. AMC executives had voted to close the Vienna office in early 1939, and one 
year later the Paris office was disbanded during the German invasion of France. Although 
the AMC managed to bring Léon from the Paris office to the United States in 1941, all 
contact with Streicher, who became an enemy alien almost overnight, was lost.528 
Messersmith’s ascent in the Foreign Service took him further and further from the 
European theater after 1940, and he spent the rest of his career in Central and South 
America. Kirstein continued to advocate for refugees by contributing substantial funds 
                                                      
527 For details re: Ilse Sternberg’s case, see references in “Hanns Streicher, 1938-42,” Box 81, but 
especially “Sternberg,” Box 8, LEK HBL; Also see Ilse Sternberg, record in SHOAH database, Yad 
Veshim; Wyman, Paper Walls, 191-205. 
528 Hanns Streicher and his wife moved back to Austria and survived the war. Streicher returned to work 
for the AMC in 1947 and remained a manager of trade in Central Europe until he retired in 1964. See: 
“Vienna Office is Reopened by the AMC,” Women’s Wear Daily, June 9, 1937, 2; “AMC Names Two 
Managers Abroad,” Women’s Wear Daily, July 27, 1964, 3; “Leon, Paris AMC Head Due June 1,” 
Women’s Wear Daily, May 21, 1941, 2. 
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and leadership to major Jewish organizations immersed in redressing the refugee crisis. 
However, in 1942 Kirstein’s health began to fail and, at the age of seventy-five, he 
succumbed to pneumonia. In a tribute published in the Boston Globe, Kirstein’s longtime 
friend and Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter remarked that with his passing “a 
deep well of rare goodness has suddenly dried.”529 It was a fact well known to many who 
knew Kirstein, and especially to those whom he tried to shield from the terror of the 
Third Reich.  
 
 
Ira Hirschmann’s Path to the War Refugee Board 
During the summer of 1943, Ira Hirschmann was in his office at Bloomingdale’s, 
where he had served as Vice President and Director of Advertising and Sales since 1938, 
when he received a visit from Peter Bergson, head of The Emergency Committee to Save 
the Jewish People of Europe (EC). 530 Bergson, a Lithuanian Jew who had spent much of 
his life in Palestine, arrived in the United States in 1940 and since then had founded a 
number of groups devoted to the rescue of Jewish refugees. A friend suggested that 
Bergson visit Hirschmann after he learned that the New York Times could no longer 
provide the advertising space that the EC desperately needed to promote its vital mission. 
Within minutes of meeting Bergson in his office, Hirschmann called the advertising 
                                                      
529 “Louis Kirstein Dead,” Boston Evening Globe, December 10, 1942, “Death of Louis Kirstein,” Box 6, 
LEK HBL. 
530 Peter Bergson was born Hillel Kook, but went by the pseudonym “Peter Bergson” during his time in the 
United States. Given the fact this chapter is focused on Kook’s time in the United States I have elected to 
use his pseudonym in the narrative.  
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department at the Times and asked them to transfer a portion of Bloomingdale’s’ 
advertising contract over to the EC. As Bergson later recounted, Hirschmann “showed 
such interest in the work of the EC that I suggested he become Vice President.” 
Hirschmann accepted the invitation, and so began a new phase in the retailer’s decade-
long campaign to oppose the Nazi Party and aid Europe’s refugees. Six months later, 
Hirschmann was en route to Ankara, Turkey with an appointment to serve as the first 
special attaché to the War Refugee Board (WRB).531  
Although several studies have covered Hirschmann’s refugee work in extensive 
detail, his status as a retailer has only merited passing mention and inspired a handful of 
amusing anecdotes sprinkled here and there.532 Yet, as a leading American retailer 
Hirschmann had privileged access to trade centers in Europe, a platform to advance his 
views on Nazism and the plight of refugees, and connections to a great many influential 
people, especially to American Jews with close ties to the Roosevelt Administration. 
Among Hirschmann’s most important contacts were Supreme Court Justice Felix 
Frankfurter, who facilitated his attendance at the 1938 Evian Conference on the Refugee 
Crisis, and Kirstein, who brought Hirschmann into the fold of the AMC network and 
facilitated his appointment to the National War Labor Board in 1942. When Hirschmann 
forced his way onto the nascent WRB in 1943 he was not unknown to the State 
Department officials who approved his appointment. To the contrary, Hirschmann’s 
                                                      
531 For quotes from Bergson and for details about Berson’s visit to Hirschmann at Bloomingdale’s see: M. 
J. Nurenberger Interview with Hillell Kook in Israel July 1, 1971 recorded in Medoff, Blowing the Whistle 
on Genocide, 83-84. 
532 See fn 10 for a list of significant literature in which Ira Hirschmann plays a role. Charles King makes 
the most of Hirschmann’s background as a retailer, but mostly to add levity to his text, referring to 
Hirschmann as a “Bloomie’s exec.” See King, Midnight at the Pera Palace, 324-29. 
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appointment to the WRB marked the culmination of more than ten years of opposition to 
Nazism that grew out of his experiences, political connections, and leadership in the retail 
industry. Far from incidental to his WRB appointment, Hirschmann’s unique position as 
an influential American Jewish retailer made it possible. 
Despite showing little promise in his youth, Hirschmann gained a foothold in the 
retail industry as a young man in 1922 by way of Jewish philanthropy. As the sixth of 
seven children born to A.B. Hirschmann, a Latvian Jewish immigrant and a prosperous 
merchant and banker in Baltimore, Hirschmann would always remember feeling that he 
grew up “in a kind of child’s no-man’s land.”533 Although his father tried to steer him 
through a proper business education, he had no interest in the family’s clothing store, 
pulled pranks throughout high school, and eventually dropped out of Johns Hopkins 
University. Hirschmann’s first break came when he was twenty-one years old and invited 
to follow his brother-in-law to Newark to help run a fundraising campaign for the Joint 
Jewish Relief Committee. When a family illness forced his brother-in-law to drop his 
leadership role in the campaign, Hirschmann took over the planning for a high profile 
gala event. He transformed the evening by introducing dramatic musical performances 
and special lighting alongside the keynote address given by the celebrated Rabbi Stephen 
Wise. The chairman of the campaign, Felix Fuld, was so impressed that he offered 
Hirschmann an entry-level position in the merchandising department at the AMC 
member store he owned, Bamberger’s of Newark. Within just a few years Hirschmann 
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would become Bamberger’s Director of Advertising.534 In 1928 the young executive 
collaborated for the first time with Kirstein on publicity campaigns for the AMC’s Paris 
office and on a scholarship program for students through Filene’s of Boston.535 By 1931, 
however, Hirschmann had developed a reputation as an innovator in retail publicity and 
advertising, and he left the AMC network to accept a new executive post at Lord & 
Taylor in New York City.536 
Although Jewish social and philanthropic connections helped Hirschmann start 
his career in retail, he later wrote that he did not consider himself Jewish in any 
meaningful way until Lord & Taylor sent him on a six-week tour of Europe in June 1933. 
Hirschmann had played a leading role in the planning of a national retail campaign to 
drive up retail sales during the worst years of the Great Depression.537 The purpose of the 
National Quality Movement, which had earned the endorsement of President Herbert 
Hoover in December 1932, was to convince shoppers that buying higher quality, higher 
priced merchandise offered better overall savings than buying only bargain basement 
goods at slashed prices. Hirschmann drafted slogans for the campaign, such as “Quality is 
Thrift!” or “Price with Profit,” and in June 1933 he traveled to Europe to study and 
                                                      
534 Hirschmann, Caution to the Winds, 16-24; “Name Feature Ad Manager,” Women’s Wear Daily, May 
17, 1927, 1; “Bambergers names Ad Head,” Women’s Wear Daily, May 3, 1928, 1. 
535 See correspondence between LEK and Ira Hirschmann March – July, 1928, “Bambergers,” Box 82, 
LEK HBL. 
536 After the death of Bamberger’s charismatic owner. Felix Fuld, R. H. Macy’s purchased the firm. 
Macy’s had long been considered a chief rival of Bamberger’s and Hirschmann was disenchanted with the 
changes at the firm. See: “Named Publicity Director,” New York Times, July 17, 1931, 34; Hirschmann, 
Caution to the Winds, 37; “Credit Policy of Bamberger to be Continue by R. H. Macy,” WWD, July 1 1929, 
1, 20; “I. A. Hirschmann New Publicity Head,” Women’s Wear Daily, July 17, 1931, 1. 
537 Hirschmann had begun speaking widely on this subject in 1932, see: “’We Are Trading America 
Down,’ Asserts Ira Hirschmann,” Women’s Wear Daily, April 20, 1932, 1. 
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compare the quality of European and American merchandise. 538 The tour included 
several stops in Germany, but Hirschmann refused to travel beyond Berlin after 
witnessing a Nazi Party rally at which Adolf Hitler was the keynote speaker. As 
Hirschmann retells the story in his 1962 memoir Caution to the Winds, what frightened 
him most about the event was Hitler’s “magnetic” hold on the audience as he “spewed 
forth his hatred” of Jews. Their eyes, as he remembered, were “fired with hate… their 
fists clenched.” He left the meeting hall for fear of his own safety. The experience, as he 
remembered it, forced upon him a new awareness of himself as a Jew. Prior to that trip, 
Hirschmann considered himself a mere “spectator,” of his Jewish background—he was 
neither religious, nor moved by the dream of a Jewish state. However, “to see Hitler and 
to hear Hitler… it hit me hard,” Hirschmann recalled. “He was talking about me.”539 
Though he continued to travel to Europe annually for business, Hirschmann did not visit 
Germany again until after the Second World War.  
Ira Hirschmann returned from his 1933 European trip “fighting mad” about what 
he had witnessed in Germany and he was determined to let Americans know it.540 When 
                                                      
538 “Quality Campaign Gaining Headway,” NYT, October 23 1932, F9; “Hoover Endorses Quality 
Campaign,” New York Times, December 18, 1932, N6; “End of Shoddy Era Seen by Merchant,” NYT, June 
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September 1933. See: Louis W. Fairchild, “The Big Retail Show in Boston, Seen from the Front Seat,” 
Women’s Wear Daily, September 19, 1933, 24. 
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his steamship docked in New York City news reporters climbed aboard eager to hear his 
thoughts on trade conditions across Europe. Instead Hirschmann sounded an alarm bell 
about the rise of the Nazi Party. Germany was “a mad house,” he told reporters. Its 
leadership was “emotional, negative, destructive, and combustible to an incredible 
degree.” He described German citizens as being “in a state of bewilderment, terror, and 
nervous tension.” Hirschmann argued that any American who celebrated the “carefully 
shown exterior peacefulness” of Germany “permits themselves to be deliberately 
fooled.”541 His accusations were so strong that that Adolf Ochs, the owner of the New 
York Times called him after the story had run to caution against expressing such 
“intemperate and extreme views” in the future.542 But Hirschmann pressed on. Two days 
later he used even stronger language in an interview with the Jewish Telegraphic Agency: 
“The Nazis are bent on a mass sadistic orgy; their bloodthirsty crimes are committed in 
the dead of night and Germany is paralyzed with fright.” The best way to eradicate “the 
Hitler menace,” he told the Jewish Telegraphic Agency, was to support the boycott of 
German goods. Hirschmann alleged that plenty of American businesses were buying 
goods in Germany and encouraged American Jews to “take pains to discover who these 
concerns are and refuse to buy their merchandise.”543 Although the first calls to boycott 
German merchandise had come months earlier in March 1933 from the leaders of the 
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militant Jewish War Veterans, Hirschmann became the first and most vocal American 
retailer to support the anti-Nazi boycotts, and he regularly used his influence to support 
the movement.  
In September 1933 Hirschmann gave a bold pro-boycott speech at the Boston 
Conference on Retail Distribution, a large gathering of retailers from across the country, 
which attracted widespread attention. Although Hirschmann had been slated to speak 
about the National Quality Movement he used the platform as an opportunity to criticize 
industry leaders for discussing the German situation only in “hushed tones.” According to 
the publisher of Women’s Wear Daily who attended the event, Hirschmann spoke “with 
feeling” as he called for frank and open discussion of the boycott. “We must definitively 
and courageously cease from buying goods from Germany,” he declared. Hirschmann’s 
speech stole newspaper headlines from the keynote speaker, the celebrated H. Gordon 
Selfridge, who gave a highly anticipated radio address from his successful flagship 
building on London’s Oxford Street. It even surpassed coverage of retailers’ discussions 
of the National Recovery Act, which had recently mandated a series of controversial 
codes aimed at raising wages and lowering prices across the industry.544 Over the next 
several months, Hirschmann worked tirelessly to oppose the Nazi regime in the press and 
publicly committed Lord & Taylor to upholding the boycott despite opposition from 
other executives at the firm.545 He was even invited to contribute an essay to a powerful 
                                                      
544 “Retail Men Urged to Ban Nazi Goods,” NYT, September 19, 1933, 12; Fairchild, “The Big Retail 
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edited collection titled Nazism: An Assault on Civilization, which was heavily promoted 
by the New York Times. In Nazism, Hirschmann’s writing appeared alongside essays by 
Dorothy Thompson, who was expelled from Germany for her criticism of Hitler in 1934, 
Senator Robert F. Wagner, Rabbi Stephen Wise, and the former governor of New York 
Alfred E. Smith.546 Perhaps most importantly, however, the young retailer’s speech at the 
Boston Conference caught the attention of future Supreme Court Justice Felix 
Frankfurter, who was then teaching law at Harvard University. After reading 
Hirschmann’s speech reprinted on the front page of the Boston Transcript, Frankfurter 
invited Hirschmann to his home on Brattle Street in Cambridge for tea.  
Over the ensuing decade Frankfurter would become one of Hirschmann’s most 
influential allies in his opposition to Nazism, and, increasingly, in his efforts to aid 
refugees. Born in Vienna’s Jewish Quarter in 1882, Frankfurter moved to the United 
States with his family at the age of twelve, quickly learned English, and distinguished 
himself at Harvard Law School where he went on to teach for more than thirty years. He 
served as Judge Advocate under Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson during the First 
World War and later helped to found the American Civil Liberties Union. In 1939 
President Roosevelt nominated him to the Supreme Court. When Frankfurter called 
Hirschmann to tea in 1933 the law professor was already considered one of the most 
influential economic and legal advisors to Roosevelt. Although Frankfurter had turned 
                                                      
546 “Book Notes,” February 27, 1934, 15; “Smith Calls Hitler Foe of Civilization,” NYT, March 7, 1934, 
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down Roosevelt’s request to appoint him Solicitor General in favor of accepting a 
visiting professorship at Oxford University, he remained engaged with the administration 
and in active in Jewish affairs, especially regarding the impending refugee crisis.547 
Frankfurter had been impressed by Hirschmann’s political courage and implored him to 
take on a formal leadership role in a traditional Jewish organization. He even arranged for 
Hirschmann to meet his trusted friend and mentor, Supreme Court Justice Louis D. 
Brandeis, who again tried to persuade the retailer of the importance of Zionism and 
organized leadership. 548 Hirschmann never joined any traditional Jewish organization, 
but he did follow Frankfurter’s suggestion to join the board of the University in Exile, 
which worked to bring Jewish and liberal intellectuals exiled from Nazi Germany—
Albert Einstein among them—to the United States.549 Hirschmann went on to chair the 
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board of the University in Exile from 1935 to 1937 and oversaw a capital campaign 
designed to make the University a permanent institution. The laudable work of the 
University earned praise from Roosevelt, who hailed it as a “symbol of American 
freedom.”550  
While he oversaw the growth of the University in Exile alongside Frankfurter, 
Hirschmann cemented his reputation as one of the country’s most influential retailers and 
as a valued commentator on trade and politics in both the United States and Europe. In 
1935, when Hirschmann was still just thirty-four years old, the prestigious firm of Saks 
Fifth Avenue recruited him to serve as Vice President “with unrestricted duties.” When 
he accepted the appointment Women’s Wear Daily celebrated Hirschmann’s ascent in the 
retail industry as “meteoric.” 551 Although Hirschmann would later admit that he never 
fully adjusted to the “high-style” culture of Saks, which he described as “retailing based 
on snob appeal,” the appointment afforded him tremendous travel opportunities and even 
greater influence. As part of his contract with Saks, Hirschmann spent at least six weeks 
in Europe every summer. During these trips he cultivated a taste for classical music, 
which he brought back to Saks both through radio and live performances, and oversaw 
the expansion of the store’s trade in ski fashions and equipment produced in Austria, 
Switzerland, and France. 552 News reporters flocked to Hirschmann upon his return to 
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New York each summer, eager to print his observations about political and market 
stability in Europe. He was also appointed to the executive board of the Retail Dry Goods 
Association of New York and gave a series of speeches advising retailers how to handle 
the economic downturn of 1937-38.553 Hirschmann continued to use his influence to 
oppose the influences of Nazism in American life in unconventional ways. In 1936, for 
example, he formed an ad hoc committee to oppose the New York Philharmonic 
Symphony’s decision to appoint a German conductor as its musical director. Support for 
Hirschmann’s committee grew so quickly that the German appointee stepped down less 
than one week later.554 
With the help of Frankfurter, Hirschmann transformed his 1938 trip to Europe for 
Saks into a diplomatic and humanitarian mission aimed at alleviating the refugee crisis, 
which had drastically worsened following the German invasion of Austria. Frankfurter 
arranged a diplomatic passport and proper credentials for Hirschmann to attend an 
important worldwide conference on the refugee crisis at Evian, France in July.555 At the 
invitation of President Roosevelt, delegates from thirty-two countries gathered in Evian 
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to discuss global strategies for facilitating the emigration of refugees from the Third 
Reich, as well as to form a new international organization to address the deepening crisis. 
Hirschmann was among the many delegates and reporters who considered the conference 
a failure because no nation agreed to take in more refugees.556 In his 1946 book, Life Line 
To A Promised Land, which details his experiences on the WRB, Hirschmann recalled 
critically that it took only a few days for the Evian conference to “run up a blind alley.” 
He charged the delegates with “shedding crocodile tears over their inability to accept 
refugees,” all while attending festive banquets.557 Yet, if the delegates at the Evian 
Conference accomplished little, Hirschmann accomplished much after he departed from 
France and traveled to Austria in the company of George Brandt, one of the diplomats 
who had officially represented the United States at Evian.558 
Although Hirschmann had visited the U.S. Consulate in Vienna during his 
previous trips to Austria, in 1938 he was armed with a diplomatic passport and 
accompanied by Brandt.559 Hirschmann entered the consulate without an appointment 
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and easily expedited visa applications concerning his wife’s family members who were 
still in the country. During his time at the consulate Hirschmann met Messersmith’s 
beleaguered successor, Consul General Wiley, who had remarked that, amid the crisis of 
1938, the “instinct to do something for everybody [was] overwhelming.”560 Hirschmann, 
too, was horrified by the large crowds of Viennese Jews filling two or three blocks 
around the consular office, all of them hoping for a chance to emigrate.  Unlike Wiley, 
however, he was under no obligation to uphold the restrictive immigration policies of the 
U.S. State Department. Although he could not approve visas or expedite applications for 
people he did not know, Hirschmann could and did help countless refugees lacking 
financial sponsors in the United States. After guzzling six pilsners at the hotel bar, 
Hirschmann spent a full day signing affidavits to sponsor countless Austrian Jewish 
refugees whom he had never met, and would never meet again.561 “I was struck,” he later 
wrote in his memoir, “by the cruel incongruity of so many lives depending on slips of 
paper.” An official State Department memorandum listing Hirschmann’s qualifications 
for an appointment to the WRB in 1944 reports that the retailer “cooperated with friends 
in Austria and arranged for several hundred refugees to leave the country.”562 Later in 
life, Hirschmann took great pride in reporting that not one of the hundreds of refugees he 
helped ever required his financial assistance, though several did seek him out to thank 
him. 
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Hirschmann’s 1938 trip to Europe for Saks not only gave him the opportunity to 
personally intervene on behalf of hundreds of refugees, it also brought him back into the 
fold of the politically connected AMC network. Although Hirschmann had known 
Kirstein since his work at Bamberger’s in the 1920s, he had spent most of the 1930s 
working as an executive at stores un-affiliated with the AMC, namely Lord & Taylor and 
Saks. However, while working in Saks’ Paris office in 1938 Hirschmann had a chance 
encounter with Kirstein. In his memoir Hirschmann describes their conversation as 
focused almost entirely on the troubles facing Bloomingdale’s, which Kirstein believed 
was not living up to its potential.563 It is hard to imagine, however, that two men so 
deeply entrenched in refugee advocacy did not also discuss the circumstances facing Jews 
in Vienna and throughout the Third Reich. After all, part of Kirstein’s purpose in 
traveling to Paris was to work with Hanns Streicher on a plan to close the AMC’s Vienna 
trade office by the end of the year, and Hirschmann had only just returned from that city. 
As Hirschmann remembered it, Kirstein offered him a new position as director of 
advertising and publicity at Bloomingdale’s before they left Paris. Indeed, Hirschmann 
abruptly resigned from his position at Saks upon his return to New York City, seemingly 
to the surprise of the firm’s president who had not yet chosen Hirschmann’s replacement 
by the time reporters caught wind of the news. 564 A few weeks later, Hirschmann 
accepted a new post as Vice President at Bloomingdale’s and began working under the 
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supervision of Michael Schaap—the very same executive who happily employed the 
AMC’s Schwartz upon his release from a Nazi prison in Vienna.565  
As an executive in the AMC network in 1939 Hirschmann became the beneficiary 
of a longstanding friendship between Frankfurter and Kirstein, both of whom wielded 
considerable political influence and remained committed to redressing the refugee 
crisis.566 Frankfurter and Kirstein met during the First World War when they both worked 
in different capacities under the Secretary of War Henry Stimson.567 The two remained 
friendly and when Kirstein accepted several appointments to oversee agencies created 
under the National Recovery Act in 1933 he corresponded frequently with Frankfurter to 
debate the progress of Roosevelt’s programs and the merits of his political appointees, 
especially those who might have some influence on the refugee question, such as 
Messersmith and Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau. 568 During his trip to 
Europe in 1938 Kirstein wrote to Frankfurter: “I have met some of our people (AMC 
employees) who are very extraordinary and who have been victims of Austrian and 
German rule… the courage they have displayed is remarkable. I will tell you more when I 
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see you.”569 Frankfurter was well acquainted the foreign offices of the AMC not only 
because of his friendship with Kirstein, but also because he coordinated his trips to 
England through the AMC office in London; staff there arranged his travel and hotel 
accommodations, received his mail, and provided banking services.570 In 1939 both 
Frankfurter and Kirstein were at the height of their political influence: the former had 
accepted Roosevelt’s appointment to serve on the Supreme Court and the latter had 
become one of the president’s foremost advisors on matters relating to economy and the 
retail industry.571  
Between 1939 and 1942 Hirschmann began working again with U.S. diplomats 
and spending more time in Washington, largely due to the influence of Frankfurter and 
Kirstein. After German forces advanced through Czechoslovakia in 1939, Kirstein 
undertook new initiatives alongside AMC foreign office managers to develop trade 
markets east of German territory, including in Estonia and Latvia. When Wiley, the 
former Consul General at Berlin who had subsequently been appointed Minister 
Plenipotentiary to both Estonia and Latvia, arrived in Washington unexpectedly, 
Frankfurter immediately wired Kirstein to come to Washington. Kirstein was unable to 
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Also, see: Roosevelt, “A Positive Fiscal Program,” speech given at American Retail Federation Annual 
Meeting, May 22, 1939, in Master Speech Files, Series 2, Reel 16, FDRL. Also see: “American Retail 
Federation Will Be ‘Open for Business’ Monday, Says Louis Kirstein,” Women’s Wear Daily, April 17, 
1935, 1; “Merchants of the Nation Organize to Act as Unit on Economic Issues,” NYT, April 17, 1935, 1. 
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make the trip on short notice so Frankfurter suggested that Hirschmann meet Wiley 
instead. Hirschmann negotiated on behalf of Kirstein in his discussions with Wiley over 
new terms for trade in Latvian and Estonian markets; he was looking for replacement 
merchandise in lines formerly sourced in Germany, Austria, and Czechoslovakia, such as 
wooden toys, novelties, costumes, and jewelry. Hirschmann also oversaw Wiley’s 
meetings with Léon of the AMC’s Paris office to begin the purchasing process.572 
Kirstein must have been impressed with Hirschmann’s work because in 1942 he helped 
the Bloomingdale’s executive receive an appointment to serve as special investigator to 
the newly formed National War Labor Board. Several years earlier, President Roosevelt 
had appointed Kirstein to serve on the NRA’s Industrial Advisory Board, and in 1942 he 
appointed Kirstein’s son George to head the National War Labor Board. Not 
coincidentally, George Kirstein was also an executive at Bloomingdale’s and he knew 
Hirschmann well. Throughout 1942 Hirschmann spent considerable time in Washington 
negotiating agreements to prevent strikes and work stoppages in the steel industry that 
might disrupt the wartime production.573 From his office at the Supreme Court in 
Washington Frankfurter kept Kirstein updated on Hirschmann’s “extraordinary” work 
with the National War Labor Board.574 
When Bergson of the EC visited Hirschmann at his Bloomingdale’s office in 1943 
he was likely aware that the retailer’s influence extended well beyond the firm’s flagship 
                                                      
572 Hirschmann to Leon, letter, April 19, 1939; Frankfurter and LEK, telegrams, April 17, 1939; LEK to 
Frankfurter, September 6, 1938, “Frankfurter,” LEK to FF, letter, Friday n.d. 1938, Box 24, LEK HBL. 
573 “Special War Labor Board Invesitgator,” Women’s Wear Daily, June 25, 1942, 44; Hirchmann, Caution 
to the Winds, 110-11. 
574 Frankfurter to LEK, letter, May 2, 1942, “Frankfurter Supreme Court,” Box 24, LEK HBL. 
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store. “For us,” Bergson told an interviewer in 1971, “the Vice President of 
Bloomingdale’s was a very big deal.575 When the two began petitioning the State 
Department to send an envoy to Ankara, Turkey charged with helping refugees, 
Hirschmann volunteered to act as the envoy himself. However, Special Assistant 
Secretary of State Breckinridge Long laughed at the proposal during his first meeting 
with Hirschmann. Indeed, Long had developed a reputation for obstructing efforts to 
alleviate the suffering and death toll of Jewish refugees in Europe, either because he was 
viciously anti-Semitic or paranoid about fifth columnists or both.576 After Long’s rebuff, 
Hirschmann began contacting his “friends in the administration around Roosevelt” and 
“started pushing.”577 Not only did Hirschmann have the support of Frankfurter, many 
who had known and respected Kirstein (d. 1942), and his own personal contacts in the 
U.S. State Department, he had also garnered the support of Secretary of the Treasury 
Henry Morgenthau, Assistant Solicitor General Oscar Cox, and Isador Lubin, U.S. 
Commissioner on Labor Statistics and trusted advisor to the President. 578 Under pressure 
from Hirschmann’s “friends,” Long agreed to meet with the retailer a second time. 
Hirschmann persuaded Long to wire the U.S. Ambassador in Ankara to inquire as to 
whether such an envoy might be welcome. The Ambassador immediately agreed to host 
                                                      
575 M. J. Nurenberger Interview with Hillell Kook in Israel July 1, 1971 recorded in Medoff, Blowing the 
Whistle on Genocide, 83-84. 
576 Breitman and Kraut, American Refugee Policy, 126-145. 
577 Ira Hisrchmann interview in Medoff, Blowing the Whistle, 85. 
578 Henry Morgenthau to General Harold George, letter, January 28, 1944, “Administrative Matters,” War 
Refugee Board Records, 1944-45, FDRL; Hirschmann to Lubin, letter, March 22, 1944, “Hisrchmann, Ira 
A.” Box 52, Isidor Lubin Papers, FDRL; Hirschmann to Cox, letter, August 22, 1944, “Hirschmann, Ira 
A.,” Box 15, Oscar Cox Papers FDRL; Also see Medoff (53-11) to get a sense of the critical role that both 
Morgenthau and Cox played in the formation of the WRB.  
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Hirschmann and provide basic support in his rescue efforts.579 In every published 
recollection of his second meeting with Long, Hirschmann described Long’s challenge: 
“What can you do there alone, as a private citizen?” Hirschmann calmly replied: 
“Sometimes a non-professional in a new situation may be able to pry open a window or a 
door which others have found hopelessly barred.”580 
Fortunately, Hirschmann did not travel to Ankara as a private citizen. Several 
weeks after Long reluctantly approved his trip Roosevelt signed an executive order to 
establish the WRB. The order granted Hirschmann the full protection of the U.S. State 
Department and almost unprecedented power to undertake negotiations with 
representatives from enemy countries for the purpose of saving refugees. When Long 
learned of the executive order, he wrote in his diary: “What they can do that I have not 
done I cannot imagine.”581 Hirschmann would soon prove that a lot could be done that 
Long had not imagined. When he arrived in Ankara in February 1944 Hirschmann was 
shocked by conditions refugees faced in the region. “What we try to comprehend in 
America as a deplorable outgrowth of war,” Hirschmann wrote to a friend, “is here seen 
in flesh and blood. That which was academic becomes real. A statistic becomes a 
human.”582 Over the course of 1944 the executive board at Bloomingdale’s repeatedly 
                                                      
579 See Erbelding, “About Time,” 94-95.  
580 Hirschmann, Caution to the Winds, 130-132; Hirschmann, Life Line To A Promised Land, 16-18. Also: 
Breckinridge Long to Ira Hirschmann, letter, December 23, 1943 in “Identity Certificate and Travel 
Authorizations,” Box 2, Ira Hirschmann Papers, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library [hereafter IH FDRL]. 
581 King, Midnight at the Pera Palace, 328-329; Erbelding, “About Time,” 164-167. 
582 Hirschmann to Fiorello La Guardia, March 2, 1944, “Correspondence 1943-1955,” Box 2, IH FDRL. 
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approved Hirschmann’s requests for additional leave and continued to pay him his full 
salary while he was overseas.583  
Hirschmann’s work as the first special attaché to the War Refugee Board in 1944 
would be impressive if he were a career diplomat; that he was not is one of reasons why 
at least one historian has labeled his efforts “superhuman.”584 During his two missions to 
Ankara, Hirschmann negotiated a series of agreements that brought nearly 7,000 Jews out 
of danger in the Balkans, through Turkey, and on to safety in Palestine. He also helped 
implement safeguards for Jews still living in Bulgaria and Romania after March 1944 and 
played a critical role in the infamous Joel Brand affair, one of the Nazis’ desperate 
attempts to trade the release of one million Jews for ten thousand Allied trucks.585 His 
most impressive achievement, though, came through his negotiations with a Romanian 
Minister, which ensured the release and protection of 48,000 Jews imprisoned in 
concentration camps in that country. The work took a physical toll on Hirschmann who 
endured many sleepless nights in Ankara and spent weeks recovering from his 
experiences, which he repeatedly described in letters to friends as heartbreaking.586 When 
his second mission concluded in October 1944 and Hirschmann returned to his post at 
                                                      
583 Telegrams and Memos re Leave of Absence: Ira Hirschmann, Michael Shaap, James Schoff, Laurence 
Steinhardt, Walter Rothschild, “Administrative Matters,” War Refugee Board Records, 1944-45, FDRL. 
584 Diner, We Remember, 297. 
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Hungarian Jewish activist, a grotesque deal. Eichmann would release one million Jews if Brand could 
convince Allied leaders to give Germany ten thousand trucks and other needed supplies. After the British 
Foreign Office and the Colonial Office in Cairo detained Brand, the WRB sent Hirschmann to conduct 
preliminary interviews as a test of Brand’s honesty. See Hirschmann, Report, Ankara, September 11, 1944, 
“Preliminary Reports Re: Activities in Turkey, June 18, 1944-September 11, 1944,” Box 2, IH FDRL. See 
Breitman and Kraut, American Refugee Policy, 214-216. 
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Bloomingdale’s, he gave a nationally broadcast radio address to describe the work of the 
WRB to millions of Americans eager for news about the war. He opened his address by 
saying: “In light of the terrible need for destroying the enemy, which must take first place 
in the job of war, we seldom stop to think of the other essential job, and that is saving 
people.”587 Indeed, Hirschmann had managed to save more than fifty thousand people 
from certain death in the Balkans. Few Americans had done more to address the “other 
essential job” of war. 588 
 
 
                                                      
587 The emphasis was Hirschmann’s. I.A. Hirschmann, “Saving Refugees Through Turkey, Radio Address 
CBS, October 22, 1911, “Saving Refugees Through Turkey,” Box 3, IH FDRL.  
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Administration (UNRRA) with a focus on Displaced Persons Camps. Hirschmann’s appointment to the 
UNRRA also came from an important political connection and friendship made through the retail industry. 
Former congressman and mayor of New York City, Fiorello La Guardia had noticed Hirschmann’s talents 
for publicity and recruited him as his campaign manager in 1932. The two became close friends and La 
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Epilogue  
 
Towards a New Narrative on the 
 Fall of American Department Stores 
 
 
Between 1888, when John Wanamaker accepted an appointment to serve in 
President Benjamin Harrison’s cabinet, and 1945, when Ira Hirschmann returned home 
from his post on the War Refugee Board in Turkey, department stores enjoyed their 
heyday. Yet, over the next ten years eight major New York City department stores shut 
their doors, including McCreery’s, Hearn’s, and the sprawling Wanamaker complex on 
Broadway and Ninth Avenues. The same tragic case plagued cities across the Northeast 
from Washington and Baltimore to Cincinnati, Detroit, and Buffalo. By 1957 the New 
York Times columnist and future media mogul Carl Spielvogel lamented that the 
commercial capital of the country was suffering from “a case of disappearing department 
stores.” The irony, as Spielvogel pointed out, was that this “grave retailing phenomenon” 
erupted at a time when earnings and consumer spending had reached record high levels. 
He attributed the spate of closures to “numerous and complex factors,” beginning with 
executives who had failed to modernize aging infrastructures or adapt to new styles. He 
also argued that radical changes in the city’s population played a role. “Many of the 
middle-class homemakers who spend heavily in department stores,” Spielvogel noted, 
“have moved to the suburbs.” Moreover, lower and middle income families that remained 
in the city increasingly shopped at low-cost houses that easily undersold venerable old 
firms like Wanamaker’s. Despite the grim tone of the column (it was titled “Old Stores 
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Die if they Stay Old”), Spielvogel concluded that there was hope for any firm associated 
with a chain operation. For example, he argued that Abraham & Straus, which operated 
under the Federated Department Stores chain, provided “graphic testimony that there still 
is a profit to be made from New York City.” In other words, Spielvogel speculated that 
the old downtown stores could survive as long as a growing number of more profitable 
suburban stores subsidized their traditionally high overhead costs.589  
For decades, historians, journalists, and retailers themselves have tended to agree 
with how Spielvogel explained the demise of urban department stores. Much like the 
mid-century decline of America’s downtowns, the disappearance of these once 
foundational commercial institutions has long been viewed as inevitable--the result of 
seemingly inexorable economic forces. Scholars have pointed to three key factors in 
particular: the proliferation of the automobile, the expansion of suburbs, and the rise of 
low-cost retailers, or what one historian has labeled the “discount revolution.” Today’s 
thriving suburban commercial centers, anchored by big-box stores like Wal-Mart and 
Target, are evidence enough that these explanations are important. Yet, as recent studies 
have revealed, cars, suburbs, and big-box stores are not the whole story. For example, 
Alison Isenberg’s work on cities illuminates a “changing constellation of national actors” 
who influenced the decline of commercial centers, from real estate developers and urban 
planners to academic retail experts and consumer activists. Vicki Howard’s analysis of 
the national department store industry expands on Isenberg’s work to reveal how federal, 
                                                      
589 Vicki Howard, From Main Street to Mall: The Rise and Fall of the American Department Store 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015), 137, 38; Carl Spielvogel, “Old Stores Die if they 
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state, and local policy makers, regulators, jurists, legislators, and lobbyists facilitated the 
rise and fall of these pioneering commercial institutions. In particular, Howard argues 
that neoliberal political and economic practices, such as deregulation and privatization, 
drove department stores from large metropolises like New York City, as well as smaller 
mom-and-pop stores from main streets across the country. Both studies make clear that 
the forces that have shaped both our cities and the marketplace more generally were 
neither objective nor inevitable, but rather the result of deliberate and informed actions 
taken by an array of powerful actors. However, for the major urban department stores that 
have anchored this dissertation, there is still more to the story.590 
The unique position that large urban department stores occupied in early 
twentieth-century American life stemmed, in no small part, from retailers’ deep 
connections in Washington and their entanglements in vast trade networks abroad. 
Moreover, by approaching transatlantic trade in a more cooperative and less destructive 
manner than many other American magnates, retailers reinforced their influence among 
elected officials and were widely regarded as highly knowledgeable about business and 
political conditions in Europe. To a greater extent than scholars have yet to appreciate, 
retailers shaped the marketplace according to their own worldviews, as informed by their 
business acumen, expertise in trade, and personal views on politics, race, and 
religion.  With this knowledge, it is impossible to view department stores as bound by the 
                                                      
590 On downtowns, see: Robert M. Fogelson, Downtown: Its Rise and Fall, 1880 – 2950 (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2001); Alison Isebberg, Downtown America: A History of the Place and the People 
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Main Street to Mall; Richard Longstreth, The American Department Store Transformed, 1920-1960 (New 
Haven, Yale University Press, 2010). 
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limits of the city, state, or nation. If John Wanamaker thrust the retail industry into a 
modern era largely through his success on Capitol Hill and in the Paris trade, and if other 
retailers followed similar paths to industry leadership prior to the Second World War, 
then national politics and international trade must have a place in explaining the decline 
of department stores, too. Both Isenberg and Howard have made clear how national 
policies and political movements, from urban renewal campaigns to civil rights activists, 
contributed to the downfall of cities and department stores alike. But what of the deep 
connections that retailers themselves had once fostered in the White House? Or the 
relationships they cultivated with consular officials and ambassadors in key trade 
centers? Did any retailer have the ear of President Eisenhower or his closest advisors 
when department stores began to disappear from New York City? Which trade 
agreements and economic or social policies might they have discussed? There is little 
doubt that the Second World War significantly altered retailers’ political alliances and 
trade priorities, but as yet no study has accounted for the role these shifts might have 
played in the downfall of major urban department stores.   
In their heyday, department stores served not only as anchors of downtown 
commercial districts and harbingers of a new kind of consumer culture, but also as 
institutions that connected ordinary Americans to extraordinary global events and vital 
national conversations. Executives, buyers, and stores that operated before and after this 
period did not achieve the same levels of influence--a fact that automobiles, suburbs, and 
discount stores do not fully explain. After all, many of the failed department stores ran 
suburban outlets, at least for a time, and none of those stores held Americans’ 
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imaginations in the same way their old urban predecessors had. What’s more, the 
shopping plazas, malls, and big-box stores that came to dominate new commercial 
landscapes largely avoided drawing consumers into national political or globally 
conscious conversations in quite the same way—with one notable exception. Wal-Mart, 
now the country’s largest retailer (by far), has engaged Americans in a very different kind 
of political consciousness, one centered on the firm’s unique brand of evangelical 
Christian free-enterprise, an ethos that very rarely looks abroad for any reason outside of 
missionary work. At the same time, Wal-Mart’s sales and trade networks are far more 
“global” than any pre-war retailer could have imagined, and much, much larger than any 
of its competitors. How did an industry led by northeasterners, liberals, Democrats, and 
Jews in the 1940s come to be so dominated by Sam Walton, a southerner, conservative, 
Republican, and Christian by 1970? Such a paradigm shift warrants a broader 
explanation, one that looks beyond cities and suburbs, discounts and automobiles.591 
New narratives tracing the downfall of American department stores like 
Wanamaker’s, Filene’s, and even Macy’s and Bloomingdale’s, must also address what 
happened to retailers’ connections in Washington and the impact of profound shifts in the 
retail trade during the postwar period. Suburbanization is a major factor, but not only 
because it pushed middle-class consumers beyond the city. As Spielvogel pointed out, 
suburban branches or chains had the potential to subsidize older and grander city-center 
stores, but they also decentralized and bureaucratized management and merchandising. 
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Highly profitable branch stores did not reflect the worldviews of their civic-minded and 
politically-savvy founders, but rather the persuasions of forgettable mid-level managers 
operating independently from the downtown stores. As decentralization undermined the 
status and visibility of leading executives, so too it must have undermined their pull in 
Washington. Suburban branch department stores did not, for example, throw their weight 
behind national service programs, foster patriotism, or support wartime mobilization 
during the second half of the twentieth century, nor did they boast managers with 
connections to national political parties or to elected officials in Washington. Lacking the 
foresight of their founders, branch stores adopted the zeitgeist of their time: the notion 
that simply selling goods—any kind of goods and lots of them—served the nation. While 
sales at suburban branch stores skyrocketed at mid-century (they accounted for more than 
half of total department store sales by 1966), the downtown stores began to disappear. In 
many ways, the decentralization of department stores and the declining influence of once-
visionary retail executives shaped, in part, the rise of what Lizabeth Cohen has labeled 
the “purchaser as citizen,” by divorcing retail from politics at all levels: local, national, 
and global. Ironically, as the image of the American consumer gained more political 
importance in the context of the Cold War, retail executives linked to pre-war department 
stores, the successors to Wanamaker and Kirstein, seem to have lost interest in their own 
political import.592  
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The slow drain of high-level politics from the circles of department store 
executives came at a time when they could least afford it—amid  seismic shifts in global 
trade. Scholars have often pointed to the late 1960s and 70s as a crucial turning point for 
the United States, away from a national economy fueled by its productive capacities and 
trade surpluses and towards one dependent on consumer power and trade deficits. In 
search of producing cheaper consumer goods, many large American corporations 
expanded their production methods by sending manufacturing and even management 
operations overseas (though mostly not to Europe). By the 1970s this globalization trend 
had begun to cause economic stagnation and deindustrialization, spawning a middle class 
awash in cheap goods, but suffering from low wages and declining job opportunities. 
Large manufacturers and consumers have tended to anchor studies focused on the “global 
shock” to the national economy during the second half of the twentieth century, while 
retailers have remained largely on the sidelines. Without a doubt, retailers that embraced 
global free trade, such as Wal-Mart and other big-box discounters, succeeded beyond 
measure. But these firms did not advertise their trade in any particular national context, at 
least not in the same way that department stores had once promoted Austrian imports as 
Alpine fashions. Instead, firms like Wal-Mart repackaged cheap goods manufactured 
overseas as part and parcel of an American way of life. In a society that prized 
“abundance” above other conceptions of prosperity, retailers committed to a bygone 
vision of commerce as something connected to a national vision or world events, likely 
suffered from a vast cultural disconnect. At the very moment that Henry Luce deemed the 
twentieth century “the American century,” downtown department stores, with their 
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decades-old trade networks entrenched in war-torn Europe, likely found themselves 
outmoded by a trade environment that was at once more global and far less meaningful to 
the average American. In short, as demand for a commercial institution that put 
Americans in touch with the nation and world around them disappeared, so too, did the 
department stores. Branches and big-boxes better suited to the new imperatives of trade 
and prosperity rose comfortably to take their place.593 
 
AMC executives severed their connections with Hanns Streicher when Germany 
declared war on the United States in 1941, but they tracked him down again in Austria in 
1946. Streicher had survived six bombings during the war, and by 1947 he and Kirstein’s 
successor at the AMC hatched a plan to reopen a trade office in Vienna. Streicher 
managed that office until 1964, at which time the AMC looked very little like the 
innovative cooperative buying organization that he joined thirty years earlier. By the mid-
1960s the AMC’s largest client was still, at least in name, a founding member of the 
organization, the Dayton Co. of Minneapolis. However, in 1962 the Dayton Co. unrolled 
a new discount chain to better compete in the burgeoning global trade and amid the 
culture of abundance. They called it Target, and designed the now-iconic red “bulls-eye” 
to represent the new firm’s “marksmanship” in the competition over low prices. Target 
quickly became the AMC’s most important client, and in 1998 the big-box retail giant 
purchased the AMC outright and later renamed it Target Sourcing Services. Thus, by the 
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dawn of the twenty-first century, a large discount chain had swallowed up the most 
powerful retail buying organization of the early twentieth century—the lifeblood of some 
of the country’s most innovative department stores. This postwar history promises to add 
a new and important dimension to our understanding of the relationship between the 
global economic turn and the rise of mass consumption. After all, if modern urban 
department stores were never as provincial as they have so often been characterized, then 
perhaps their demise suggests another paradigm shift. As the retail trade became more 
global in scope, American consumers became only more insular, and less directly 
interested in and connected to the world around them. And that, is a “grave retailing 
phenomenon” indeed.594 
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